Destination MOON:  A History of the Lunar Orbiter Program by Byers, B. A.
~
~
 
~.;: 
'0 
:~ 
~
 
i.:.o(;!j 
~".!. 
~~ ..,~ 
.
-
.if.! 
;j-l 
~S:.! 
ljra 
~:1 
M
 
g",j. 
ifll 
;r.:;1 
~::: S .~;,~ 
"!'''~ 
g;;;i 
,,~~ 
.,,"! 
.~ 
~.l~ 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19770016195 2020-03-22T08:49:26+00:00Z

, 
1. Report No. -, 2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No. 
NASA TM X-3487 
4. Title and Subtitle 5. FWPOrt Date 
DESTINATION MOON: A History of the Lunar Orbiter Program April 1977 
6. Performing Organization Code 
ADA 
7. Author(s) B. Performing Organization Report No. 
TM X 3487 
Bruce K. Byers 
10. Work Unit No. 
9. Performing Organization Name and Address not applicable 
History Office 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 11. Contract or Grant No. 
Headquarters not applicable 
Washington D.C. 
13. Type of Report and Period Covered 
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address HISTORY 1963 - 1970 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND aPACE ADMINISTRATION 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546 14. Sponsoring Agency Code 
ADA 
15. Supplementary Notes 
16. Abstract 
This publication documents the origins of the Lunar Orbiter Program and records the activities 
of the missions then in progress. Covers the period 1963 - 1970 when Lunar Orbiters were providing 
the Apollo program with photographic and selenodetic data for evaluating proposed astronaut 
landing sites 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALITY 
17. Key Words (Suggested by Author(s)) lB. Distribution Statement 
Apollo landing site selection In addition to normal computerized 
Lunar exploration, unmanned, far-side; distribution, 100 copies to history 
radiation dosages, micrometeoriod flux, office, Code ADA and 300 Oopies to Langley 
dual image, photography, image enhancement Research Center (J. Marshall Hughes). 
convergent stereoscopic photography 
Cat. 12 Mascons, Moon's graVitational field 
19. Security Oassif. (of this report) 20. Security Classif. (of this page) 21. No. of Pages 22. Price· 
L-UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 418 $11.00 
• For sale by the National Technical Information Service"Springfield, Virginia 22161 
., 
..i.. 
.. .J 
-I 
DESTINATION MOON 
A History of the Lunar Orbiter Program 
CONTENTS 
Preface • • • • 
I Unmanned Lunar Exploration and the Need for a 
Lunar Orbiter • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 
II Toward a Lightweight Lunar Orbiter 
III Beginning the Lunar Orbiter Program. • • 
IV NASA and Boeing Negotiate a Contract 
• • 
V Implementing the Program •• •• • • • 
VI The Lunar Orbiter Spacecraft 
• • • 
Page 
v 
1 
9 
49 
75 
97 
III 
VII Building the Spacecraft: Problems and Resolutions 133 
VIII Lunar Orbiter Mission Objectives and Apollo 
Requirements • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 177 
IX Missions I, II, and III: Apollo Site Search and 
Verification ••••• 
•• ••• •• •• 225 
X Missions IV and V: The Lunar Surface Explored 269 
XI Conclusions: Lunar Orbiter's Contribution to 
Space Exploration • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 303 
XII Lunar Orbiter Photography •• 
• •• ••• 
Appendix A 
Appendix B 
Appendix C 
References 
Glossary •• • • • • • 
Organization Charts 
• •• ••• 
Record of Unmanned Lunar Probes, 1958-1968 • 
•• •••• ••• 
iii 
331 
361 
363 
367 
375 
, 
L. 
..L.. 
, j 
PREFACE 
In June 1967, as a member of the NASA History Office 
Summer Seminar, I began work on a history of the Lunar 
Orbiter Program, then in its operational phase. My objective 
was to document the origins of the program and to record the 
activity of the missions in progress. I also wanted to study 
the technical and management aspects of the lunar orbital 
reconnaissance that would provide the Apollo Program with pho-
tographic and selenodetic data for evaluating the proposed 
astronaut landing sites. 
Lunar Orbiter brought several new departures in U.S. 
efforts to explore the Moon before landing men there. It was 
the first big deep space project for Langley Research Center. 
It came into being in 1963 after the Ranger and Surveyor Pro-
grams were well along in their development and at a time when 
the data it could acquire would be timely to Apollo only for 
mission design, not for equipment design, since the decisions 
on the basic Apollo equipment had already been made. Although 
Lunar Orbiter was not a I1crashl1 effort, it did require that 
Langley Research Center set up a development and testing sched-
ule in which various phases of the project would run nearly 
concurrently. This approach had not been tried before on a 
major lunar program. 
Research led me first to the Office of Space SCience 
and Applications at NASA Headquarters in Washington. I dis-
cussed the project with Lunar Orbiter Program officials and 
received help and encouragement from Oran W. Nicks, the Di-
rector of Lunar and Planetary Programs (later Deputy Director 
of Langley Research Center); Lee R. Scherer, then Lunar Orbi-
ter Program Director (later Director of Kennedy Space Center); 
and Leon J. Kosofsky, Lunar Orbiter program engineer. Complete 
chronological files of the Lunar Orbiter Program Office enabled 
me to outline the basic developments since the inception of 
Lunar Orbiter. 
After studying files in Washington and at Langley Research 
Center and interviewing project officials, I went to Kennedy 
Space Center to witness the launch of Lunar Orbiter 5, the 
last mission of the program. There I interviewed program offi-
cials and Boeing and Eastman Kodak contractor representatives. 
Back in Washington, I wrote a preliminary manuscript about the 
program, for limited circulation among NASA offices as a His-
tcrical Note. 
v 
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I returned to NASA Headquarters in the summers of 1968, 
1969, and 1970 to expand my study of the program--one of 
NASA's major successes before the Apollo landings. In early 
June 1969, I was assigned to the Apollo Lunar Planning Office, 
whose dire~tor, Scherer, had encouraged me throughout the 
first two summers of research. In his office, I could see 
how Lunar Orbiter photographic data were being used in plan-
ning the Apollo 11 landing and subsequent missions. I con-
ducted additional interviews and discussed results of Orbiter 
missions with Dr. Farouk EI-Baz and Dennis James of Bellcomm, 
a consulting firm supporting NASA on Apollo. Through these 
talks I learned the technical and scientific significance of 
much of the Orbiter photography and how it was being applied. 
I went again to Langley, with new questions. Many of the 
former Lunar Orbiter project officials were occupied with a 
new planetary program: the Viking Program to explore Mars. 
Lunar Orbiter was history for them, but the experience from 
that program was already helping them in their newest en-
deavor. As this manuscript goes to press the two dual-
role Viking spacecraft have successfully orbited Mars and 
sent two landers to the Martian surface. These craft have 
conducted numerous experiments to search for signs of life 
and to give us our first detailed views of the Martian 
landscape. 
During the remainder of 1969 and in the summer of 1970 
I worked to complete the draft of the history contained in 
the following pages. I submitted the manuscript in June 1971, 
shortly before beginning my present career as a Foreign Ser-
vice officer. 
The decade of the sixties was filled with turbulence, 
discontent, and upheaval. It also was a time of outstanding 
achievements in advancing our knowledge of the world in which 
we live. We accelerated the exploration of our planet from 
space. We landed men on the Moon, brought them safely home 
again, and learned how they could survive in space. And we 
began sending unmanned planetary explorers to chart the solar 
system and to search for signs of life on M&rs. It is the 
purpose of this history to recount one chapter in this explor-
ation, as a small contribution to the store of knowledge about 
America's first voyages on the new ocean of space. 
I am grateful to the NASA History Office, whose staff 
have enabled me to write this history. I dedicate it to all 
the people who worked to make Lunar Orbiter the success it 
was--that they might have a record of their accomplishments 
to share with future generations. 
vi 
Bruce K. Byers 
Bombay, December 14, 1976 
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CHAPTER I 
UNMANNED LUNAR EXPLORATION AND THE NEED FOR A LUNAR ORBITER 
The Call for a Program of Exploration 
During the decade of the sixties, three major ventures 
of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration thrust 
America's unmanned exploration of the Moon outside the Earth's 
atmosphere: the Ranger Program, the Surveyor Program, and 
the Lunar Orbiter Program. Initiated before President John 
F. Kennedy's May 25, 1961, request for a national decision 
to make a manned lunar landing in the sixties, Ranger and 
Surveyor gave the United States its first close look at the 
Moon. The original objectives of the programs had not en-
visioned imminent exploration of the Moon by men. Instead, 
NASA had developed highly proficient instrumented means for 
preliminary exploration without direct applications in an 
undertaking such as the Apollo manned lunar landing program. 
One of the chief spokesmen for lunar exploration in 
the early days of America's space program was Nobel Laureate 
Harold C. Urey. In his address to the Lunar and Planetary 
Colloquium meeting on October 29, 1958, .at the Jet Pro-
pulsion Laboratory, Urey called for a stepped-up United 
'" 
.;<... 
States effort to explore Earth's natural satellite. l 
He summarized what scientists then knew about the origin 
and composition of the Moon: that much speculation but 
little conclusive knowledge existed concerning the Moon's 
environment. 
Man had noticed many unique and unusual phenomena 
on the lunar surface through optical telescopes since 
Galileo's first observations in 1609, but Earth's atmo-
sphere limited the explorative abilities of scientists. 
Urey concluded that automated probes would enable human 
observation to pierce the atmosphere for more detailed, 
precise looks at the Moon. Such probes would allow man 
to take the next logical step before actual manned lunar 
missions brought him to the Moon's environment and a 
landing on its alien surface. That surface, unlike Earth's, 
had not experienced millions of years of atmospheric 
erosion and weathering processes, as far as observations 
up to that time had revealed. What had it experienced? 
The answer to this question could possibly explain the 
birth and development of Earth and, indeed, of the solar 
system. 2 
lHarold C. Urey, "The Chemistry of the Moon," Pro-
ceedings of the Lunar and Planetary Exploration Colloquium, 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, Calif., October 29, 
1958, Vol. I, No.3, pp. 1-9. . 
2 
Ibid. 
2 
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Following Ureyts call for intensified efforts to 
extend America's lunar exploration capabilities, but not 
necessarily in response to it, the newly created National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration requested the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory to develop a study of the require-
ments for a multi-phase program to explore the Moon~ 
Albert R. Hibbs, Chief of the Research Analysis Section at 
JPL, organized a study group to analyze the problem. On 
April 30, 195~he submitted the group's findings to NASA 
Headquarters. Among other steps the Hibbs Report proposed 
placing a satellite 
in a well-controlled orbit around the moon 
using terminal guidance •••• High resolution 
photographs of the surface of the moon will 
be taken at various wave lengths and polar-
izations. These photographs should provide 
information on the surface characteristics 
of the moon that will be valuable for choosing 
a site for a lunar soft landing.3 
The Hibbs Report suggested a more sophisticated 
approach toward lunar exploration than that which NASA 
actually undertook, and it did not become the basis for 
the Lunar Orbiter Program. Nevertheless, it indicated the 
kind of probe which would perform necessary, extensive 
photography of the Moon's surface. The lunar orbiter con-
3 ) . Albert R. Hibbs (ed. , Exploration of the Moon, the 
Planets, and Interplanetary S ace, JPL Report No. ~O-l 
asadena, Calif.: Jet ropulsion Laboratory, California 
Institute of Technology, April 30, 1959), pp. 93-95. 
~ 
3 
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cept later was adapted from the Surveyor Program which 
NASA Headquarters initiated with JPL in May 1960. 
In December 1959 NASA and JPL had started the Ranger 
Program, the first step in NASA's unmanned lunar explora-
tion venture. Surveyor, the second major program in this 
venture, originally envisioned two kinds of probes: a 
softlanding spacecraft for on-site investigation of the 
Moon's surface and an orbiter for investigation of the 
near-lunar environment. They would share common hardware, 
the~ probably reducing costs. 
Both Surveyor Lander and Surveyor Orbiter, as Con-
gressionally authorized programs, called for very sophis-
ticated spapecraft whose hardware would require major 
development. The burden of this development fell upon 
JPL and together with the Ranger and Mariner programs 
made it the pioneering agency in the difficult process of 
designing and building automated, long-life spacecraft for 
deep space exploration. 
The Surveyor Orbiter did not materialize. The Ranger 
and the Surveyor Lander programs, as first-ge~eration space-
craft programs, came to overtax the manpower and facilities 
at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and the Centaur 
Rocket Program at the Marshall Space Flight Center ex-
perienced development problems and was eventually trans-
ferred to the Lewis Research Center. Centaur was to be the 
launch vehicle for Surveyor, and, as originally envisioned, 
4 
, 
it was to have a capability to put an 1,100-ki1ogram space-
craft into a translunar trajectory. At Lewis this capa-
bility was reduced to 950 kilograms, causing redesign of the 
Surveyor Lander. 
In the wake of early Soviet space achievements the 
American space program became enveloped in far-reaching 
political competition with the Soviet Union. In this at-
mosphere the United States counted heavily on the Ranger 
and Surveyor programs, pioneering endeavors in the appli-
cation of new technology, to achieve an urgently needed 
"first" in space. 
The first six Ranger mission~ between August 1961 and 
February 1964,experienced no complete mission success, but 
they acquired valuable data on the performance of systems. 
The publicity of their shortcomings heightened the tension, 
frustration, and anxiety among Americans about the state 
of U.S. technological prowess, while it drowned out the 
significance of the lessons learned by NASA and JPL. By 
June of 1964 the congressional Subcommittee on NASA Over-
sight had reviewed the Ranger Program and had concluded 
that 
••• progress in improving testing and fabri-
cation techniques at JPL is a step-by-step 
process with little direction from NASA Headquar-
ters and that major improvement actions take 
place primarily as a result of failures. The 
subcommittee recognizes that the Ranger Pro-
gram is both unique and complex in the 
strictest sense of a scientific accomplish-
ment and supervisory practices as currently 
5 
, 
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in use throughout the missile-space industry 
would go far to develop improved testing and 
fabrication procedures needed fo~ a sophisti-
cated spacecraft such as Ranger. 4 
Mustering for the Challenge of Space 
Since its inception in 1958 the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration had undertaken the development 
of new procedures in planning, organization and management, 
as well as in hardware fabrication and in training for 
mission operations. In 1964 Congress had found weaknesses 
in one of NASA's lunar programs that demonstrated clearly 
some of the difficulties which NASA had to overcome in the 
development of its program to explore the Moon. This 
long-range task greatly challenged the knowledge and the 
talent which America mustered, and the muster took place 
in a politically charged atmosphere in which the United 
States had decided to pit its scientific and technological 
resources and .prestige against those of the Soviet Union. 
The history of the Lunar Orbiter Program constitutes 
a significant chapter in the initial exploration of the 
Moon and in America's first decade in space. It is part 
4proJect Ranger, Report of the Subcommittee on NASA 
Oversight of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. 
House of Representatives, June 16, 1964, p. 23. Three 
of the first six Ranger missions were not completed be-
cause of malfunctions in the launch vehicles, pot the space-
craft. Moreover, Ranger flew on NASA's first Atlas-Agena 
launch vehicle with all of the problems entailed in proving 
a new system. Finally, it is fair to state that the Mercury 
Program took priority over Ranger in the selection of Atlas 
rockets as launch vehicles. 
6 
~ 
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of the record of the preliminary phase in the Apollo 
Manned Lunar Landing Program, and we must now turn to its 
origins for a closer study of its role in putting the 
first men on the Moon on July 20, 1969. 
7 
, 
.:..L 

CHAPTER II 
TOWARD A LIGHT1:<lEIGHT LUNAR ORBITER 
The Surveyor Pro~ram 
As a major part of America's first lunar exploration 
effort NASA initiated the Surveyor Program in May 1960 
with a dual objective: to build an unmanned lunar lander 
for surface investigations and to build a lunar orbiter 
for photographic coverage of the Moon,with instrumentation 
to explore and measure some of its environmental character-
istics. Both would use the Atlas-Centaur launch vehicle. 
NASA charged JPL with the responsibility for carrying out 
the objectives of the Surveyor Program. JPL employed a 
conceptual philosophy for Surveyor which reflected the 
thinking of the Office of Space Sciences and which was 
similar to that of Ranger: design and build a common 
1 
spacecraft bus to carry out different missions. . 
On March 23, 1961,the Lunar SCiences Subcommittee of 
OSS recommended that an orbiter have the capability to: 
1) achieve high-resolution photography which could define 
objects smaller than 10 meters in size, 2) obtain 
total photographic coverage of the limb area and of the 
far side of the Moon at a resolution of 1 kilometer, 
1 
Transcript of Proceedings -- Discussion between 
Nicks, Milwitzky, Scherer, Rowsome, and members of the 
National Academy of Public Administration, NASA Head-
quarters, September 12, 1968. 
PRECEDING PAGE TILANK NOT FILMm 
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3) take reconnaissance photographs of the lunar 
surface at 100 meters resolution, and, finally, 4) 
make stereo pairs of areas where high-resolution photo-
2 
graphy was planned. 
The idea of modifying the Surveyor Lander system to 
serve as an orbiter was very attractive to NASA Head-
quarters planners, but during the last quarter of 1961 the 
Office of Space Sciences began to review the feasibility 
of a Centaur-class orbiter in the weight range of 950 to 
1~100 kilograms. On December 5 Charles P. Sonett, Chief 
of Lunar and Planetary Sciences at NASA Headquarters, re-
quested his staff scientist Newton W. Cunningham to compile 
an inventory of JPL's programs and a description of their 
status. 3 Specifically he wanted to know the stage 
of development of the authorized Surveyor Orbiter. 
Early in January 1962 Cunningham sent a report to 
Sonett detailing the activities which JPL had been con-
ducting since J958 pertainin[ to a lunar orbital mission. 
These amounted to the following: 1) a 1958 study on close 
photography of the Moon with a spacecrart launched by the 
Jupiter rocket, 2) the development of a unique camera 
system for Pioneer IV, 3) a study in 1959 for the Vega 
Program concerning instrumentation for a lunar probe in 
2 
Memorandum from Newton W. Cunningham to Charles 
Sonett, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C., January 12, 
1962, p. 6. 
3 
Ibid. 
10 
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which a dual vidicon camera was to be used for obtaining 
4 
low-and high-resolution photographs of the Moon, and, 
finall~ 4) a study made in 1960 of a lunar orbiter experi-
5 
mente 
Cunningham also pointed out in his report that JPL 
scientists could not successfully adapt the Ranger photo-
graphic system for use in the Surveyor spacecraft and that 
no photographic system had been developed specifically 
for the long-life requirements of an orbiter mission. This 
was the general status of the Surveyor Orbiter at the be-
ginning of 1962. 
The advent of the Apollo Program soon changed the 
requirements for a lunar orbiter and placed urgent demands 
on the Office of Space Sciences for information on lunar 
surface conditions. Apollo needed these data in order to 
design hardware and misSions, and in turning to the Office 
of Space Sciences the Office of Manned Space Flight helped 
to reshape the philosophy supporting the need for a lunar 
orbiter spacecraft. 
Early Apollo Impact on Lunar Orbiter Planning 
On June 15, 1962,the Office of Manned Space Flight 
submitted for the first time since the U.S. manned lunar 
4 
Ibid., p. 2. 
5-
Edwin F. Dobies, The Lunar Orbiter Photographic Ex-
periment, Jet Propulsion Laboratory Section Report No. 1-48, 
June 1, 1960. 
11 
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landing commitment a formal list of requirements to 
OSS for data on the Moon's surface. The list gave the 
Office of Lunar and Planetary Programs within OSS its 
first opportunity to compare the objectives of its 
lunar programs with preliminary Apollo needs. It re-
examined the mission objectives of the Surveyor Lander 
and acknowledged that Ranger data would not meet the Apollo 
requirements. 
It directed JPL to review all possible ways of con-
verting the Ranger into an orbiter. JPL scientists and 
engineers soon responded that a conversion was not possible. 
JPL, in turn, requested the Hughes Aircraft Comp~ny, prime 
contractor for Surveyor, to examine the possibility of 
designing a 360-kilogram orbiter that the Atlas-Agena 
rocket could carry on a translunar trajectory. Hughes's 
report showed that such a lightweight spacecraft ·would have 
only a 27-kilogram payload, placing extreme constraints 
6 
on the visual instrumentation system. Following this up, 
JPL examined the feasibility of using the Agena with a 
Surveyor Kick Stage which would allow for a spacecraft 
weight of about 540 kilograms and a payload of 57 kilograms.7 
6 
Support of Project Apollo by Programs in the Office 
of Space SCiences, Issue No.1, July 30, 1962; Hughes Air-
craft Company Document No. 262001, June 18, 1962. 
7 
Ibid., p. 3. 
12 
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However, this approach would require more research and 
development.before NASA could pass judgment on its feasi-
bility. Deciding that it did not have time to investigate 
this approach, the Office of Space Sciences proceeded with 
the Centaur-class Surveyor Orbiter. 
By the end of July 1962 OSS had formulated the basic 
photographic requirements for the Surveyor Orbiter, but 
unfortunately these fell below the very demanding needs of 
Apollo. The Apollo Program required photographic data of 
the lqnar surface that could show slopes of less than 70 
with less than I-meter protuberances and depressions on the 
surface of the Moon's front side. The first version of the 
Surveyor O~biter would be able to shoot stereoscopic photo-
graphs of the lunar surface with a resolution only as small 
as 9 m~ers and monoscopic photographs which would resolve 
details as small as 1 meter. It would cover a minimum 
area of 1000 longitude by 400 latitude from the equator 
8 
on the visible side of the Moon. 
The spacecraft would most likely employ a television 
camera system. The Surveyor Orbiter photo system had 
one great drawback which the Support of Project Apollo 
document cited: "Landing area coverage of the size required 
[by Apollo] is not now possible except through repeated 
Ranger or Surveyor flights into the same area or by means 
8 
ill5!., p. 7. 13 
I ,. 
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9 
of a photographic roving vehicle or a hovering spacecraft." 
The level of technology in pllotographic systems for 
long-life lunar missions had not progressed much beyond 
the Ranger system, and NASA Headquarters recognition of 
this fact contrasted markedly with the status of the Surveyor 
Orbiter, on paper, as of July 20, 1962. Briefly summed up 
it was: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Five flights were planned. 
Centaur rocket was to be launch vehicle; spacecraft 
weight was to be about 800 kilograms. 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory was to establish design 
requirements and present them by September 1, 1962. 
Surveyor Orbiter was to incorporate maximum amount 
of Surveyor Lander hardware and technology. 
JPL was to develop a plan for the evaluation of 
experiments other than the Visual Instrumentation 
System by August 17, 1962. NASA Headquarters was 
to review this. 
No Surveyor Orbiter Project Plan existed. JPL 
was to develop one and submit it to NASA for review 
by November ~O, 1962. 
\ 
A total of $~9.5 million in funds existed for the 
Surveyor Orbiter in FY 1963 and $29.0 million in 
FY 1964. These funds would be redistributed be-
tween Surveyor Orbiter, Surveyor Lander, and the 
Ranger Improvement Plan only on the basis of de-
fined relative values.lO 
The Jet' Propulsion Laboratory had no operational Surveyor 
Orbiter program at this time. Indeed the troubles which 
9 
Ibid., p. 8. 
10-
NASA, Office of Space SCiences, Surveyor Orbiter 
Guidelines, July 20, 1962. 
14 
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JPL was experiencing with the Ranger Program acted as a 
11 
brake on the development of the orbiter. 
The Centaur Rocket Program 
The Centaur Rocket Program did not facilitate JPL's 
work on Surveyor. The Marshall Space Flight Center, in 
charge of Centaur but with the Saturn Rocket Program as 
its prime responsibility, was experiencing development 
problems which caused the rocket's delivery schedule to 
slip, moving the earliest date for the first launch of a 
Surveyor Lander to late 1964. Moreover, the Centaur diffi-
culties motivated officials in the Office of Space Sciences 
to review Surveyor Orbiter plans with the objective of 
obtaining an orbiter independent of Centaur. The Office 
of Space Sciences began to examine the idea of a spacecraft 
which might use existing hardware and the Agena rocket, 
already successfully tested in space. By September 1962 
OSS had the ~equirements for, and the feasibility o~ a 
lightweight lunar orbiter under serious study. Neverthe-
less, it had one major technological obstacle to surmount: 
developing a flexible, long-life photographic system capa-
ble of obtaining data to meet the requirements established 
by the Office of Manned Space Flight. 
11 
Interview with Oran W. Nicks, Director of Lunar and 
Planetary Programs, Office of Space Science and Applications, 
NASA Headquarters, August 14, 1967. 
15 
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The Search for a Lishtweight Orbiter 
On September 21 Oran W. Nicks, Director of Lunar 
and Planetary Programs in OSS, requested Lee R. Scherer 
a naval Captain on assignment to NASA, to form "a working 
group with appropriate representation from the Directorate 
of Lunar and Planetary Programs and consultants from Qther 
Headquarters offices, the scientific community and Field 
Centers ••. to study adaptations of the Ranger and Able 5 
spacecraft to conduct lunar reconnaissance missions be-
12 
ginning in 1964 •••• " Nicks asked Scherer to confine 
his activity to the known spacecraft systems: the Ranger, 
the Able 5 built by Space Technology Laboratories (STL), 
and a system proposed by the Radio Corporation of America 
(RCA) • 
At the same time A.K. Thiel, Vice President in charge 
of Spacecraft Systems Program Management at STL, sent a 
detailed summary of a proposed lunar photographic satellite 
to Nicks at NASA Headquarters on September 20. The STL 
proposal offered for the first time a conceptual basis 
for a lightweight orbiter. It presented a plan for launching 
a spin-stabilized spacecraft into lunar orbit with the 
Atlas-Agena D. Once there the spacecraft's photographic 
system would take pictures of the Moon with a 254-centimeter 
12 
Memorandum from Oran W. Nicks to Capt. Lee R. Scherer, 
OSS, September 21, 1962. 
16 
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focal-length spin-scan camera very similar to one which 
Merton E. Davies of RAND Corporation developed in 1958. 
The STL system did away with a cumbersome television 
payload and used a film system instead. Film had the 
definite advantage over television as far as its ability 
to obtain higher resolution photographs. Thiel stressed 
the reliability of the STL proposal and stated that his 
firm would be prepared to build and launch three space-
13 
craft within 22 months from the go-ahead date. 
On October 15 Nicks informed Thiel that his office had 
the STL.proposal under consideration. Meanwhile, within 
NASA discussion continued concerning the priorities in 
the American lunar exploration program. 
OSS-OMSF Cooperative Planning 
The Office of Space Sciences and the Office -of Manned 
Space Flight soon discovered that in order to expedite a 
manned lunar landing before 1970 they had to define more 
precisely their working relationship and the Apollo re-
quirements which unmanned lunar probes could fulfill. 
On October 23, 1962, Joseph F. Shea, Deputy Director of 
the Office of Manned Space Flight, informed Nicks that 
OMSF had confirmed "the relative priorities which should 
13 
Letter from Dr. A.K. Thiel, Space Technology Labora-
tories, Inc., to Oran W. Nicks, Director, Lunar and Plane-
tary Programs, OSS/NASA, Washington, D.C., September 20, 1962. 
17 
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be attached to the development of unmanned lunar systems 
for acquisition of data on the lunar environment in support 
14 
of the manned lunar program." 
Shea also informed Nicks that the Apollo Program had 
a more urgent need for the kind of data which a soft landing 
Surveyor could provide than for that which an orbiter 
could obtain in the near-lunar environment. The data 
which an orbiter could supply OMSF could directly apply 
to Apollo mission planning, but Surveyor data on the load-
bearing conditions of the lunar surface had a more direct, 
immediate application in the design of the Lunar Excursion 
Module (LEM). Shea stressed that NASA should not commit 
itself to an orbiter in FY 1963 if this would jeopardize 
the present Ranger and Surveyor programs. This priority 
r'" 
ordering from OM SF directly affected JPL's priorities with 
Surveyor. 
In any case, Shea concluded, for an orbiter to pro-
vide the manned lunar landing program with useful data, 
it should concentrate on selenodetic and topographical 
conditions. This kind of data would permit the veri-
fication and selection of the initial sites for a manned 
15 
lunar landing. 
14 
Memorandum from Joseph F. Shea, Office of Manned 
Space Flight, to Oran W. Nicks, Office of Space Sciences, 
October 23, 1962. 
15 
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Shea recommended to Nicks the establishment of a for-
mal OSS-OMSF working relationship, and subsequently Homer 
E. Newell (Director, OSS) and D. Brainerd Holmes (Direc-
tor, OMSF) announced the organization of the Joint OSS/OMSF 
Working Group with full-time representation from both offices. 
The group would be responsible for lire commending to OSS 
a program of data acquisition so as to assure the timely 
flow of environmental information into the planning for 
16 
manned projects." 
While the Joint Working Group initiated greater cooper-
ative efforts between the two NASA Headquarters offices, 
the work group which Nicks had requested Scherer to set 
up arrived at a decision on October 25 concerning its re-
view of the studies for a lightweight orbiter. It recom-
mended that the STL proposal be given more intensive 
17 
consideration and that NASA drop RCA's proposal. Several 
reasons supported the group's decision, and among them the 
Apollo requirements were the most important. As of Novem-
ber 16 these requirements stood as follows: An orbiter 
should be able to identify 1) 45-meter size objects over 
the entire surface of the Moon, 2) 4.5-meter objects in 
16 
Memorandum for the Associate Administrator, NASA 
(Robert C. Seamans, Jr.), from Dr. Homer E. Newell, OSS, and 
D. Brainerd Holmes, OMSF, October 22, 1962, p. 1. 
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Lee R. Scherer, Surveyor Program Engineer, Study of 
Agena-based Lunar Orbiters, NASA Headquarters, Office of Space 
Sciences, October 25, 1962, p. 1. See also Memorandum from 
Captain Lee R. Scherer to Oran W. Nicks, OSS, November 16, 1962, 
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the areas of prime interest, and 3) 1.2-meter objects 
18 
in the landing areas. 
The Scherer Group's Report 
According to the Scherer group,STL's orbiter seemed 
to have the greatest potential for fulfilling the require-
ments set by OMSF and OSS. The spacecraft would weigh 
about 320 kilograms, which placed it well within the 
Atlas-Agena launch vehicle capabilities. It would be 
spin-stabilized and its monopropellent propulsion system, 
capable of multi-starts, would give it the added flexi-
bility of being able to change its orbital parameters 
around the Moon. This spacecraft could photograph 
the entire Moon from a polar orbit of 1,600 kilometers above 
the lunar surface and obtain pictures resolving objects as 
small as 18 meters across. If ground control placed the 
spacecraft in an equatorial orbit of 40-kilometer altitude, it 
could photograph the area along the lunar equator at the 
amazing resolution of 0.5 meter.19 The Scherer group be-
lieved that these positive features of the STL system far 
outweighed the drawbacks involved in image motion compen-
sation, the need for high-speed film, and for high shutter 
speeds in the camera. 
20 
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On the other hand the RCA approach, which the group 
rejected, consisted of injecting a 3-axis attitude-sta-
bilized payload into lunar orbit from a Ranger-type bus. 
The photographic system onboard would employ a vidicon 
television which had two major weaknesses: low sensitivity 
in the vidicon unit and inadequate horizon scanners. In 
addition, the capsule that the Ranger bus would inject 
into orbit would weigh a mere 200 kilograms and this left 
little allowance for the actual payload hardware. 
The integration of the capsule and the Ranger bus and 
their separation before lunar orbit insertion further 
compounded the problem of weight limits on the payload. 
Even if this could be resolved with a high degree of reli-
ability, the TV system could not detect objects smaller 
than 130 meters in wide-area coverage and 30 meters in 11m1ted-
20 
area coverage, at best. 
Scherer's group considered these negative aspects of 
RCA's proposal, together with the estimated cost of $20.4 
million for building and flying only three spacecraft, too 
expensive and inadequate for the needs of Apollo. The 
group believed that pictures of the lunar surface of equal 
resolution could be obtained by far less expensive means, 
20 
Ibid. 
21 
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such as balloon-borne telescopes. The RCA proposal would 
require major research and development of a better visual 
instrumentation system in order to be capable of satis-
fying Apollo requirements, and this would be too costly in 
time and money. 
There is irony in the Scherer group's final evaluation. 
The STL system won recommendation while the RCA system 
did not, and yet the final Lunar Orbiter spacecraft which 
NASA flew incorporated more of the concepts supporting the 
RCA system and less of those of the STL system. This was 
especially true of the attitude control system, althoughit 
did not apply for either of the camera systems. 
Scherer's report to Nicks recommended that NASA fund 
two STL studies in 1963 in order "to better establish the 
feasibility of the proposed Able 5 lunar photographic 
spacecraft ••• II and "to provide more detailed information 
about the Able 5 spacecraft system and its photographic 
payload." The rationale for this deciSion was that it 
was "necessary to establish the confidence needed for 
duly considering a flight program of this type, should it 
be deemed preferable to a Centaur-based orbiter for any 
21 
reason." 
Plans for the Centaur-based lunar orbiter began to 
21 
Ibid., p. 1. 
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lose their attractiveness once Scherer's group had shown 
that an Agena-class orbiter, based upon STL research, 
would give NASA a more expedient means of data acquisition 
for Apollo requirements. Moreover, the status of the Cen-
taur Rocket Program, originally managed by the Marshall 
Space Flight Center and then transferred to the Lewis 
Research Center, did not make the concept of a Surveyor 
Orbiter more acceptable. Flaws in the rocket's basic fuel 
tank configuration and delays in the development tests 
eventually influenced the schedules of the Surveyor Lander 
at JPL because the overall capability of the Centaur was 
22 
reduced from 1,100 to 950 kilograms. 
Problems at JPL 
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory was encountering in-
creasing problems with the Ranger Program which further 
influenced the progress of the Surveyor Program. The problems 
and the added pressure of the Apollo Program's newly in-
troduced priorities gave increased support to the move to 
define and establish criteria for an Agena-class lunar 
orbiter program within the Office of Lunar and Planetary 
Programs. 
22 
Memorandum, Dr. Homer E. Newell, Office of Space 
Sciences, NASA Headquarters, November 1, 1962. (Joseph 
Ziemanski, former Agena Project Engineer, Lewis Research 
Center comments that the Lewis Research Center met its 
scheduled delivery date with the first Centaur in the 
Surveyor Program, but no Surveyor was ready to be launched 
on the original launch date.) 
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In pursuit of his responsibilities with the authorized 
Surveyor Orbiter and without the knowledge of the Scherer 
group's findings, Clifford I. Cummings, JPL Lunar Program 
Director, informed Oran W. Nicks on October 26 that JPL 
was planning to undertake another study of the Surveyor 
Orbiter and its mission. He stated that JPL desired to 
spend $1.5 million of its FY 1963 budget to do this work, 
and he included in his memorandum to Nicks a proposed 
23 
plan of study for a lunar orbiter spacecraft. 
Nicks immediately answered the JPL request with a letter 
to Cummings in which he outlined the numerous study efforts 
already performed or in the process of completion. He 
pointed out the concern of NASA Headquarters about the 
growing disparity between the status of the Surveyor 
Program at JPL and that of the Centaur Program. He in-
formed him that Headquarters had already proceeded to ex-
amine the feasibility of an Agena-class orbiter. Thus an 
additional study would not serve. 
The difficulties encountered in the first four Ranger 
missions in 1961 and 1962 and the great effort made to 
23 
Memorandum from Clifford I. Cummings, Director of 
Lunar Programs, JPL, to Oran W. Nicks, Director, Office of 
Lunar and Planetary Programs, NASA Headquarters, October 26, 
1962, and memorandum in reply from Oran W. Nicks to Clifford 
I. Cummings, November 8, 1962, p. 2. See also Brief H1sto~ 
of Lunar Orbiter Work, prepared for Edgar M. Cortright, NA 
Headquarters, May 2, 1963. 
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obtain a launch vehicle which Lunar Orbiter would later 
use kept the Jet Propulsion Laboratory totally committed 
to the Ranger and Surveyor Programs. NASA Headquarters, 
meanwhile, approached Floyd L. Thomp-son, Director of the 
Langley Research Center, early in 1963 about the possibility 
of taking on a lunar orbiter project. 
Langley Enters the Picture 
On January 2, 1963, while attending a Senior Council 
Meeting of the Office of Space Sciences at Cape Canaveral, 
Floyd L. Thompson met with Oran W. Nicks,who asked him if 
the Langley Research Center would be willing to study the 
feasibility of undertaking a lunar photography project. 
The Langley Director agreed to have his staff study the 
project. 24 
Nicks had suggested to senior staff members within 
OSS the idea of approaching the Langley Research Center 
about a possible lunar orbiter project for several reasons. 
First, JPL had more than enough to accomplish with Ranger 
and Surveyor. Its manpower and management capabilities 
could be stretched only so far. Secondly, the Langley 
Research Center, founded in 1917 to develop an aeronautical 
24 
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research capability for the United States, had proved it-
self to be very successful in project management. Finally, 
a wider distribution of operational programs among NASA 
field centers appeared to Nicks to be a prudent management 
decision, allowing the centers to develop new and varied 
25 
capabilities for future NASA ventures. 
Langley put forth an intensive effort and by March 1963 
completed its assessment of the task of obtaining the re-
quired lunar photography and of its capability to manage a 
lunar orbiter project. 
In the fall of 1962 Nicks had requested Lee Scherer 
and Eugene Shoemaker, a geologist on loan to NASA from 
the United States Geological Survey, to define more exactly 
the Apollo requirements for photographic data which an 
orbiter could best satisfy. The two men spent the remain-
der of the year and early 1963 examining Ranger and Sur-
veyor spacecraft components which might be best used in 
a lightweight orbiter. Concurrently Dennis James of 
Bellcomm, a private research and advisory organization 
working with the Office of Manned Space Flight, conducted 
another review of existing technology and hardware which 
might be usable in a lunar orbiter. 
25 
Interview with Oran W. Nicks, NASA Headquarters, 
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In October 1962 the Office of Space Sciences had 
followed up the recommendation of the first Scherer group 
in a further move to define the requirements for an Agena-
class orbiter and had let a contract to the Space Tech-
nology Laboratories to "make a detailed preliminary study 
of a spin-stabilized lunar photographic spacecraft based 
upon the Able 5 development to be launched by the Atlas-
26 
Agena vehicle." 
STL conducted the study, and during a major planning 
and review meeting at the Langley Research Center on Feb-
ruary 25, 196~ representatives from OSS, OMSF, Bellcomm, 
STL, and Langley reviewed the preliminary conclusions of 
the STL research. Following this meeting both Langley 
and NASA Headquarters stepped up their activities to 
formulate a viable basis for an Agena-class orbiter. 
Space Technology Laboratories continued to work on 
a reliability assessment of a lunar orbiter photographic 
mission and analyzed the problem of having a lunar orbiter 
locate and photograph a landed Surveyor. Dennis James of 
Bellcomm developed a study for Joseph F. Shea of OMSF 
and Lee R. Scherer of OSS concerning the role a lunar 
orbiter could play in the manned and unmanned exploration 
26 
Project Approval Document dated October 16, 1962, 
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of the Moon. 
Langley personnel continued to study the feasibility 
of a lightweight orbiter during the remainder of February. 
Their activity was independent of the STL study and, on 
March 5 at a second plenary meeting at Langle~ represent-
atives from STL and Langley presented the findings of 
their two studies to officials from OMSF, OSS, Langley, 
28 
and Bellcomm. 
Amazingly the two independent analyses came to very 
similar conclusions. First, the probability factor of 
one mission success out of five attempts was approximately 
93/100, based upon known systems. The probability of two 
successes in five was about 81/100. In addition the studies 
confirmed that an orbiter using existing hardware could 
photograph a landed Surveyor and thus definitely assist in 
Apollo site verification. On the basis of these data the 
members of the meeting concurred that an unmanned lunar 
orbiter had an extremely important role to play in the 
29 
pre-Apollo phase of the Moon's exploration. The next 
major step was to convince top Headquarters management 
~ 
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that an Agena-class orbiter could best accomplish explora-
tion for both the Office of Space Sciences and the Office 
of Manned Space Flight. To this task OSS and Langley now 
turned. 
Following the March 5 meeting at Langley, Floyd 
Thompson's staff made a presentation of Langley's assessment 
at NASA Headquarters to Associate Administrator Robert 
Seamans, Jr. Clinton E. Brown acted as spokesman for the 
center and presented the following basic pOints to Dr. 
Seamans and members of the Office of Space Sciences: 
1. Langley had the capability to handle a lunar 
orbiter project, but it would require an additional 
100 persons if it was to avoid serious inter-
ference with its commitments to the Office of 
Advanced Research and Technology. 
2. Analyses showed that it was feasible to obtain 
the desired lunar photography. 
3. The contract for the project should be made on 
a competitive basis despite the work which STL 
had conducted on a preliminary Agena-class lunar 
orbiter system. 30 . 
Establishing Management Arrangements 
The Office of Lunar and Planetary Programs within the 
Office of Space Sciences acted as coordinator of the various 
activities required by a new lunar orbiter program. Lang-
ley, once it had assessed its ability to undertake a 
30 
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major unmanned deep space project to obtain lunar photo-
graphy, began to develop formal plans for conducting 
such a project. It used the guidelines established in 
General Management Instruction 4-1-1, effective as of 
March 8, 1963. 
General Management Instruction 4-1-1 covered planning 
and implementation of NASA projects and was part of an 
agency-wide management reform which NASA Administrator 
James E. Webb had initiated in October 1962. GMI 4-1-1 
specifically "prescribes the policies and procedures for 
project management within NASA with respect to the manner 
31 
in which projects are planned, approved and implemented." 
These applied to NASA Headquarters, the field centers, and 
JPL. 
Under GMI 4-1-1 a program was defined as "a related 
series of undertakings which continue over a period of 
time (normally years), and which are designed to accomplish 
a broad scientific or technical goal in the NASA Long-
32 
Range Plan; e.g., Lunar and Planetary Exploration •••• " 
The appropriate Program Office (i.e., Office of Space Sciences) 
had the responsibility of carrying out the program. Support-
ing the program activity was the project, which, within a 
31 
NASA Management Manual, Part I, General Management 
Instructions, Chapter 4, Number 4-1-1, March 8, 1963, p. 1 
(hereinafter cited as GMI 4-1-1). 
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program, was "an undertaking with a scheduled beginning and 
33 
ending •••• " 
Within the project was the system -- "one of the 
principal functioning entities comprising the project 
hardware within a project or program." The system consisted 
of a number of subsystems, each a functional entity within 
34 
it. Lunar Orbiter was such a system. 
The GMI 4-1-1 established four basic policies appli-
cable to a program: 1) Project Initiation, 2) Project 
Approval, 3) Project Implementation, and 4) Organization 
for Project Management. Of these the second required 
that for any given project a Project Approval Document 
(PAD) be drawn up. This document would give a brief 
description of the proposed project's scope, of its 
assignment and its system management responsibility, and 
of the resource requirements by fiscal year. The Associate 
Administrator of NASA (in this case Seamans) had to 
approve the' PAD before any steps to implement the project 
35 
could be taken. 
Once the Associate Administrator had signed the PAD, 
the third policy came into effect. The first major step 
in implementing a new project was the drafting of the 
Project Development Plan (PDP), which the respective 
33 
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Program Director (in this case Homer E. Newell, Director 
of the Office of Space Sciences) had to approve. The PDP 
had to describe in specific terms the technical, financial, 
procurement, and management arrangements for the project. 
It had to state clearly the assignment of managerial re-
sponsibilities and authority, manpower, and facilities and 
36 
the procedure for funding. 
Finally the fourth policy stated that lithe organiza-
tional pattern for a given project to system will be de-
termined on a case-by-case basis. The centers or Head-
quarters Offices having project and system management re-
sponsibilities will be described in the Project Approval 
Document approved by the Associate Administrator. The 
detailed assignment of responsibility and authority will 
37 
be described in the Project Development Plan." 
The policy of Organization for Project Management 
also established the roles which Headquarters and the field 
centers would play in a given project. Headquarters held 
the following specific responsibilities: 
32 
1. Establishment of objectives and policy guidelines. 
2. Allocation of resources and provision for re-
programming. 
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3. Provision of decisions and resources not within 
the scope of approved Project Development Plan 
or not otherwise within the field center authority. 
4. Performance of inter-project coordination. 
5. Evaluation of overall perfo~ance and accomplish-
ment of project objectives. jO 
The brief, foregoing explanation of GMI 4-1-1 will 
enable the reader to assess how Langley went about pre-
paring for the Lunar Orbiter Program during the course of 
1963 up to August 30. During March the Langley Research 
Center formulated a Project Approval Document for a light-
weight orbiter. It was assisted by Scherer and Shoemaker 
at NASA Headquarters and by the studies which STL and Bell-
corom had con~ucted. 
On March 25, 196~ the Project Approval Document was 
finished. Floyd L. Thompson and Sherwood L. Butler, the 
Langley Contracting Officer, submitted it to Associate 
Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., together with a 
procurement document on this date. At the same time 
Langley also finished drafting a preliminary Project De-
velopment Plan, which it sent to Deputy Associate Ad-
ministrator, Office of Space SCiences, Homer E. Newell at 
39 
the end of March. 
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The Office of Space Sciences faced several major 
management decisions at this time which influenced the 
initiation of a new lunar orbiter program. A};iong these 
OSS had to decide what action to take on a lunar orbiter 
in the face of a projected shortage of funds in FY 1964. 
At the time that OSS submitted its FY 1965 budget estimates, 
it held that the initiation of a new orbiter project was 
40 
not financially realistic. 
However, Langley's quick assessment of its ability to 
take on the orbiter project enabled the Deputy Director of 
OSS, Edgar M. Cortright, to recommend to OSS Director 
Homer E. Newell that it be initiated. Cortright's re-
commendation was not based only on Langley's assessment. 
Following the submission of the FY 1965 budget estimates 
his office received new information which made it more 
feasible to decide on a start for a new lunar orbiter 
project. 
First, the'Office of Manned Space FLLght had endorsed 
the orbiter, and OSS had made a tentative analysis of its 
ability to meet the needs of the manned program. Secondly, 
Cortright had assessed through numerous meetings with 
peor '.e from OSS, OMSF, JPL, and the Goddard Space Flight 
--.. -------
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Center (aSFC) that an orbiter project was definitely 
needed and feasible. 41 
He outlined to Newell the major factors to be con-
sidered in the lunar orbiter decision: 
1. The STL-type lunar orbiter had been studied by 
OSS, OMSF, Bellcomm, and LRC and had been found 
to be feasible and desirable. 
2. One successful orbiter would be worth dozens of 
successful Ranger TV impacters. 
3. Langley could provide the management within its 
present ceiling, if necessary, and was highly 
motivated to do so. 
4. The orbiter would be a new start and would prob-
ably have its share of unforeseen problems. The 
technology was not quite "off-the-shelf" and the 
schedule for a 1965 launch would be tight. 
5. The Apollo Program might plan a photo-reconnaissance 
mission capability. 
42 
In view of these and other decisions pending on the 
Ranger program extension and the Mariner B flight, Cort-
right concluded that the Office of Space Sciences should 
"initiate the lunar orbiter project at 1.7 million in FY 
1963, and 27.9 million in FY 1964. Contract award would 
await Congressional action on FY 1964 funds. Retreat is 
43 
therefore possible." A new start could be absorbed if 
the Block V Ranger were dropped. 
41 
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that it and subsequent Ranger blocks be dropped.) The 
$99 million programmed for Ranger would more than cover 
orbiter needs in FY 1965 since they would be about $71 
44 
million. 
Langley Develops the Request for Proposal Document 
The approval of the Project Development Plan set the 
stage for drafting the Request for Proposal document (RFP) 
with which NASA would go to the aerospace industry in search 
of a contractor for Lunar Orbiter. 
Of the assignments made in the PD~ the Langley Re-
search Center (LRC) was to handle the project management 
and spacecraft system management responsibilities for 
Lunar Orbiter. In addition it had charge of overall pro-
ject-wide systems integration between the spacecraft and 
the launch vehicle and the spacecraft ground support 
facilities, includin~5cornmunications, tracking, and data-
acquisition systems. 
The Project Development Plan assigned to the Director 
of LRC overall technical, operational, and financial 
management for the Lunar Orbiter Project. In turn the 
Director was to implement project management through the 
44 
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Project Manager (Clifford H. Nelson). The Project 
Manager, working with a team of me~ each expert in a 
specific area of the project, exercised control over plans, 
schedules, costs, technical changes, and data in order to 
obtain the most advanced lunar Photogra4~iC and seleno-
detic information as early as possible. 
During the spring of 1963 Bellcomm continued to define 
lunar orbiter objectives for the Office of Manned Space 
Flight. Early in May it informed Scherer in OSS that 
"there are at the moment no fully developed lunar orbiter 
47 
systems." Subsequently it submitted a document entitled 
"Orbiter Recommendations" to Scherer. He reviewed it and 
forward·ed i~ to Clinton E. Brown at Langley with the 
statement that,"although specific recommendations are 
subject to change on review by the Office of Space Sciences, 
it is considered an excellent document for guidance of 
Langley Research Center in preparation of the Request for 
48 
Proposal for the Lunar Orbiter." 
The Bellcomm and Scherer groups assisted Langley in 
the work on the RFP while, at the same tim~ Oran W. Nicks 
briefed Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., on the initiation of 
46 
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the new lunar orbiter and its impact on the Block V Ranger 
49 
series of spacecraft. 
In a further move to assist Langley in drafting the 
RF~ the Office of Manned Space Flight submitted a revised 
summary of the Apollo requirements to OSS. It stated these 
critical needs: 1) data on radiation flux over a typical 
two-week period, 2) a summary and analysis of all efforts 
for short-term prediction of severe solar proton events, 
3) measurements of particles capable of penetrating 
O.Ol-centimeter and O.l-centimeter aluminum during an 
average and a peak two-week period of micrometeoroid activity, 
and 4) photographic data on lunar surface conditions capable 
of showing cones 3.5 meters high and slopes of 15° inclina-
tion in an area of 60-meter radius, before the fall of 
1965, and thereafter equivalent data showing cones 50 
centimeters in height and slopes inclined 8° in an area 
50 
of 1,600-meter radius. 
Other major needs were: 1) the measurement of the 
distribution of slopes greater than 15° in areas 7 meters 
in diameter; 2) photographs of at least 25-meter resolution 
over the largest possible area within +- 100 latitude and 
49 
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00 to 600 west longitude on the Moon. 
While the Office of Manned Space Flight and the Office 
of Space Sciences coordinated their activities through the 
Joint Working Group, officials at the Langley Research 
Center prepared the Request for Proposal document and the 
requirements of a lunar orbiter contract. NASA Head-
quarters representatives met with Dr. Thompson and his 
staff at Langley on June 25 to reach an agreement on the 
type of contract to be utilized in the procurement of the 
Agena-class lunar orbiter spacecraft. 
Headquarters took the position that the contract 
should employ a cost-plus-incentive-fee mechanism similar 
to that used in the Pioneer Program. Langley officials, 
on the other hand, desired the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract 
because they expected unknown development problems to arise. 
They felt that such a contract would be easier to adminis-
ter in that case. Headquarters officials remained vague 
about the nature of incentives which should be incorporated 
52 
into the contract. 
Langley officials concerned with the determination of 
the kind of contract to be used remained firm on the point 
51 
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of retaining sufficient flexibility in seeking a contrac-
tor and negotiating a contract that would best suit Lang-
ley's needs. Thompson insisted from the beginning that 
all bidding be competitive. He was not convinced that 
Space Technology Laboratories had a decided advantage over 
other firms in the field, despite STL's research on lunar 
orbiter systems. He also made it clear that Langley would 
not commence work with a contractor under a Letter of In-
tent. Instead the contract would have to be negotiated 
and signed, and it would have to reflect, as closely as 
possible, the actual work it entailed. This would eliminate 
any basis for defining the nature of assignments following 
the initiation of work. 
NASA Headquarters officials favored a spin-stabilized 
spacecraft and desired that the RFP reflect a preference 
for this kind of system. However, Langley officials in-
sisted that they not be frozen to one concept for· a space-
craft system. They wanted to see what exactly the aero-
space industry could produce before selecting the spin-
stabilized system. Although NASA's research into a light-
weight orbiter had shown that the spin-stabilized system 
was feasible, Langley wanted room left for an attitude-
stabilized (three-axis-stabilized) spacecraft system. 53 
53 
Interview with Floyd L. Thompson, former Director of 
the Langley Research Center, NASA Headquarters, January 29, 
1970. 
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The June 25 meeting at Langley resulted in a compromise 
solution which would use the eost-plus-incentive-fee con-
tract for procurement. Preliminary incentives were also 
established, but room was left for further suggestions 
from potential bidders. 
Following this Homer E. Newell, Director of the Office 
of Space Sciences, sent a statement to Floyd L. Thompson 
at Langley on July 1 in which he further clarified the 
Headquarters position on Lunar Orbiter and its objectives. 
Thompson had expressed concern that the proposed orbiter 
project might be greater and more sophisticated than 
Langley had first estimated. Newell explained that his 
office maintained a policy of giving the needs of the 
Office of Manned Space Flight maximum support as far as 
such support did not impinge on OSS goals. At that 
time, Newell explained, the OSS specifications for a lunar 
orbiter could be approached but not entirely reached by 
,an Agena-class orbiter. The Bellcomm studies had developed 
objectives for a lunar orbiter which would not fully satisfy 
Apollo reqUirements. Bellcomm's review and the STL pro-
posal showed that these objectives represented the 
54 
limits of feasibility up to that time. 
54 
Memorandum from Dr. Homer E. Newell, Director of the 
Office of Space Sciences, to Dr. Floyd L. Thompson, Director 
of the Langley Research Center, July 1, 19630 
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Newell assured Thompson that although the proposed 
high-resolution photography, capable of pinpointing a 
landed Surveyor, seemed to be beyond feasibility, Langley 
did not have to rely upon the Bellcomm work to reach a 
decision. It could use the Bellcomm studies merely as a 
reference for determiping the kind of Agena-class orbiter 
which could best accomplish the objectives of providing 
OMSF-Apollo with the data it required. If this were too 
impractical for Thompson, then Newell was open for any 
; 55 
alternative suggestions. 
During July Langley and NASA Headquarters worked 
closely on the Request for Proposals. Headquarters desired 
that the RFP indicate to bidders that NASA was going to 
insist upon a very close working relationship with the 
contractor in selecting and approving subcontractors for 
the photographic data-acquisition components. NASA would 
reserve the right to determine the selection of the manu-
facturer of the sensor in the spacecraft system in order 
to obtain the best sensor regardless of any relationship 
between the prime contractor and the subcontractors.56 
OSS officials desired that the Statement of Work, 
accompanying the RFP, indicate that NASA favored a spin-
55 Ibid • 
56 
Headquarters Comments on Documents for the RFP of 
the Agena-class lunar orbiter, no date, p. I 
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stabilized spacecraft. Despite the recognition that such 
a spacecraft was feasible, simpler and less expensive 
than an attitude-stabilized system, Langley argued that 
the Request for Proposam should also allow bidders to offer 
an attitude-stabilized spacecraft. It was a sound ar-
gument. Langley would have the responsibility for the 
spacecraft system, and it wanted to explore all possible 
concepts. A compromise agreement was reached, providing 
that if bidders could offer approaches which differed from 
the established specifications but which would result in 
substantial gains in the probability of mission success, 
reliability, schedule, and economy, then NASA certainly 
. 57 
invited them to submit such alternatives. 
Stipulations of the Request for Proposal Document 
NASA Headquarters and Langley agreed that the RFP 
should explicitly ~larify that the main mission of the 
new lunar orpiter was the acquisition of photographic data 
of high and medium resolution for selection of suitable 
Apollo and Surveyor landing sites. The secondary objectives 
provided for the acquisition of information about the size 
and shape of the Moon and about the properties of its 
gravitational field. The orbiter would also measure cer-
tain other lunar environmental characteristics in the Moon's 
vicinity. 
57 
Ibid., p. 2. 
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However, the RFP was to state clearly that under no 
circumstances would these secondary objectives be allowed 
to dilute the major photo-reconnaissance mission. For 
this reason the Statement of Work which was to accompany 
the RFP was not to give any detailed descriptions of the 
secondary objectives. 
In outlining the photographic requirements which the 
RFP was to make explicit, NASA Headquarters counseled 
Langley to use the following guidelines for identifying 
cones and slopes on the lunar surface. Cones were assumed 
to be circular features at right angles to a flat surface. 
These could be considered as recognized if the standard 
deviation of the cone's estimated height caused by system 
noise in the spacecraft was less than 1/5 of the cone's 
height. Slopes were assumed to be circular areas inclined 
with respect to the plane perpendicular to local gravity. 
Again a slope would be considered as recognized if the 
standard deviation of estimated slope caused by system noise 
was less than 1/5 of the slope. 58 These criteria re-
quired at least two photographic modes in the orbiter 
to obtain the data: 1) high resolution of limited areas 
and 2) wide coverage at medium resolution. Any bidder's 
58 
~., pp. 7-8. 
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proposal had to meet this requirement. However, a pro-
posal would not have to employ both modes of photography 
on anyone mission. 
The Request for Proposa~had also to state clearly that 
a bidder would provide in his proposal for instrumentation 
and telemetry capable of measuring certain characteristics 
of the lunar environment. These components would have to 
function independently of the photographic subsystem in 
order to record data regardless of the success or failure 
in obtaining pictures. Among the various environmental 
conditions which might be measured, micrometeoroid flux 
and total exposure to energetic particles and gamma radia-
tion were two whose measurement would be necessary for 
gauging the performance of the spacecraft while also 
providing vital data for the Apollo Program. 
In addition to this instrumentation the bidder would 
have to be able to determine precisely the altitude of his 
spacecraft at the time of each photographic exposure, the 
orientation of the picture in relation to lunar north, and 
the relative angle of the Sun to the portion of the Moon's 
surface covered by any photograph. The bidder would have 
to demonstrate his capability for providing such data as 
would be necessary to position all points within an area 
of contiguous coverage while being able to pinpoint 90~ 
of all well-defined points to within 100 meters of their 
true horizontal positions relative to each other in the 
45 
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high-resolution mode. Finally the RFP was to require each 
bidder to be al.e t( give the locations of photographed areas 
within ne kilometer of their correct positions in the lunar 
system. 59 
Headquarters defined what it desired that the RFP do 
on the basis of the STL and Bellcomm studies, with the 
results of the two Scherer groups' research. Thus the 
spin-stabilized spacecraft system was preferable to Head-
quarters, but the RFP, in final form, did not precisely 
state which kind of spacecraft system would best do the 
job. 
By August 1 Langley was concluding its preparations 
on the RFP. It also had drawn up the Statement of Work 
(sow) document to accompany the RFP when it was released. 
The SOW set forth explicit guidelines for each bidder to 
use in developing a proposal. In addition to a general 
description of the mission which Lunar Orbiter would per-
form, the document stated the requirements which the space-
craft system would have to fulfill, the testing procedures 
and the interfaces which the contractor would have to 
establish and carry out, and the divig60n of tasks which 
the contractor would have to perform. 
59 
Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
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Statement of Work, Lunar Orbiter Project, Langley 
Research Center, March 18, 1964, Exhibit A. 
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Langley reached an understanding with Headquarters 
on the contract, which was to have incentives based upon 
61 
cost, delivery, and performance. Late in August Scherer 
presented a summary of Langley's Request for Proposal 
document to Nicks and Cortright, and on August 30, 1963, 
after Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., had reviewed the RFP, 
NASA released it to the potential bidders. This step 
62 
officially initiated the Lunar Orbiter Program. 
61 
Status Report on Lunar Orbiter, Langley Research 
Center, August 1, 1963. 
62 
Letter from Capt. Lee R. Scherer to Or an W. Nicks 
and Edgar M. Cortright, Office of Space Sciences, NASA 
Headquarters, Washington, D.C., August 23, 1963. 
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CHAPTER III 
BEGINNING THE LUNAR ORBITER PROGRAM 
Congress Questions NASA on Orbiter 
NASA's new Lunar Orbiter Program began while Congress 
was conducting annual authorization hearings. During-
August 1963 top NASA officials waged an impressive fight 
for more funds for an orbiter. They had to answer queries 
from the House Committee on Appropriations concerning 
their move to initiate a new orbiter project when the 
Surveyor Orbiter Project already had authorization and 
funds. The Committee claimed that NASA had channeled much 
of the money into other projects and that this attested 
to their higher priorities. Almost nothing had been 
1 
spent on the Surveyor Orbiter. The Committee seemed to 
think that NASA's lack of progress on its original concept 
of the Surveyor Orbiter and its development of a new lunar 
orbiter concept for a different project at Langley meant 
that it did not consider the mission of an orbiter as 
important as it wished Congress to believe. 
Seamans, Dryden, Newell, and Cortright from NASA 
1 
Independent Offices Appropriations for 1964, Hearings 
before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 
House of Representatives, 88th Congress, first session, 
August 19-20, 1963, p. 412. 
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMm 
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Headquarters, and Pickering from JPL all provided testimony 
to clarify NASA's position on the Surveyor Orbiter and the 
urgent need for a lightweight lunar orbiter which could 
obtain vital data for the Surveyor Lander and Apollo pro-
grams. After their testimony before the Senate Committee 
on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, the Senate restored 
the proposed $28.2 million in funds for FY 1964 for an 
orbiter which the House had deleted from its authorization 
bill. Both houses reached a compromise late in August 
2 
and authorized a total of $20.0 million for an orbiter. 
Appropriation hearings pertaining to the lunar orbiter 
project were scheduled to begin on October 18, but the 
Office of Space Sciences relied upon the approved authori-
zation as a reasonable assurance that funds would not 
evaporate after the Lunar Orbiter Program was under 
way. 
The Lunar Orbiter Project Office Is Established 
With the Request for Proposals already sent out, the 
fledgling Lunar Orbiter Project Office (LOPO), under the 
direction of Clifford H. Nelson, set up shop at the end of 
August in the Langley Research Center's sixteen-foot wind 
2 
House of Representatives. NASA Authorization for Fis-
cal Year 19646 Conference Report (to accompany H.R. 7500), House 
Report No. 70 , August 26, 1963, p. 1. 
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tunnel facility in the West Area. The members of the ori-
ginal LOPO nucleus included Israel Taback, Robert Girouard, 
William I. Watson, Gerald Brewer, John B. Graham, Eugene 
A. Brummer, Robert Fairbairn, and Anna Plott, the last 
conducting all secretarial tasks. William J. Boyer joined 
the group soon after its formation. 
Langley Center Director Floyd L. Thompson was instru-
mental in selecting Nelson as Project Manager. Very ex-
perienced at Langley, Nelson had the technical skills and 
the ability to work closely with people which his assign-
ment required. Ideally a project manager should be capable 
of serving all vital managerial functions in a project. 
These include business as well as technical responsibilities. 
Nelson met most of the requirements which these responsibi-
lities entailed. 
Dr. Thompson brought James S. Martin, Senior Engineer 
at Republic Aviation, into Langley in October 1964 to 
assist Nelson in the realm of business management for the 
project. Coming from the aerospace industry to NASA, 
Martin had extensive experience in handling the business 
problems of contractors, and he was very capable of 
getting a Job done. He had great knowledge of the 
operations of industrial contractors, something which Nel-
son and his staff needed. Martin's area of competency 
complemented that of Nelson and the two men formed a 
good team. 
51 
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Both successfully instilled in the other members of 
the Lunar Orbiter Project Office a sense that the whole 
venture depended upon their individual work. Each member 
of the team came to see how his job fitted into the overall 
objectives of the project. Dr. Thompson assisted Nelson 
and Martin in the task of establishing good working rela-
tionships among those divisions at LRC which would lend 
support to Lunar Orbiter and among the other NASA and 
contractor personnel who had a part in the program. 
Preparing for Contract Bids 
At NASA Headquarters Lee R. Scherer, the Lunar Orbiter 
Program Manager, issued a status report to Oran W. Nicks 
and Homer E. Newell on September 4, stating that Seamans 
had signed the Project Approval Document on August 30. It 
called for five flight spacecraft using the Atlas-Agena 
D launch vehicle. The program would rely on the tracking 
and data-acquisition facilities of the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory and the Deep Space Network which JPL was under 
contract to NASA to operate. The Deep Space Network (DSN) 
consisted of the Deep Space Instrumentation Facility (DSIF) 
and the Space Flight Operations Facility (SFOF). Langley 
had the responsibility to establish interfaces between its 
Project Office and those offices at these facilities which 
3 
would assist the Lunar Orbiter Program. 
3 
1963. 
Lunar Orbi _,er Status Report, OSS Review, September 4, 
52 
., '" 
--'---
NASA's decision to build a new lunar orbiter attracted 
several aerospace firms engaged in research and develop-
ment for America's space exploration effort. While Con-
gress questioned NASA and the Office of Space Sciences 
continued planning, five major aerospace companies began 
to develop proposals in the hope of submitting the winning 
bid for the new spacecraft. 
In AViation Week & Space Technology, a major aerospace 
periodical, Richard G. O'Lone briefly surveyed the nature 
of NASA's Lunar Orbiter contract. He stated that the Lunar 
Orbiter Program was to be "the first major National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration project that will in-
clude cost, delivery and technical performance incentives 
4 
as part of its contract." OrLene stressed that "selection 
of the orbiter as its first major incentive venture illustrates 
5 
the urgency NASA attaches to the program." In addttion 
NASA included substantial incentives based upon predeter-
mined rates for all underruns and penalties for overruns 
on deadlines. These it had made explicit so that the con-
tractor would know the limits within which he could work. 
However, NASA officials were quick to state that the 
4 
Richard G. O'Lone, "Orbiter Is First Big NASA Incen-
tive Job," AViation Week & Space Technology, Vol. 79, No. 
15 (October 7, 1963), p. 32. 
5 
Ibid. 
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Lunar Orbiter incentive contract did not "mean that NASA 
has shifted its emphasis from a firm's technical manage-
6 
ment ability to the price it quotes for a job." More 
significantly for Lunar Orbiter, !I incentive contracting 
compels both NASA and the contractor to define what they 
7 
want at the earliest practical date. II This had been 
Langley's major intention with the Request for Proposal 
document, and the aerospace companies bidding for the 
contract had to reflect in their proposals a well-defined 
understanding of the RFP. 
While the potential contractors developed proposals 
for a lunar orbiter spacecraft, NASA's Office of Lunar and 
Planetary Programs accelerated its planning for the new 
lunar exploration venture at Headquarters. The Langley 
LOPO did likewise. Oran W. Nicks met with Floyd L. Thompson, 
Clinton E. Brown, Clifford H. Nelson, Charles Donlan, 
Eugene Draley, and Harold Maxwell at the Langley Research 
Center for a management conference on Tuesday, September 
11, to discuss at length the major management aspects of 
the program. Lee R. Scherer and Leon Kosofsky, the Program 
8 
Engineer for Lunar Orbiter, also attended. 
6 
Ibid. 
7-
Ibid. 8-
Memorandum from Captain Lee R. Scherer to the Record, 
September 20, 1963. 
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Nicks expressed the belief that Headquarters and Lang-
ley had to maintain a well-defined, firm understanding on 
major policies to ensure the success of the whole under-
taking. He sought from the beginning, through meetings 
such as this, to establish strong links of communication 
between the two groups in order to expose and resolve any 
problems quickly rather than allowing them the opportunity 
to grow into a major crisis for the program. 
Thompson emphasized the importance of achieving an 
early understanding on all responsibilities by those in 
the program. There could be no room for inference; in-
stead each member of the Lunar Orbiter Program had to 
recognize and agree upon an explicit basis for under-
standing what he was to do. The early establishment of a 
fixed point of reference from which future changes could 
be worked out was essential to the conduct of the program. 
The September 11 meeting clarified the position of 
Headquarters and Langley. Each organization's representa-
tives sounded out the others about delegation of authority 
and responsibilities. This approach was to be character-
istic of relations between Langley and Headquarters through-
out the program. 9 
9 
Thompson interview, January 29, 1970. 
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The Langley Source Evaluation Board 
During September the Lunar Orbiter Project Office at 
Langley established the Source Evaluation Board (SEB) 
which it divided into several teams of experts who would 
analyze every contract proposal which they received. As 
an important part of the SEB, the Lunar Orbiter Project 
Office formed the Lunar Orbiter Proposal SCientist Panel 
to consider the scientific merits of each bidder's approach. 
The members of this reviewing group were Clinton E. 
Brown and Samuel Katzoff from Langley, Jack Lorell from 
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Norman Ness from the Goddard 
Space Flight Center, Bruce Murray from the California 
Institute of Technology, and Robert P. Bryson from NASA 
10 
Headquarters. They helped in the criti~al phase of 
proposal analysis,which began in October and lasted more 
than six weeks. 
Of the score of: possible aerospace companies which 
seemed to have the capability to carry out the objectives 
of a lunar orbiter program, five submitted contract pro-
posals. To understand the significance of the spacecraft 
proposal which NASA finally chose, it will be useful briefly 
10 
Memorandum from the Office of Lunar and Planetary 
Programs, NASA Headquarters, to Clifford Nelson, Project 
Director, Lunar Orbiter Office, Langley Research Center, 
October 22, 1963. See also: Agena Class Lunar Orbiter 
Photographic Project Plan for the Evaluation of Offerors' 
Proposals, Approved: Eugene C. Draley, Chairman, Source 
Evaluation Board, September 20, 1963. 
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to summarize the five choices which industry presented, 
remembering that NASA wanted a lunar orbiter which would 
require as little development of systems and as much use 
of off-the-shelf hardware as possible. 
The Lunar Orbiter Proposals 
The Hughes Aircraft Company, one of the five bidders, 
entered the competition with an impressive record. The 
Surveyor systems contractor for JPL, Hughes was no new-
comer to the field of spacecraft deSign and fabrication. 
Its proposal centered on a spin-stabilized spacecraft. 
However, the Source Evaluation Board found in the Hughes 
approach several important weaknesses. First, while spin-
stabilization greatly simplified the problem of attitude 
control, it placed disadvantages upon the photographic, 
power, and communications systems. Several inherent draw-
backs in the photographic system, which would require 
extensive development before it could be incorporated into 
11 
the spacecraft, compounded these disparities. 
The insufficiency of the power system to supply the 
necessary electricity to drive the other systems added a 
second negative aspect to the Hughes proposal. The SEB 
found that the deSign did not provide enough solar 
11 
Memorandum for Lunar Orbiter Contract File, Subject: 
Debriefing of the Hughes Aircraft Company, Culver City, 
California, January 21, 1964, Langley Research Center, Hampton, 
Va. 
57 
r,} , 
cells to produce the required electrical energy and that 
if more were added Hughes would be forced to change the 
configuration of its spacecraft. In addition the proposal 
had given an incomplete description of the communications 
system, leaving out items which NASA had specified in the 
Request for Proposal document. 
Finally, the Source Evaluation Board concluded that 
the solid-fuel retro-rocket for deboosting the spacecraft 
into lunar orbit was inadequate to alter the orbital para-
meters around the Moon. All of these factors, taken to-
gether,. constituted too great an element of unreliability, 
and this plus the development problems outweighed the strong 
points of the spin-stabilization concept. 
The only other proposal for a spin-stabilized lunar 
orbiter came from Thompson Ramo Wooldridge/Space Technology 
Laboratories of Redondo Beach, California. The TRW/STL 
orbiter concept used spin-stabilization to control the 
spacecraft's attitude during the mission. This meant that 
it had to make the other major systems compatible with spin-
stabilization. While the attitude control problem was 
easily solved, it put severe restraints on the photographic 
system. It would have to employ fast shutter speeds and 
a high-speed film which would be very susceptible to solar 
radiation foggillg. 
The use of a liquid developer in the film processing 
58 
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system also presented greater risks than would accompany 
other existing photographic systems. Moreover, due to the 
absolute necessity to maintain constant image-motion com-
pensation, the quality of resolution of a single exposure 
might vary considerably from one side of the film to the 
other. The proposed format of a single photographic frame 
was too narrow, requiring the camera to make a large number 
12 
of frames of any given area on the lunar surface. 
If the TRW/STL photo-system was judged impracticably 
el~borate, the proposed communications system simply failed 
to meet the requirements of the NASA RFP. Neither the 
communications nor the power systems were capable of per-
forming their functions for the minimum thirty-day spaceoraft 
life span. Because of spinning, the solar panels of the 
orbiter could not produce adequate quantities of power at 
any given time to recharge the spacecraft's battery. More-
over, the capacity of the battery was such that it could 
not have accepted a greater recharging rate than it already 
had, even if the energy producing area of the panels were 
enlarged. This amounted in the final analysis to a pro-
posal with too many areas open to critical development 
12 
Memorandum for Lunar Orbiter Contract File, Subject: 
Debriefing of the Space Technology Laboratories, Inc., Redondo 
Beach, California, January 22, 1964, Langley Research Center, 
Hampton, Va. 
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problems. 
Ironically NASA had based its earlier decision to 
have a lightweight lunar orbiter on the STL systems re-
search. STL had proven the feasibility of an Agena-class 
orbiter, but its concept of an orbiter proved to be less 
practicable than that of another bidder. 
While Hughes and TRW/STL could claim experience in 
the increasingly complex realm of designing, building, 
and flying automated space probes, the Martin Company, 
which offered a third approach, had no such advantage in 
this respect. However, it presented a very satisfactory 
proposal from the standpoint of technical feasibility. 
Unlike the first two firms, Martin designed its orbiter to 
employ three-axis stabilization to serve as the attitude 
control system for a platform from which a very well-
designed photographic system could take pictures of the 
Moon without having to compensate for rate of spin. 
Although it had a limited capability to perform high_ 
quality convergent stereo photography, its film processing, 
readout, and communications systems appeared to be highly 
capable of transmitting data to Earth in a very short 
time. This aspect of the Martin proposal greatly pleased 
the SEB evaluators at Langley. On the other hand, the 
Martin orbiter lacked redundant systems which would ensure 
greater reliability in spacecraft performance, and the 
60 
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proposed solar panels seemed to the Source Evaluation 
Board somewhat fragile for the task of supplying energy 
13 
to the spacecraft. 
Martin's proposal showed its most serious weaknesses 
in the areas of launch and flight operations and in the 
use of the tracking and data-acquisition facilities. The 
proposal stressed launch operation procedures over flight 
operations, and the description of both was ambiguous. 
Moreover, Martin had failed to include an integrated plan 
of the functions and responsibilities of NASA, Martin, the 
Deep Space Instrumentation Facility, and the Space Flight 
Operations Facility and their personnel. Finally, because 
of limited experience in spacecraft design and fabrication, 
Martin would necessarily have to rely upon subcontractors, 
and this could present NASA with major difficulties in the 
event that relations between Martin and its subcontractors 
became disturbed. ThiS, according to the SEB, made the 
Martin proposal the least practicable from the standpoint 
14 
of program management. 
The two remaining bidders -- the Lockheed Missiles 
and Space Company and the Boeing Company -- presented the 
13 
Memorandum for Lunar Orbiter Contract File Subject: 
Debriefing of the Martin Company, January 21, 1964, Langley 
Research Center, Hampton, Va. 
14 
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Source Evaluation Board with an interesting challenge. 
The former had long years of experience in designing and 
building the Agena system for the U.S. Air Force. Indeed, 
its Agena had served as a photographic platform in Earth 
orbit. The rocket and the photographic systems were well 
mated, making a very efficient spacecraft for work in 
orbit around the Earth. Lockheed proposed to convert 
this to an orbiter for lunar photography. It would con-
sist of the Agena with integrated photographic, power, com-
munications, and attitude control systems. Lockheed 
stressed that the Agena had been proved in space and would 
require only minor modification~ thus making it 
unnecessary for NASA to buy a new, expensive, and untested 
15 
spacecraft. 
The Boeing Company, on the other hand, could not make 
such an offer, since it had never managed a major NASA 
space flight program. Aircraft manufactuxewas Boeing's 
big business, but competition in the aerospace industry 
motivated the Seattle-based firm to turn toward space 
proJects and to invest in new capital equipment in order 
to meet and excel in the increasingly competitive world 
of rocket research and space exploration. Indeed as part 
15 . 
Memorandum for Lunar Orbiter Contract File, Subject: 
Debriefing of the Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, 
Sunnyvale, California, January 21, 1964, Langley Research 
Center, Hampton, Va. 
62 
~ , 
~ 
of the USAF Project Dynasoar,Boeing had constructed its 
new Kent Facility for testing spacecraft components under 
simulated space environmental conditions. This capability 
would enable Boeing to conduct its own testing without 
costly delays caused by the necessity to send equipment 
elsewhere to be tested. (Project Dynasoar was canceled 
about the time NASA became seriously involved in a new 
lightweight lunar orbiter.) 
The Source Evaluation Board saw the facility with 
which Lockheed's proposal might be implemented and realized 
that Boeing did not have as much experience in space-
craft design and fabrication. But the Lockheed proposal 
had some serious flaws which outweighed the attractive 
possibility that NASA might obtain a ready-made orbiter. 
First, the existing Agena system was designed for 
Earth orbit, and it had proved its ability to perform 
there very well. But sending a spacecraft some 385 kilo-
meters into space and putting it into orbit around the 
Moon was an entirely different undertaking, and the con-
figuration of the Lockheed orbiter presented special 
problems related to this. Any lunar orbiter would be use-
less if it could not orbit the Moon as NASA -scientists and 
engineers desired it to do. Moreover, any orbiter would 
be a waste of money if it could not perform the desired 
photography in the most efficient, reliable way possible 
with existing technology. The SEB believed that the use 
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of any incompatible hardware for such critical work would 
impinge upon mission assurance. 
This being the case, the Source Evaluation Board 
found the concept of sending a modified Agena rocket to 
do lunar orbital photography too impracticable, because 
the Lockheed orbiter presented the extreme difficulty of 
deboosting the heavy deadweight Agena into a lunar orbit. 
Once deboosting was accomplished, the spacecraft's orbit 
would create severe restraints on photography. NASA would 
have to go to unnecessary trouble to obtain vital photographic 
data of the lunar surface, and this fact made the Lockheed 
16 
proposal much less attractive. 
Yet the SEB found the Lockheed photo system to be 
almost ideally suited to its task. It was a space-proven 
package with the capability of performing high-quality 
stereographic photography. However, the proposed processing 
and readout systems would require more development before 
Lockheed could use them in an orbiter, and this meant 
extra time and funds to accomplish baSic development work. 
Even if this were surmountable, the necessity to carry 
the heavy deadweight of the burned-out Agena to the Moon 
still remained the major negative factor of the Lockheed 
Orbiter. It would require extra fuel to control the useless 
64 
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bulk in lunar orbit. Hardly any of the Agena's weight 
would be directly involved in vital mission activity, and 
yet its presence would definitely affect orbital parameters 
and spacecraft velocity to the extent of reducing the 
versatility of the orbiter as a photographic platform. 
These features made the Lockheed approach less acceptable 
than that of the final bidder. 
The Boeing Lunar Orbiter Proposal 
The Source Evaluation Board turned to the proposal 
of the Boeing Company of Seattle, Washington. Boeing 
presented an orbiter concept which used three-axis stabili-
zation with a spacecraft weighing only 360 kilograms. The 
design employed much space-tested, off-the-shelf hardware. 
For example, Boeing would have a photographic system fab-
ricated by Eastman Kodak, the contractor for the Agena 
photo system already in use by the U.S. Air Force. Film 
processing on board the orbiter would be handled by the Kodak 
Bimat process which had been perfected in 1961. The Boeing 
orbiter would use the same Canopus sensor for acquiring the 
star Canopus as an attitude reference as the Mariner C 
spacecraft had used. The 100-pound-thrust Marquardt 
rocket engine which was being developed for the Apollo 
Program would be used for deboosting the spacecraft into 
lunar orbit. Four large solar panels would generate 
power for the spacecraft, and these would be backed up 
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by nickel cadmium batteries which would supply power at 
the times when the orbiter would be out of sight of the 
Sun. The whole system would generate 266 watts of electrical 
17 
output to power the spacecraft's components. 
Boeing's proposed photographic system pleased the 
Source Evaluation Board because it offered greater flexi-
bility than those submitted by the other four bidders. 
It would be a scaled-down version of the Eastman Kodak 
system used by USAF, and, unlike the others, it featured 
a camera with two lenses which could take pictures simul-
taneo~sly -- one using a high-resolution, the other a 
medium-resolution mode. On a single mission the Boeing 
orbiter could photograph a greater area of the lunar sur-
face and also obtain more detailed photographic data than 
any other proposed system. Moreover, if loss of the use 
of one lens occurred, the whole photographic mission would 
not be ruined. 
The photographic system would be capable of providing 
pictures of areas up to 8,000 square kilometers in the high-
resolution mode -- four times the size of area called for 
in the NASA Request for Proposall. Moreover, the photographic 
payload would use the very suitable, highly perfected Kodak 
17 
OSSA Review -- Lunar Orbiter Status Report, January 
23, 1964, p. 2. 
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Bimat process to develop and fix the film on board the 
spacecraft. It is, therefore, important to the under-
standing of ~he Boeing lunar orbiter concept to survey 
briefly the photographic system and the Bimat process in 
order to recognize the greater degree of flexibility 
which these two integrated subsystems offered NASA. 
The Eastman Kodak Photographic System 
The basic system which Eastman Kodak would provide 
Boeing had been in existence since mid-1960,when Kodak 
had developed it for military applications. For Boeing's 
use it had been reduced in size and weight to fit within 
the Agena weight restrictions. The mechanics of the system 
were as follows: Film from a supply reel passed through 
a focal plane optical imaging system, and controlled 
exposures were made. Once past the shutter, the film 
underwent a semi-dry chemical developing process and 
then entered a storage chamber. From here it could be 
extracted upon command from the ground for scanning by 
a flying-spot scanner and then passed on to a take-up reel. 
The line-scanning device consisted of a cathode-ray 
tube with a rotating anode having a high-intensity spot 
of light. The scanner optics of the moving lens system 
reduced by 22 times this point of light, focused it on the 
film transparencies and scanned them. A photomultiplier 
then converted the light passing from the scanner through 
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the film into an electrical signal whose strength would 
vary with the density of the emulsion layer of the film. 
This signal would then be transmitted to a receiving sta-
tion on Earth and reconstructed. The Eastman Kodak Com-
pany would upgrade the system for the demands of the Boeing 
orbiter and its mission. 
A significant part of the improvement in the system 
was the introduction of the Kodak Bimat process,which 
eliminated the necessity to use "wet" chemicals on the 
film. Instea~a film-like processing material was briefly 
laminated to the exposed film to develop and fix the 
negative image and, if the need existed, to produce a 
positive image. In the case of the Boeing orbiter this 
18 
second step was not used, and only negatives were made. 
Once the film had been developed and fixed, the Bimat 
material separated from the film and wound onto a storage 
spool. 
Kodak's "dry" process offered the photographic system 
of the Boeing orbiter very positive advantages over those 
of the other bidders. Besides eliminating the need for 
liquids and their storage containers, Bimat did away with 
the necessity of an extra fixing step while producing 
18 
Raife G. Tarkington, "The Kodak Bimat Process," 
Photogrammetric Engineering, Vol. XXXI, No.1 (January 1965), 
p. 126. 
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photographic negatives having normal, high-quality physical, 
sensitometric, and image characteristics. This greatly 
simplified the problems involved in materials-handling 
while making the whole process fully automatic. More-
over, every part of the film enjoyed fresh-processing 
chemistr~ which made the resulting negatives more con-
sistent and uniform. Bimat would not leave any crystalline 
deposit on the film after separation, and lamination of the 
two materials would not result in any damage to the emulsion 
layer. In addition, the position of the equipment would 
not affect processing of the film, a factor which made the 
19 
Bimat process ideally suited to work in a space environment. 
The Boeing-Eastman Kodak photographic system was not 
the only strength of the proposal. Boeing also demonstrated 
a very real understanding of the relationship of the various 
program phases to one another as detailed in the Request 
for Proposal~ It clearly expressed its willingness to 
cooperate with NASA and to keep a nucleus of full-time 
personnel managing key areas of the program from the be-
ginning to the conclusion of operations. Proven technical 
competency, flexibility and imagination, sound planning 
and organizational management, wide use of space-tested 
hardware in the spacecraft deSign, reliable test facilities, 
19 
Ibid. 
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and the absence of any major development tasks or the need 
to rely on many subcontractors made the Boeing Company's 
lunar orbiter propnsal the most realistic, manageable, 
and potentially successful of the five. The NASA-Langley 
Source Evaluation Board overwhelmingly graded Boeing's 
proposal as the most likely to fulfill the objectives of 
the Lunar Orbiter Program and to cost the least per 
photograph returned to Earth. 
Selecting the Lunar Orbiter Contractor 
The final decision on which of the five proposals to 
choose rested with NASA Associate Administrator Robert C. 
Seamans, Jr. The Langley SEB recommended that NASA select 
Boeing. Thompson passed his center's recommendation on to 
Seamans. Yet Seamans had to be convinced not only that 
the proposal's technical approach was the best, but also 
that its management arrangements and estimated costs were 
better than those of the other bidders. Boeing seemed to 
meet two of the three criteria, but its cost figure was 
substantially higher than that of the next nearest bidder 
Hughes. 
Seamans had to find an absolute justification for 
selecting the highest priced bid in order to defend the 
choice before Congress if called on to do so. That ab-
solute factor turned out to be a technical detail of 
major significance for the St ~ess of the Lunar Orbiter 
Program. 
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Dr. Trutz Foelsche, a Langley scientist working in the 
field of solar radiation hazards, had been conducting ex-
periments whose results demonstrated that even small doses 
of radiation from solar particle events were "of major 
importance for such sensitive devices as, e.g., photo-emul-
sions or ordinary photographic films, which are an important 
tool in some space missions. This is especially true for 
instrumented probes, when the vehicle itself generally provides 
shielding only on the order of 1 g/cm2 or less from a large 
20 
solid angle." Foelsche's data, based upon the largest 
solar event groups of the 1954-1964 sunspot cycle, showed 
that high-speed films did not receive sufficient protection 
even when shielding around the film was increased up to 10 
grams per square centimeter. 
page for Foelsche's data.)21 
(See chart on the following 
Foelsche presented his findings to Dr. Thompson and 
the Source Evaluation Board before the final selection 
of the Lunar Orbiter contractor. The Langley SEB made a 
presentation to Dr. Seamans and senior OSS staff members at 
NASA Headquarters in November 1963. Following this, Seamans 
met with NASA Administrator James E. Webb and NASA 
20 
Dr. Trutz Foelsche, "Remarks on Doses Outside the 
Magnetosphere, and on Effects Especially on Surfaces and 
Photographic Films," paper presented at the Meeting to 
Discuss Charged Particle Effects, NASA, Office of Advanced 
Research and Technology, March 19-20, 1964, Washington, D.C., 
p. 8. 
21 
Ibid. 
71 
t,), I 
"lII ~ 
en 
C 
« 
a: 
w 
en 
0 
C 
Z 
0 
I-
« 
C 
« 
a: 
72 
200 
150 
100 
50 
• {NOV. 1960 GROUP 
JULY 1959 GROUP 
)( FEB. 56 
VEHICLE 
SHIELD 
Dt, ..... 
'~.,de f:../ 
I ~ l.a~er 
0'- --1--- -----------
NO FILM 5 g/cm2 10 g/cm2 
SHIELD FILM SHIELD FILM SHIELD 
\.. ~ J 
2 g/cm2 
VEHICLE SHIELD 
Upper Limits of Doses on Surface and in Center of Film Sphere Surrounded by Additional 
Shields for Largest Solar Event Groups of the Sunspot Cycle 1954-1964. 
RADIATION DOSES 
r'~ , 
..i... 
Deputy Administrator Dr. Hugh L. Dryden. The three con-
ferred and agreed that Seamans would meet separately with 
representatives from each of the five companies in order 
to develop a better understanding of each proposal's 
22 
technical aspects. 
Dr. Seamans arranged for each bidder to brief him 
and Earl D. Hilburn, NASA Deputy Associate Administrator 
for Industry Affairs, together with several members of the 
Langley Source Evaluation Board. The briefings took place 
in Washington over a week-long period. The data on 
radiation hazards to film enabled Seamans to question 
each bidder from a position of strength about the problem 
of film damage in their systems due to a possible solar 
particle event during the thirty-day mission which an 
orbiter would have to carry out. 
The two bidders who had proposed spin-stabilized 
spacecraft necessarily had to rely on high-speed film and 
fast shutter speeds to compensate for image-motion. Two 
other bidders also had their photographic systems designed 
to employ high-speed films. When asked directly what 
would happen in the event of a solar flare, they had to 
22 
Letter from Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., to Dr. Eugene 
M. Emme, NASA Historian, Washington, D.C., Comments on 
"Lunar Orbiter: A Preliminary History," Comment Edition 
(HHN-71), November 25, 1969. 
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admit that their film would incur significant damage. 
Only the Boeing-Eastman Kodak system was designed to 
use a very low speed, insensitive film (ASA @ 1.6) 
which, with minimal shielding, would not be endangered 
by sudden discharges of high-energy radiation from the Sun 
or during transit through the Van Allen belts. 
Seamans concluded with confidence that the Boeing 
proposal definitely offered NASA advantages and safeguards 
which the other proposals did not. He concurred with 
Langley's recommendation that NASA choose Boeing as the 
contractor, and this decision opened the next phase of 
the program. 
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CHAPTER IV 
NASA AND BOEING NEGOTIATE A CONTRACT 
Early Boeing Preparations 
The Boeing Company of Seattle, Washingto~had been 
among the bidders for the Apollo Program's Lunar Excursion 
Module (LEM, later called Lunar Module, or LM) and had 
lost the competition to the Grumman Aircraft Corporation 
in the spring of 1963. Boeing's research studies for the 
LEM proposal enabled a team led by Thomas Yamauchi in the 
Aerospace Group to develop data for lunar orbital missions. 
The technical expertise which Boeing had assembled during 
the work on the LEM proposal subsequently became available 
for new work on an unmanned lunar orbiter. Boeing began 
to develop a proposal for a lunar orbiter spacecraft 
during the summer of 1963, utilizing the earlier research 
1 
work it had done for its LEM proposal. 
When Boeing presented its proposal to the NASA-Langley 
Source Evaluation Board it had developed and analyzed a 
spacecraft system whose capabilities matched or exceeded 
the requirements of the RFP. The Boeing proposal appeared 
so complete in its coverage of the technical problems of 
1 
Recorded interview with Thomas R. Costello, Aerospace 
Group, The Boeing Company, Washington, D.C., July 9, 1970. 
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creating a lunar orbiter that if the members of the SEB 
were to find any part of it questionable they would be forced 
to challenge the original assumptions upon which the 
Request for Proposals had been based. 
Among other key system problems, Boeing Company had 
even analyzed the possible danger to the camera film 
from radiation. From its analysis, Boeing developed 
data showing that high-speed films were subject to degra-
dation and fogging if they were not properly shielded 
fTom solar-flare-particle events. When Boeing convinced 
the Eastman Kodak Company to build the photographic system 
for its lunar orbiter, the data on radiation fogging of 
film enabled both to select a low-speed, insensitive film 
which would, nevertheless,perform the photographic tasks 
outlined in the RFP. 
The Boeing proposal won the NAS~-Langley recommen-
dation for acceptance, and on December 20, 1963,NASA 
Administrator James E. Webb announced the selection of 
2 
Boeing to build Lunar Orbiter. 
The Boeing Company had already established its Lunar 
Orbiter Program Office in June 1963 un~er the direction 
of Robert J. Helberg. Between June and December Helberg 
had handled the complete management responsibilities for 
2 
OSSA Review --Lunar Orbiter Program Status Report, 
January 23, 1964. 
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the 220-man Lunar Orbiter Team. He organized a tightly 
knit project group and directed its members in the pre-
paratory activities of the Lunar Orbiter proposal. These 
included research, technical design, test program ana-
lytical studies, the reliability program, manufacturing, 
quality assurance, contract administration, finance, 
facilities, and program controls. Helberg was a very 
capable administrator with an engineering background and, 
3 
since 1958, experience in the Bomarc Program. 
Boeing selected George H. Hage to assist Helberg as 
the Chief Engineer of the Lunar Orbiter Program. Hage 
had been a member of .the Lunar Excursion Module Engineering 
Team, and early in 1963 he had also taken charge of new 
business in the area of lunar reconnaissance. He directed 
studies and preliminary designing in the development and 
definition of an unmanned lunar orbiting satellite designed 
to obtain high-resolution photographiC data of the Moon's 
surface. Following this Hage had handled Boeing's tech-
nical activities during its 4roposal effort on the Agena-
class Lunar Orbiter Project. 
Carl A. Krafft was assigned to be the Lunar Orbiter 
Program Business Manager. Coming from the Bomarc Branch, 
he had experience in operations planning, costs and expen-
ditures control, performance evaluation, administration, 
3 
4 
Boeing Company biographical note on Robert J. Helberg. 
Boeing Company biographical note on George H. Hage. 
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and progress reporting. While with the Bomarc Branch 
he had directed the use of the PERT/Time and PERT/Cost 
and Line-of-Balance control techniques. (PERT stands for 
Performance Evaluation. Reporting Technique.) Krafft 
had gained extensive experience in contract negotiation, in 
accounting for contract execution,and in the preparation 
5 
of work statements and contract proposals. 
Two events augured well for the establishment of the 
Lunar Orbiter Program at Boeing. Firs~ the building 
housing the Bomarc Program became available to Helberg, 
and he moved his organization in under one roof. At the 
peak of the program Boeing had 1,700 to 1,800 people working 
on Lunar Orbiter. The large, isolated facility acco~odating 
Helberg's organization made communications between various 
members of the Lunar Orbiter Program more open and nearly 
instantaneous. 
Secondly, the U.S. Air Force canceled Project D,ynasoar 
in the spring of 1963, releasing a number of highly quali-
fied resident USAF personnel members to support Boeing's 
new NASA undertaking. Some of the USAF people had been 
engaged at Boeing on the X-20 Project, and they also 
became available for work on Lunar Orbiter. The Air Force 
personnel worked in two areas: engineering monitoring 
5 
Boeing Company biographical note on Carl A. Krafft. 
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and quality control. In both they assisted Boeing with 
their specific technical expertise. This assistance 
saved manpower at Langley. 
NASA Preparations for Contract Negotiations 
On November 1, 1963, Dr. Homer E. Newell announced 
the details of an organizational change which merged the 
Office of Space Sciences and the Office of Applications 
to form the new Office of Space Science and Applications 
(OSSA). This new organization became the Headquarters 
base for the Lunar Orbiter Program. The Office of Lunar 
and Planetary Programs, directed by Oran W. Nicks, was 
6 
a division of OSSA. 
After the Christmas holidays, preparations for the 
NASA-Boeing contract talks got under way on-January 6. The 
Office of Space Science and Applications sent Headquarters 
representatives to Boeing together with Langley contracting 
officers. The conference there resulted in an agreement 
on basic task areas which NASA and Boeing would work out 
before signing a contract. They also drew up a tentative 
schedule of activities for the fo110wingsixty·days. 
Following the Boeing meeting Langley officials met 
6 
Memorandum from Associate Administrator for Space 
Science and Applications to Division Directors, Office of 
Space Science and Applications, November 1, 1963. 
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with officials at the Jet Propulaion Laboratory to establish 
preliminary agreements on how Langley might best benefit 
from JPL assistance. JPL people pOinted out at this time 
that problems involving trajectory design for Lunar Orbiter 
would have to be handled by Langley and Boeing. Trajectory 
design, with its known strong correlation to the internal 
design of the spacecraft, could not easily be done by 
JPL without JPL becoming involved in spacecraft design. 
This kind of involvement would place a severe burden on 
the~manpower situation at JPL and would constitute the 
probable germ of interlaboratory friction. 
JPL officials defined the facility limits in tracking 
time and the probable ways in which the Deep Space Net 
(DSN) could best serve Lunar Orbiter. The tracking and 
data-acquisition facilities at JPL and the DSN were serving 
the needs of Ranger, Mariner, Surveyor, and Pioneer and 
Centaur during the period in which the Lunar Orbiter 
Program was establishing itself. JPL made an additional 
commitment to serve the needs of Lunar Orbiter when the 
7 
time came to fly. 
Following the West Coast preparations, NASA-Langley 
7 
Letter from Dr. Eberhardt Rechtin, Director, Advanced 
Research Projects Agency, Washington, D.C., to Dr. Eugene 
M. Emme, NASA Historian, November 18, 1969, with comments 
on manuscript "Lunar Orbiter: A Preliminary History" 
(HHN-7l) • 
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representatives met with officials of the Lewis Research 
Center and the Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, the 
prime contractor to Lewis for the Agena launch vehicle. 
At this time an intercenter agreement was established to 
cover the Agena-Lunar Orbiter interface. Subsequently 
the Lunar Orbiter Program Office in Washington conducted 
an information meeting to acquaint representatives of 
the various government mapping agencies with the Lunar 
Orbiter spacecraft deSign and the NASA mapping requirements 
as they existed at the time. By late January Boeing 
officials at Langley completed the preliminary tasks 
required for actual contract ~egotiations and gave a 
detailed presentation of all elements of their proposal 
8 
with tentative cost estimates and funding requirements. 
Lunar Orbiter planning accelerated during February 
when NASA officials met again with the Air Force personnel 
stationed at Boeing to discuss the role which they would 
play in the Lunar Orbiter Program. Following this meeting 
the Office of Space Science and Applications drafted a 
document defining the USAF support activity and sent it 
to Langley and the Air Force for approval. 
The Lunar Orbiter Project Office at Langley desired 
to make as much use of Air Force technical support at 
8 
OSSA Review --Lunar Orbiter Program Status Report, 
January 23, 1964. 
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Boeing as possible, especially since the Air Force had 
extensive experience with the Eastman Kodak camera system. 
In addition Boeing ! ~presentat ves met at Langley with 
officials from Lewis to discuss the problems of integrating 
the Agena and the spacecraft systems and to distribute the 
responsibilities involved ir. this task. Boeing and NASA 
officials agreed that Lewis would handle the shroud which 
would enclose the Lunar Orbiter atop the Atlas-Agena 
launch vehicle. Eventually Lewis issued an RFP for the 
shroud. It awarded the contract to Boeing and supervised 
production of the shroud. Once Boeing realized that Lock-
heed, manufacturer of the Agena, would not be able to handle 
the shroud, Boeing decided to take responsibility for its de-
sign and manufacture. Boeing wanted to see that the shroud 
and the spacecraft were absolutely compatible. 
In addition to making the shroud Boeing would take 
care of the adapter and separation system~whichwould 
integrate the spacecraft-shroud combination with the Agena 
and separate them at the proper time in space. 
Other Boeing officials continued to work out cost 
estimates with Langley contracting officers, and Langley 
finished drafting an integrated work statement toward 
the end of February. These preparations enabled NASA/Lang-
ley to begin detailed contract negotiations with Boein& 
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and on March 2 the talks commenced. 
Congressional Criticism of Contractor Choice 
While the Office of Space Science and Applications, 
the Langley Research Center, and the Boeing Company pro-
ceeded to work out the fine points of the Lunar Orbiter 
contract, some congressional criticism over NASA's choice 
of contractors rumbled down from Capitol Hill to NASA 
Headquarters. According to Aviation Week & S~ace Technology, 
NASA had decided to choose the Boeing proposal "because 
it offered the greatest assurance of mission success," 
and although the Seattle firm's price tag was seemingly 
the most expensive (approximately $60 million) "the firm 
won the contract because of the high reliability factor in 
10 
spacecraft design approach." 
As satisfying as this may have been to NASA and 
Boein&it struck a dissonant chord with Congressman Earl 
Wilson of Indiana. Wilson questioned NASA's selection of 
Boeing's more expensive bid over that of the Hughes Air-
craft Company, which would have cost supposedly half as 
much. The Space Science Subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Science and Astronautics, chaired by Congress-
9 
Status of Lunar Orbiter Program for possible use in 
OSSA Review, February 24, 1964. 
10 
"Boeing to Build Lunar Orbiter," AViation Week & 
Space Technology, Vol. 79, No. 27 (December 30, 1963),p. 22. 
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man Joseph Karth of Minnesota, joined Wilson and questioned 
NASA spokesmen extensively about their choice of Boeing. 
Despite their criticism NASA succeeded in convincing the 
Congressmen that "Boeing's proposal was selected because 
of its three-axis system rather than the spin-stabilized 
11 
system suggested by Hughes." 
Although one approach was not necessarily better than 
the other, the three-axis system greatly reduced the tech-
nica~ difficulties involved in the photographic system. 
Moreover, the Boeing proposal had a far superior technical 
approach to obtaining the necessary photographic data and 
a greater inherent likelihood that it would reliably do 
just that. This had been the determining factor in the 
evaluations of the five bidders' proposals. Langley 
evaluators had employed the philosophy that the price of 
a proposal was secondary to the quality of the technical 
design and the management program which the bidder offered. 
In both respects the Boeing bid had been judged superior. 
No Duplication of Effort 
Having vaulted the congressional hurdle, OSSA turned 
next to examine suggestions within NASA of the possible 
11 
. "NASA Explains Choice of Boeing Over Hughes in Lunar 
Orbiter Award,," Missiles and Rockets, Vol. 14, No. 10 
(March 9, 1964),p. 13. 
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duplication of work and development in the Lunar Orbiter 
Program. Earl D. Hilburn, Deputy Associate Administrator 
for Industry Affairs, notified Edgar M. Cortright in OSSA 
early in March that his office was concerned about the 
apparent intention of the Lunar Orbiter Program Office 
to allow Boeing to develop a new attitude control system 
despite the fact that NASA had already invested $10 million 
in research and development for such systems for the Ranger 
and Mariner spacecraft. Hilburn pointed to the possibility 
that Boeing might desire to use the Lunar Orbiter contract 
as a means to justify building up a new technological 
capatility. Hilburn requested that Cortright scrutinize 
any such situation in contract negotiations with Boeing 
and establish a reason for any seeming duplication of 
12 
effort. 
Cortright responded to Hilburn quickly with a lengthy 
description of the NASA-Boeing negotiations as they had 
developed through March. The Lunar Orbiter Program, he 
stressed, was attempting to make the maximum use of flight-
proven hardware. This meant that Boeing would serve as the 
prime systems integrator because it alone retained the 
12 
Memorandum from Earl D. Hilburn, Deputy Associate 
Administrator for Industry Affairs, to Edgar M. Cortright, 
Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Science and 
Applications, March 19, 1964. 
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responsibility for the Lunar Orbiter spacecraft structure 
and attitude control system. Boeing and NASA would spend 
more than 50% of the contract funds on hardware which 
Eastman Kodak and RCA would supply. 
Contrary to Hilburn's major worry, the Boeing Company 
had a well-developed electronics capability gained through 
its experience as contractor for the Bomarc, Dynasoar, and 
Minuteman systems, and despite this NASA negotiators had 
encouraged Boeing to look for companies with greater com-
petency in guidance systems: Northrop, Philco, General 
Electric, and Bendix, for example. Moreover, during the 
final phase of the Ranger Program when a fifth block of 
spacecraft had been under consideration, Northrop had 
been prime contractor. When the Block V Rangers were 
canceled in December, 1963, Northrop had been assigned to 
conduct a technology transfer study. This study had proved 
13 
very useful to NASA and Boeing. 
Cortright stressed that the Lunar Orbiter Program 
Office and the Boeing Company were basing contract talks 
on the axiom that they use as much off-the-shelf hardware 
13 
On March 8, 1963, NASA had announced the selection of 
the Northrop Corporation for industrial support on Ranger 
Blocks III and IV and as contractor for produQing R~ger 
Block V spacecraft (see Aviation Week, March l~, 1963). 
On December 13, 1963,NASA Headquarters directed JPL to ter-
minate all activities with the Ranger Block V (see NASA 
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1963, p. 477). Following this, 
Northrop began a technology transfer study (see Northrop 
Space Laboratories, Technology Utilization Review and AnalysiS, 
Final Report, Vol. II, NSL 64-192, September 1964). 
86 
.. L 
i.~., t 
.. 'll if-
..:L.,.. 
14 
as possible. He stressed that because the attitude con-
trol system of the Lunar Orbiter spacecraft would have to 
fulfill many more demands than that of a Ranger or a 
Mariner deep space probe, and because the system was so 
interrelated to all other spacecraft systems, the Office 
of Space Science and Applications had decided that the 
prime contractor, Boeing, should take the full responsi-
bility for the attitude control system and its integration 
with all other systems. However, NASA and Boeing had 
reached agreement that the latter would use at least the 
following items of hardware in building the attitude 
control system: 
1. Inertial Reference Unit --to be purchased from 
Kearfott, previously used on Mariner C. 
2. Sun Sensor--to be purchased from Bendix, previously 
flight qualified. 
3. Canopus Sensor --identical with one on board Mariner 
C; JPL fabricating this item. Boeing would request 
proposals from seven contractors, including Northrop, 
using JPL specifications. 
4. Reaction Control System (thrusters, squibs, filters, 
regulators, etc.) -- to be purchased from various 
companies. Boeing to construct the nitrogen tanks. 
5. Flight Programmer -- because of the complexity and 
critical importance of this unit, Boeing would 
retain full responsibility but would purchase items 
for its construction from various companies as it 
14 
Memorandum from Edgar M. Cortright to Earl D. Hilburn, 
April 8, 1964. 
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deemed fit.15 
The brain of the spacecraft would be the Flight 
Programmer, an electronic wizard approximately the size 
of a shoe box, and its performance could determine the 
success or failure of any mission to the Moon. Because 
of the crucial role of the Flight Programmer, its con-
figuration significantly influenced the design of the rest 
of the Lunar Orbiter's systems. (See Chapter VI for a 
description of the Flight Programmer.) The completion 
~ 
of the Programmer would have to await the integration of 
the spacecraft's other components and subsystems so that 
it could be placed in the spacecraft as the nerve center 
linking all of the parts together in an electronic or-
ganism. 
Langley and the Office of Space Science and Appli-
cations believed that Boeing had to retain the complete 
responsibility for the Programmer, the attitude control 
system,and their integration. Boeing also would conduct 
any necessary analyses, engineering, and computer studies 
of this system in order to have the working flexibility to 
16 
cope with unforeseen problems and unexpected changes. 
This arrangement in no way meant that Boeing would under-
88 
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take the completely new design and fabrication of a unique 
attitude control system. On the contrary, the record 
demonstrated convincingly that the contractor was attempting 
to use as many off-the-shelf and flight-proven items of 
hardware as possible and that it was utilizing experience 
gained in earlier NASA programs. 
NASA Solely Responsible for PhotograEhic Data 
A more difficult problem impinging upon contract 
negotiations was the working relationship which Boeing 
and NASA were going to establish with the two major sub-
contractors: RCA and Eastman Kodak. Eastman Kodak's 
photographic system would be the- heart of the Lunar Orbiter, 
and this meant that Eastman Kodak would play a major role 
in the success of the program. However, NASA-Langley and 
Boeing had to define and limit the extent of this firm's 
partiCipation in the Lunar Orbiter Program. 
One reason for this became apparent when Boeing 
suggested that the Lunar Orbiter Program use the Eastman 
Kodak facilities for reconstituting and processing photo-
graphic data from the spacecraft. Boeing considered this 
to be advantageous because of the presence of the NASA-
owned Ground Reassembly Printer at the EK plant in Roches-
17 
ter New York. Lt. Col. Clifton E. James, Assistant for 
17 
Memorandum from Dr. Homer E. Newell, Associate Ad-
ministrator for Space Science and Applications, to Dr. Robert 
Seamans, Associate Administrator of NASA, March 19, 1964. 
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Photography, USAF Office of Space Systems, raised the first 
sign of disapproval of the Boeing idea in a memorandum 
to Brockway McMillan, the Under Secretary of the Air 
Force, in February. "'James stressed that lithe achievement 
of large scale lunar photography will most certainly 
create wide public interest which can be compared with the 
acclaim accorded to Sputnik I and the first manned orbital 
18 
flight." 
Because of the great potential impact of such an event 
and because it would be sustained not by one but by five 
photographic missions, James felt that United States 
space exploration would best profit if the National Aero-
mautics and Space Administration managed every facet of 
the processing, handling, and distribution of all photo-
graphic and other data transmitted to Earth by the space-
craft. James stressed that "the selection of a contractor's 
facility for establishing the Lunar Photographic Production 
Laboratory will not only detract from the potential prestige 
of this program, but it will also result in management 
19 
problems •••• " 
In NASA Seamans read the James memorandum and sent it 
on to Homer E. Newe11 in OSSA for review. After evalua-
18 
Memorandum from Lt. Col. Clifton E. James, USAF Office 
of Space Systems, to the Under Secretary of the Air Force, 
February 26, 1964, p. 1. 
19 
Ibid., p. 3. 
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ting the criticisms which James had raised, Newell's 
office resolved tha~ although "the consequences of per-
forming this ~ork at Eastman Kodak are uncertain, the 
20 
possible disadvantages appear to outweigh the advantages." 
Newell felt that Eastman Koda~with its reputation for 
extremely precise, high-quality work but also strong 
security consciousness, might hinder the accessibility of 
interested parties to the lunar photographic data. There-
fore, his office recommended that NASA conduct the pro-
cessing of Lunar Orbiter photographic data, most likely 
at Langley, using technicians from EK in the initial stages 
of data reduction. All of this work would be done under 
NASA auspices and management. Boeing would have to accept 
NASA's position on this matter as final. 
Langley-JPL Working Relations 
Langley began to work with the Jet Propulsion Labora-
tory in the establishment of the formal support activity 
which the Lunar Orbiter Program would require in order to 
fly the five authorized missions. Members of the Lunar 
Orbiter Project Office at the Langley center met with JPL 
officials during the spring of 1964. The vital service 
which the JPL-managed Deep Space Net, consisting of the 
Deep Space Instrumentation Facility (DSIF) and the Space 
20 
Memorandum, Newell to Seamans, March 19, 1964. 
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Flight Operations Facility (SFOF), would provide Langley 
was stated as "the acquisition, transmission, processing, 
display, and control of spacecraft tracking and communi-
cations information necessary to the support of flight 
project mission requirements. These project requirements 
include navigation, scientific mea~urements, photography, 
spacecraft and mission control, and spacecraft performance 
21 
monitoring." 
Eventually the JPL DSN support effort for Lunar 
Orbiter approached the level of between 500 and 1,000 man-
years of work. At the same time the tracking and data-
acquisition facilities also served the Ranger, Mariner, 
and Surveyor programs. At first Langley experienced some 
difficulties in defining precisely what tasks JPL could 
perform for the program, but this was no fault of JPL. On 
the contrary, JPL, facing manpower shortages and a scarcity 
of computer time, managed to meet the needs of the Lunar 
Orbiter Program without causing any schedule slippages or 
22 
launch delays. 
One of the key problems in establishing a coordinated 
working relationship between Langley and JPL was the defi-
21 
J. R. Hall (ed.), TDS Final Report, Tracking and Data 
System Report Series for Lunar Orbiter Project, Vol. I, 
Support Summary (608-15), Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Septem-
ber 1, 1969, p. 1-1. 
22 Letter, Rechtin to Emme; November 18, 1969. 
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nition of the extent to which JPL should become involved 
in analytical work for Orbiter, involving such areas as 
trajectory design. Langley requested JPL to make a de-
finitive study of the Lunar Orbiter tracking data require-
ments to parallel a similar one which Boeing was conducting. 
At the Lunar Orbiter Mission and Trajectory Analysis 
Meeting on April 15, JPL representatives suggested to 
Langley officials that Boeing send one or more men to 
undergo a familiarization and orientation period at the 
DSN facilities so that Boeing might know exactly what 
the facilities offered. Following this Boeing could erect 
its own computer facility to simulate the Space Flight 
Operations Facility, accomplish its own programming, and 
check out and integrate this set-up with that of JPL at 
SFOF. 
The problem which Langley and Boeing had to work 
around was the shortage of computer time at the JPL facili-
ties due, in part, to the needs of Surveyor. The familiar-
ization and orientation period would involve approximately 
20 man-years of work. More important, however, for JPL 
was the recognition that any direct and intimate involve-
ment in trajectory design and related analyses would de-
mand that JPL also become involved in spacecraft design, 
because much of the planning of software and trajectory 
deSign depended upon the deSign of the spacecraft's communi-
cations system. JPL, understandably, was not in a position 
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to conunit manpower and computer time to sur~h work for 
Langley, and it made this clec.....,:.' in a memorandum to Floyd 
L. Thompson 0 April 2, 1964. Following the April 15 Tra-
jectory Analysis Meeting Thompson notified Newell at NASA 
23 
Headquarters of the JPL position. The JPL suggestion 
to~ducate Boeing men at its DSN facilities proved accept-
able to Boeing and Langley. 
In addition to meetings with JPL officials, Lunar 
Orbiter Project officials from Langley spent two days at 
the beginning of April with representatives from Boeing 
and OSSA at the Kennedy Space Center inspecting the facili-
ties for Lunar Orbiter. They also briefed personnel there 
on the Orbiter requirements which KSC would have to meet. 
Scherer noted that the program needed new hangar facilities 
at Cape Kennedy if it wanted to avoid an undue burden on 
24 
existing space. 
With most of the anticipated problems resolved, the 
Langley Research Center and the Boeing Company signed the 
Lunar Orbiter contract on April 16 and sent t to NASA 
Headquarters for final review. The total period of con-
tract negotiations had been remarkably short and intense. 
23 Ref.: (a) Memorandum to NASA Code S, Attention: Homer 
E. Newell, from Langley Director, Sut~ect: Request for Addi-
tional Support for Lunar Orbiter from 'PL, dated April 2, 
1964, dictated by Crabill (LRC), April 20, 1964. 
240SSA Rev::)dw, Lunar Orbiter Status Report, May 5, 1964. 
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NASA and Boeing worked out an excellent implementation 
cycle for program activities while, simultaneously, Boe-
ing supplied Langley and NASA Headquarters with very ex-
tensive supporting documentation, which detailed among 
other things the cost back-up data from the major sub-
contractors. 
Scherer ascribed Boeing's excellent responsiveness 
during contract negotiations to the fact that NASA had 
predetermined the incentive features of the contract in 
the Request for Proposals. Moreover, the absence of a 
letter contract made it mandatory that negotiations be 
completed before actual work began, creating a sense of 
urgency for completing them as quickly as possible. 25 
Boeing's willingness to listen to and analyze NASA's re-
quests paid off on May 7, 1964, when James E. Webb signed 
the document approving the Lunar Orbiter contract and 
making the program an official NASA commitment. 
Lunar Orbiter was a second-generation spacecraft and 
the first new start in lunar exploration since the decision 
to attempt a manned lunar landing mission to the Moon. 
The program's objectives were straightforward: the imple-
mentation at the earliest possible date of simple, reliable 
engineering measurements to determine the soundness of the 
25 
OSSA Rev1ew~ Lunar Orbiter Program Status Report, 
March 26, 1964, pp. 1-2. 
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spacecraft's design and the acquisition of scientific 
26 
data about the Moon and its environment. This infor-
mation would prove vital for the mission design activities 
of the Apollo Program. In every respect, therefore, the 
Lunar Orbiter Program must be viewed as a direct support 
activity in implementing the decision to land men on the 
Moon and return them safely to Earth. 
26 
Plans for Lunar Orbiter Data Acquisition and Analysis, 
Lunar Orbiter Program Office, March 20, 1964, pp. 1-2. 
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CHAPTER V 
IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM 
Early Funding Considerations 
The beginning of the Lunar Orbiter Program's next 
stage was hardly noticed in the turbulent atmosphere in 
which the U.S. space program existed at home and abroad. 
Congress was questioning NASA and JPL about apparent poor 
management in the Ranger Program, while the first manned 
Gemini flight, scheduled for launch late in 1964, was 
experiencing setbacks. Everywhere, it seemed, the critics 
of America's space exploration efforts were finding fault, 
with NASA. They pointed to Soviet manned and unmanned 
space accomplishments and asked why the United States was 
not keeping pace. In the midst of these inauspicious 
circumstances, the fledgling Lunar Orbiter Program at 
Langley nevertheless got off to a promising start. 
Four aspec~s of the new program became important 
during the twelve months that followed the signing 
of the contract: 1) funding; 2) spacecraft design; 
fabrication, testing, and integration with the launch 
vehicle·j 3) mission designj and 4) the establishment of 
schedules and working relationships between the various 
NASA centers and the contractors. Once the definitive 
contract with Boeing had been approved, funding problems 
became more complex. They constituted one of the dominant 
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constraints defining the flow of activities during the 
entire course of the program. A brief description of 
funding through the end of 1964 will illustrate the problem. 
Beginning in February 1964 the Office of Space Science 
and Applications had decided to commit to Lunar Orbiter 
the full $20 million which Congress had appropriated for 
FY 1964 specifically for an orbiter. However, the nego-
tiated contract of April 16 obligated NASA to provide 
Boeing with funds as it required them, if the contractor 
was to be held to the incentive provisions in the contract. 
This meant that NASA had to establish and maintain a mini-
mum funding rate to avoid schedule lags. Although NASA 
committed the FY 1964 funds, the Lunar Orbiter Program 
faced a new situation in FY 1965, beginning July 1, 1964. 
During the contract talks Boeing had predicted an expenditure 
rate of $26.1 million for that fiscal year, but by May 
1 
this sum had increased to $37.1 million. 
A detailed PERT revealed one reason for this sudden 
rise. It found that by compressing the development phase 
of the progra~ NASA could gain more time for the testing 
phase. Acceleration of development, however, would require 
a higher funding rate than Langley or Headquarters had 
originally anticipated. 
1 
NASA, Office of Space Science and Applications, Memo-
randum, Subject: Lunar Orbiter Funding, POP-64-3, August 24, 
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Realizing this the Office of Space Science and 
Applications released a guideline of $31.5 million for 
FY 1965 to the Langley Research Center in the spring of 1964. 
Of this Boeing would spend $28.9 million. Langley, on the 
other hand, had requested $39.1 million, of which Boeing 
was to spend $37.1 million. OSSA preferred to remain 
conservative, waiting until Boeing could supply more accurate, 
concrete information on funding needs before making a 
decision to increase the funding rate. Oran W. Nicks, 
Director of Lunar and Planetary Programs within OSSA, 
felt that the Lunar Orbiter funding requirements could in-
crease at an uncomfortably fast pace and thus compromise 
other projects within OSSA. 
Costs data for the Lunar Orbiter Program during the 
first quarter of the project, ending June 30, 1964, re-
vealed that actual costs had exceeded estimated costs by 
$1.1 million. The estimated costs had been made by the 
Boeing Company on April 30, and the difference between the 
two constituted an underestimate by Boeing of 45% for the 
2 
quarter. 
Throughout the summer of 1964 the rate of expenditure 
at Boeing remained Langley's single greatest headache. 
This was almost entirely due to Boeing's failure to sign 
2 
Lunar Orbiter Project Office, Langley Research Center, 
Project Lunar Orbiter, Narrative Analysis, August 14, 1964. 
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the two major subcontractors, Eastman Kodak and RCA, to 
definitive contracts. Floyd L. Thompson kept Nicks 
informed of the funding problem during the summer months, 
and in August Nicks requested Thompson to review the 
entire funding situation and its potential impact on other 
3 
programs. 
The scope of the funding problem revealed the need 
for closer cooperation between Langley and NASA Headquarters. 
Both organizations sent representatives to an August 19 
meeting at Langley to examine and resolve their differences 
and strengthen the coordination of policies pertaining to 
4 
Lunar Orbiter. At the meeting officials from the various 
Langley offices connected with Lunar Orbiter gave detailed 
presentations of their work and requested further support 
of clarification of policies pertaining to the program. 
Headquarters people made it clear that they wished 
to establish much firmer ties with Langley to ens~re a 
better request-response relationship throughout the program. 
Langley people expressed concern that they had had to make 
decisions without the help of such useful tools as complete 
monthly funding reports from Headquarters which they could 
3 
Memorandum from Oran W. Nicks, OSSA, to Floyd L. 
Thompson, Director of the Langley Research Center, August 
20, 1964. 
4 
Minutes of Lunar Orbiter Program Funding Meeting, 
Langley Research Center, August 19, 1964. 
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5 
use to gauge their expenditure flow. 
Another pressing matter aired at the meeting was 
Langley's desire to fund Boeing three months in advance. 
This would allow enough flexibility to keep hardware pro-
curement from falling behind schedule. But, because of the 
acceleration of development during the tight money situation 
in FY 1965, Langley's request appeared to be out of the 
question. Even with the present funding plan, funding to 
Boeing tended toward a minimum below which it could not go 
without precipitating serious schedule changes. 
Langley and Headquarters officials decided to estab-
lish a minimum level for total expenditures at $41 million 
6 
for fiscal 1965. Cost reduction appeared unlikely in 
every program area except the Air Force Support Services 
at the Boeing Company. Here, according to Nicks, the very 
high projected cost figure of $2.45 million for FY 1965, 
which Langley's AugUst Program Operating Plan had forecast, 
might be subject to reduction. In FY 1964 the U.S. Air 
Force had charged NASA an expensive 6% of Langley's com-
bined contract costs as the fee for its support. NASA 
wanted the more reasonable rate of 1% to 2% which it re-
ceived from the Navy and the Army for their various support 
services. 
5 
Ibid. 6-
Ibid. 
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Nicks maintained that if NASA could obtain a figure 
of 1.5% of the Lunar Orbiter contract costs for FY 1965 
as the rate of charge for USAF support, then it could 
alleviate some of the financial pressure which limited 
the flexibility of Lunar Orbiter funding in the coming 
7 
fiscal year. This new arrangement would have to be 
worked out with Air Force representatives. 
Meanwhile the participants in the August 19 funding 
meeting agreed that no contract changes would be made if 
the changes would increase funding above the FY 1965 
guidelines or above those laid down in the Project Approval 
Document or above the total program guidelines, unless 
the Lunar Orbiter Program Office in Washington had subjected 
8 
the proposed changes to the most thorough scrutiny. 
The fact that the bulk pf the procurement and develop-
ment expenditures would come in FY 1965 further clouded 
the Lunar Orbiter funding situation. This reality placed 
a strict constraint on administration of the incentive 
contract with Boeing; it also prompted Langley Director 
Floyd L. Thompson to comment that,"if we aren't prepared to 
play table stakes, we shouldn't be in the incentive poker 
7 
Memorandum from Oran W. Nicks, Director of Lunar and 
Planetary Programs, to the Director of Program Review and 
Resources Management, August 21, 1964. 
8 
Minutes of Lunar Orbiter Program Funding Meeting, 
August 19, 1964 
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9 
game." To this Scherer added that, "when the government 
asks a contractor to assume the risk of an incentive con-
tract, it must assume itself the responsibility for funding 
10 
the contractor as he needs it." He named the figure of 
$41.8 million as the rock-bottom minimum for the program 
in FY 1965 and stressed that any slip below this would 
cause schedules to lag and force basic alterations in the 
contract. 
Lunar Orbiter funding became very tight in September 
at the time when Boeing was beginning to negotiate final 
contracts with Eastman Kodak and RCA. Langley informed 
NASA Headquarters that Boeing had received quotations 
from Eastman Kodak and RCA and, starting on September 14, 
11 
would begin contract negotiations. The original costs 
for the photographic system, which Boeing had quoted to 
Langley officials, proved to be much lower than the price 
at which Eastman Kodak was willing to deliver the sub-
system for the spacecraft. This, in turn, had slowed 
contract talks between the two firms. 
Scherer's main concern about the funding situation 
centered upon his recognition that to allow the program 
9 
Memorandum from Lee R. Scherer to Oran W. Nicks con-
cerning Lunar Orbiter FY 1966 Funding, September 4, 1964, p. 2. 
10 
Ibid. 
11-
Project Lunar Orbiter. Narrative Analysis, September 4, 
1964. 
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to fall behind schedule because of too stringent funding 
would be tantamount to erasing the advantages of the in-
centive contract. If NASA induced the contractor to lose 
confidence in the contract because of a necessity to re-
negotiate part or all of it because of NASA niggardliness, 
then the program's overall success would be jeopardized. 
But NASA Headquarters remained steadfast in its 
retention of the $41.8-million FY 1965 funding minimum, 
12 
even though Langley had called for $45.9 million. 
The growing seriousness of this problem brought Head-
quarters and Langley officials together on September 9. 
They established a new funding level based upon the in-
creased requirements of Lunar Orbiter. This raised the 
original $94.6 million figure for the FY 1965-F'Y 1966 
13 
period to $105 million. The new ceiling offered Langley 
greater flexibility and reassured the Lunar Orbiter Pro-
gram Office in Washington that the incentive provisions 
of the Boeing contract would be maintained. 
Both Langley and Headquarters concurred in the policy 
of holding all contract and schedule changes to the barest 
minimum. Moreover, both undertook studies of their opera-
12 
Memorandum from Scherer to Nicks, September 4, 1964. 
13 
Memorandum from Homer E. Newell to Floyd L. Thompson, 
Subject: Guidelines for Lunar Orbiter Project, October 22, 
1964. 
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tions to determine where costs might be reduced, and by 
the end of 1964 they had succeeded in pinpointing several 
ways to save more money. Scherer summarized the areas 
where cost reductions seemed most feasible and sent a 
report to Clifford H. Nelson at Langley at the end of 
December. 
Boeing Negotiations with Subcontractors 
Boeing satisfactorily completed technical negotiations 
with the Eastman Kodak Company by September 14, but cost 
negotiations became protracted. Eastman Kodak submitted 
a proposal of $27.1 million to Boeing, and this was sub-
stantially higher than the Boeing estimate of $19.3 million. 
By October 6 the Langley Project Office realized that 
cost overruns for the spacecraft would be in the areas 
of procurement and the major subcontracts. Boeing re-
sumed negotiations with Eastman and completed them by 
October 28. The Eastman contract would cost $22.4 
million, which was still higher than the original Boeing 
15 
estimate. This meant that Boeing had already overrun 
the original contract by approximately $11.91 million: 
$3.07 million for procurement, $3.3-million difference 
14 
14 
Project Lunar Orbiter, Narrative Analysis, September 14, 
1964. 
15 
Ibid., October 28, 1964. 
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between budgeted and negotiated costs of the Eastman 
Kodak contract, and an estimated $5.64 million between 
16 
budgeted and proposed costs for the RCA contract. 
Although negotiations with RCA originally were to run 
sJmultaneously with Eastman Kodak contract talks, they 
were delayed until Boeing had finished with Eastman. 
Scheduled for late November, the RCA talks were pushed 
back to December, when Boeing and RCA finally began cost 
negotiations. By December 9 RCA had offered Boeing a 
proposal for the communications subsystem with a 
total cost of $20.795 million for the spacecraft equip-
ment and $5.329 million for the ground equipment. The cost 
was $8.4 million over the original Boeing estimate of 
17 $17.726 million. Boeing did not complete cost negotiations 
with RCA until January 15, 1965, and, the final cost figure 
was $22.6 million, substantially higher than the $17.7 
18 
million Boeing estimate. These subcontracts brought 
the total cost of the Boeing contract to approximately 
$94.8 million by February 8, 1965. Of this, $4.0 million 
was for authorized changes and $10.3 million for estimated 
19 
overruns. 
17 I~id., December 9, 1964. 
l8Ibld ., January 25, 1965. 
19 Ibid., February 8 1965. 
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NASA Cost-Reduction Efforts 
Faced with the necessity to increase the rate of 
~ding during the development and testing phases of the 
Lunar Orbiter Program, both the Langley Lunar Orbiter 
Project Office and the Headquarters Program Office initi-
ated policies to reduce unnecessary costs wherever possible. 
Learning from the Boeing-subcontractor negotiating 
experiences, NASA Headquarters and Langley continued to 
pursue the policy of keeping contract changes to an ab-
solute minimum. The funding experiences of the second 
half of 1964 had made the managers of the Lunar Orbiter 
Program very cost conscious. The frequent meetings to 
discuss funding problems had improved communications be-
tween Langley and NASA Headquarters while they had also 
fostered a keen awareness by Boeing and NASA management 
of the implications and pitfalls in the Lunar Orbiter 
contract. 
Besides the strictest limitations on changes, Lunar 
Orbiter could be spared undue expenses in another specific 
area: the planned need for redundant spacecraft to back 
up each flight spacecraft in the event of a failure before 
the launch. Originally the plans had called for the 
backup spacecraft, but after extensive consideration the 
Project Office at Langley concluded that direct substitu-
tion of one spacecraft for another between two launch 
107 
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windows, should the first spacecraft fail, was highly un-
likely since the failure would probably necessitate an 
20 
investigation of the other spacecraft. 
In addition to this, storage problems at Cape Kennedy 
and the necessity of maintaining the back-up spacecraft 
in mission-ready condition during preparation of the flight 
spacecraft presented no real guarantee of mission success 
but added extra costs to the program. Indeed the whole 
philosophy of spacecraft substitution seemed questionable, 
especially in a situation where every dollar counted. 
Scherer pointed out to Nelson in a memorandum that the 
earlier Pioneer and Surveyor programs had originally made 
provisions for back-up spacecraft but had later eliminated 
them. The Lunar Orbiter Program, by doing the same, could 
21 
save a substantial sum of money. 
Elimination of the need for back-up spacecraft was 
not the only way savings could be made. The spacecraft 
delivery schedule proved to be another item for cost re-
duction. The spacecraft were scheduled to arrive at the 
Cape Kennedy facilities more rapidly than they could 
be launched. They would require storage space there, and 
this was very limited. As planned, spacecraft #8, the 
20 
Memorandum from Lee R. Scherer, Lunar Orbiter Program 
Manager, to Clifford H. Nelson, Lunar Orbiter Project Manager, 
Langley Research Center, December 31, 1964, pp. 2-3. 
21 
Ibid., p. 3. 
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last flight spacecraft, would arrive a full six months 
before its launch date; this would require that a "baby-
sitter" keep it company for that length of time, clogging 
vital test and storage facilities. Scherer maintained 
that if changes were made in the delivery dates of the 
fifth through the eighth spacecraft, the storage vans and 
test teams could be reduced and money diverted for use 
22 
elsewhere. 
One other item which Scherer explained to Nelson 
was the possibility of reducing costs by economizing 
on redundant recording equipment which the Lunar Orbiter 
Program would employ at each site of the Deep Space Net-
work to record incoming data from the spacecraft. Com-
paring data-acquisition requirements of the Mariner Pro-
gram with those of Lunar Orbiter, Scherer pointed out that 
Mariner had only two recording apparatuses per site, one 
of which served as a back-up. The Lunar Orbiter Program 
planned to have three or more, which seemed to be waste-
ful redundancy. He suggested to Nelson that he review 
the program's needs for so much recording equipment and, 
wherever possible, reduce or eliminate unnecessary extra 
23 
equipment. 
22 
Ibid. 
23-
Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
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If funding difficulties for FY 1965 placed a major 
constraint on initial program operations, they also en-
hanced the performance of each task force engaged in the 
program, and the process of overcoming them educated 
Langley and Headquarters management as well as Boeing 
officials about the increasing complexity of the whole 
undertaking. It was clear by the beginning of 1965 that 
Boeing had originally underestimated the costs of the 
major subcontractors. The delays in signing both East-
man Kodak and RCA had made themselves felt in the area 
of development and procurement. Indeed, throughout the 
program the photographic subsystem would remain the pacing 
item, arriving late and at the Cape Kennedy facilities 
rather than at Boeing. Fortunately for Lunar Orbiter, 
NASA and Boeing personnel successfully circumvented the 
problems caused by the tardiness in signing the sub con-
24 
tractors to final contracts. 
24 
Recorded interview with James S. Martin, former 
Lunar Orbiter Assistant Project Manager, Langley Research 
Center, July 7, 1970. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE LUNAR ORBITER SPACECRAFT 
A General Description 
Before surveying the design and development phases 
of the Lunar Orbiter Program, it will be useful to describe 
the spacecraft which Boeing built for Langley. In the 
final design the Boeing Orbiter weighed about 385 kilograms 
and was 1.7 meters tall and 1.5 meters in diameter at 
its base, without including the solar panels and the 
antennas. Structurally the spacecraft had three decks 
supported by trusses and an arch. On the largest deck 
the main equipment was mounted: batteries, transponder, 
flight programmer, photographic system, inertial reference 
unit (IRU), Canopus star tracker, command decoder, multi-
plex encoder, and the traveling-wave-tube amplifier 
(TWTA), together with smaller units. Four solar panels 
and two antennas extended from the perimeter of this equip-
1 
ment deck. 
Above it, the middle deck supported the v~locity control 
engine (the 100-pound-thrust Marquardt rocket motor), 
the fuel tanks, the oxidizer tank for the velocity control 
engine, the coarse Sun sensor, and the micrometeoroid de-
1 
Space Division, Boeing Company, The Lunar Orbiter, pre-
pared for Langley Research Center, revised April 1966, 
pp. 20-21. 
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tectors. Above this the third deck contained the heat 
shield to protect the spacecraft from the heat generated by 
the firing of the velocity control engine. In addition 
the four attitude control thrusters were mounted on its 
perimeter. This uppermost deck was part of the engine 
module, which could be detached for test purposes. 
Directly under the engine was the high-pressure nitrogen 
tan~ which provided pressure to feed fuel to the velocity 
control engine and to operate the attitude control thrusters. 
Th~s tank was one of the critical units; if anything 
caused it to lose pressure, the spacecraft could not 
manuever, and an entire mission could be ruined. 
These and other items of spacecraft equipment formed 
subsystems of the whole spacecraft system. Working 
together they performed the Lunar Orbiter mission. The 
Eastman Kodak photographic subsystem has previously been 
3 
described. Electrical power was provided by a power 
2 
system which operated in two modes: 1) solar panels con-
verted solar radiation into electric current, and 2) batteries 
powered the spacecraft systems for short periods of occul-
tation from the Sun. In periods when the solar panels 
would receive radiation from the Sun, the power supply would 
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run from the panels through the output voltage regulator 
to the other spacecraft systems (mode 1). This happened 
for the major part of the mission. At the same time power 
generated by the panels would also be directed into the 
battery charge controller, and from there a charging current 
would flow into the batteries as they could accept it. 
When no sunlight fell on the panels, the batteries would 
supply power to the output voltage regulator, and this 
would direct its flow to the spacecraft subsystems (mode 
2).4 In addition the power system had regulators and 
controllers to reduce unusual fluctuations to a minimum 
and enough solar cells to allow ~icrometeoroid damage to 
some without dangerous reduction in the capacity of the 
solar panels to generate electricity. 
The attitude control subsystem served as the navigator 
for Lunar Orbiter during an entire mission. Composed of Sun 
sensors, the Canopus sensor, the inertial reference unit, 
and the thrusters, the system controlled the spacecraft's 
attitude in space in reference to the Sun, the star Canopus, 
and the Moon. The Sun sensors would "see" the Sun, pro-
duce Signals which activated the attitude control thrusters, 
and these would align the spacecraft's roll axis with the 
sun. Once this reference was established the spacecraft 
could manuever off the reference and the IRU would remember 
4 
Boeing, The Lunar Orbiter, pp. 26-27. 
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the original reference. If the need arose to move the 
spacecraft back to that reference, the IRU would signal the 
thrusters to correct the attitude. However, the IRU 
simply remembered reference points; it did not establish 
them. 
Attitude control was directed by the flight electr~nics 
control assembly (FECA) and the Flight Programmer, which 
received data from all sensors and then informed ground 
control monitors, who could update the Programmer for future 
attitude manuevers. The FECA and the Flight Programmer 
controlled the spacecraft's attitude around its X (roll), 
y (yaw), and Z (pitch) axes by activating the thrusters. 
They also governed the orientation of the photographic 
subsystem's camera lenses in relation to the surface of 
the Moon. Commands from Earth would make the spacecraft 
rotate through an angle around each axis according to 
the task to be executed, and the outputs of the gyros in 
the IRU would tell the Flight Programmer when the new 
attitude had been achieved. The Flight Programmer would 
stabilize and maintain the spacecraft in the new attitude 
relative to the three reference directions, and the IRU 
would tell it when there was any deviation from the established 
5 
attitude. 
5 
Ibid., p. 28. 
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The Atlas-Agena D launch vehicle placed all five of 
the' Lunar Orbiter spacecraft in parking orbits around 
Earth. The Agena with the spacecraft would remain in the 
parking orbit until the time to begin the translunar 
trajectory manuever,in which the Agena would fire out of 
Earth orbit toward the Moon. Once the spacecraft separated 
from the Agena there remained the task of correcting its 
initial trajectory and then of deboosting it into lunar 
orbit. The velocity control subsystem held the responsi-
bility for this task and had to execute any changes in 
trajectory and speed. 
The heart of the system was a lOO-pound-thrust rocket 
whose hypergolic fuel and oxidizer ignited when the Flight 
Programmer commanded the intake valves to open. A burn to 
change the spacecraft's velocity would then occur and con-
tinue until the valves closed. Duration of any burn would 
be determined by information from the accelerometers in 
the IRU compared with prestored data in the Flight Programmer. 
The rocket engine was gimbaled to provide thrust vector 
control in order to accomodate center-of-gravi~y offsets 
and thrust asymmetries. The IRU accelerometers provided 
inputs for thrust vector control, the purpose of which was 
to keep the thrust of the velocity control engine through 
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6 
the spacecraft's center of mass. 
A nominal mission would provide for two midcourse 
manuevers to bring the Orbiter's trajectory precisely in 
line with an imaginary point where it would be deboosted into 
orbit around the Moon. At this predetermined point the 
velocity control subsystem would fire to slow the space-
craft and allow it to go into an initial orbit around the 
Moon. Ground personnel would then check out the space-
craft's orbital behavior and its various subsystems before 
making any decision to transfer to another orbit. Once 
they found the spacecraft's subsystems to be operating 
correctly, they would make a decision to inject it into a 
7 
photographic orbit. 
Receiving and transmitting data to and from the space-
craft was the job of the communications subsystem, many of 
whose components had been flight-proven in the Ranger and 
the Mariner programs. This complex assembly could operate 
in four modes: 1) tracking and ranging, 2) command, 3) 
low power, and 4) high power. The communications system 
could send and receive data simultaneously while also 
transponding velocity and ranging signals for the Deep 
6 
Interview with LeonJ. Kosofsky, former Lunar Orbiter 
Program Engineer, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C., July 
1, 1970. 
7 Boeing, The Lunar Orbiter, p. 29. 
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Space Network's tracking system. 
The spacecraft's low-gain antenna picked up all in-
coming signals from the NASA-JPL Deep Space Instrumentation 
Facility stations. Commands from DSIF were routed to the 
command decoder and stored. The spacecraft would transmit 
a command from Earth back to Earth for verification before 
ground controllers sent an "execute" command. Upon recei-
ving the execute command the communications subsystem would 
advance stored commands from the decoder to the Flight Pro-
grammer to be carried out. Photographic data with 
performance, environmental, and telemetry data would be 
transmitted to Earth by the high-power mOde. 8 
Photographic data were transmitted in a different way 
than telemetry data were. The spacecraft had two antennas 
that operated in the S-band at the frequency of 2295 mega-
cycles. Normally, when photographic data were trans-
mitted to the ground receiving stations, the communi-
cations subsystems operated in the high-power mode and 
transmitted via the one-meter-diameter parabolic high-gain 
antenna. Simultaneous transmission of photographic and 
telemetry data was carried out as follows: 
8 
Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
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The 50-bit/sec telemetry data train is phase modulated 
onto a 30-kc subcarrier, which is then combined with 
the video data that have been transformed to a vesti-
gial sideband signal. That signal is created by amp-
litude modulating the data on a 3l0-kc subcarrier by 
means of a double balanced modulator. This suppresses 
the carrier and produces two equal sidebands. An 
appropriate filter is then superimposed on the double 
sideband spectrum, essentially eliminating the upper 
sideband. 
Since the missing subcarrier must be reinserted 
on the ground for the proper detection of the vestigial 
sideband Signal, provision for deriving such a sub-
carrier signal is made by transmitting a pilot tone 
of 38.75 kc. That pilot tone is exactly one-eighth 
of the original 3l0-kc subcarrier frequency, and is 
derived from the same crystal oscillator. Multiplying 
the received pilot tone by 8 in the ground equipment 
provides a proper subcarrier for reinsertion.9 
Lunar Orbiter photographic data were never encoded; in-
stead, data were transmitted as frequency-modulated analog 
signals. All other data from the spacecraft were encoded 
and sent on the subcarrier frequency as described above. 
The temperature control subsystem protected all of the 
spacecraft's other subsystems from the extreme temperature 
variations of the deep space environment. Heat from the 
Sun could warm external parts of the spacecraft to l200 C 
while areas not exposed to solar radiation would cool down 
to -160oc. These extremes were beyond the temperature 
9 
Leon J. Kosofsky and G. Calvin Broome, "Lunar Orbiter: 
A Photographic Satellite," Journal of the SMPTE, Vol. 74, 
~eptember 1965b pp. 776-777. 
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levels which most components could endure. The temperature 
control system established an environment ranging from 
+2oC to +30oC for the operation of all sUbsystems. A few 
components were exposed to direct sunlight: the four solar 
panels, the two antennas, the bottom of the equipment deck. 
The solar panels were designed to withstand temperature 
variations of +120oC to -160oc without cracking or buckling 
from severe expansion and contraction over a long period 
10 
of time. 
Beginning at the uppermost deck a heat shield insulated 
the spacecraft from the rocket engine's heat while the en-
tire area down to the lower deck was enshrouded in a thin-
skinned aluminized mylar and dacron thermal blanket that 
covered all equipment except the Canopus star tracker's 
lens, the camera thermal door, and the components mentioned 
above. The bottom of the eqUipment deck, which faced the 
Sun most of the time during all five missions, was coated 
with a special paint having a high heat emission-absorption 
ratio. Small electric heaters were installed on the space-
craft inside the thermal blanket to raise the temperature 
if it fell below ~oC. The arrangement maintained every-
thing under the thermal blanket at an average temperature. l1 
10 
Boeing, The Lunar Orbiter, PP. 32-33. 
11 
Kosofsky interview. 
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The photographic subsystem had the most rigid tempera-
ture restrictions. Film could withstand heat only up to 
about 500 C, and moisture in the photographic subsystem would 
condense below 20C, fogging the camera's two lenses. 
Eastman Kodak designed the system to be biased cool and 
warmed with little electric heaters. The "bathtub" housing 
the system did not touch the equipment deck but was affixed 
by four legs. Heat transfer between the "bathtub" and 
the equipment mounting deck was largely radiative, making 
heat absorption and dissipation a slower, more even process. 
One other component of the temperature control system 
was added after the original design to protect the photo-
subsystem. This was the camera thermal door. Thermal 
tests showed that, without any cover over the camera's 
12 
lenses, the lenses would be more susceptible to extreme tempera-
ture variations and stray light leaks inside. The major 
purpose of the camera thermal door was to reduce or eliminate 
the possibility that through heating the lenses could ex-
pand and alter the focal length so that distortions would 
result in the photography. The door would also help to 
control the internal temperature of the photo-subsystem so 
that it would not become too cold during periods of occul-
tation and allow moisture condensation on the lenses. The 
door was added as one of the last components of the space-
120 
12 
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.. ~-
:-~~ , 
• 
-'-
craft before final design configurations were fixed. It 
was not part of the Eastman Kodak camera subsystem, and 
Boeing took the responsibility of designing, fabricating, 
13 
and testing it. 
Early Design, Fabrication, and Testin5 Problems 
One of the first hardware it~ms to cause Langley 
and Boeing concern was the velocity control engine. The 
Boeing Company had proposed using the same Marquardt 100-
pound-thrust rocket motor that the Apollo Program was using 
in the attitude control system of the Command Module. Lunar 
Orbiter would use this rocket for velocity control. During 
preliminary testing for Apollo requirements, the Marquardt 
rocket developed problems which caused Lunar Orbiter Pro-
gram officials to have second thoughts about it. On April 
21, 1964,Captain Scherer, with members of his staff and 
representatives of the Project Office at Langley, visited 
Marquardt to determine the seriousness of the problems 
and their implications for Lunar Orbiter. 
His group learned that the Apollo mission require-
ments called for the rocket to be used in a pulse mode. 
It would have to fire reliably in short pulses thousands 
of times during an Apollo mission in order to change the 
Command Module's attitude as desired. Testing showed 
13 
Interview with Thomas R. Costello, July 9, 1970. 
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that the rocket was not firing correctly in the pulse mode. 
This, however, did not affect its use in Lunar Orbiter, 
because- as the spacecraft's velocity control engine it 
would be fired only at specific times in a single-burn 
14 
mode. Despite this difference in use Scherer recommended 
that until the Marquardt rocket proved reliable for Apollo 
such alternatives as the JPL Surveyor vernier engine should 
15 
be studied. 
The Marquardt rocket was not so critical to the 
program's mission as another piece of hardware: the photo-
graphic subsystem's velocity-over-height sensor (V/H sensor). 
It could not be replaced easily by another component of a 
different kind, and its function was critical to the per-
formance of the photographic subsystem. An image tracker 
which scanned a portion of th~ image formed by the 610 mm 
lens, it compared outputs derived from successive circular 
scans to measure the rate and direction of image motion 
before taking a photograph. 16 
The limitations of the V/H sensor determined in part 
the parameters of any photographic mission. It had to 
determine precisely the image-motion compensation values 
May 5, 
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Kosofsky interview. 
15 
OSSA Review--Lunar Orbiter Program Status Report, 
1964, p. 2. 
16 
Kosofsky and Broome, "Lunar Orbiter ••• ," p. 775. 
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for photography below 950-kilometer altitude, where the 
spacecraft's velocity relative to the Moon's surface would 
affect the ground resolution of all photography. Above 
950 kilometers the image-motion compensation could be de-
leted without significantly affecting ground resolution. 
At that high or higher altitudes the ground resolution of 
the high-resolution pictures might be reduced from 20 to 
3 meters, but the case would be altogether different in 
an elliptical orbit which brought Lunar Orbiter as low as 
46 kilometers above the Moon's surface. At this low alti-
tude the camera would have to compensate for image motion 
17 
to avoid "smearing" in a photographic exposure. 
Kosofsky and Broome have detailed why the V!H sensor 
is vital to low-altitude photography: 
The performance required of the image motion 
compensation apparatus is particularly exacting in 
the case of the Lunar Orbiter's high-resolution 
camera, as can be seen from the following figures. 
The design exposure speed is 1/25 sec, because of 
the very low exposure index of the film used (Kodak 
SO-243 film, with exposure index about 3). The 
spacecraft's orbital velocity at the low point of 
the orbit is around 1.6 km/sec, so that it moves 
64 m across the target area during an exposure. 
In order to achieve I-m ground resolution~ the un-
compensated image motion must be no more than the 
scale equivalent of 0.6 m. The allowable error in 
image motion compensation is thus 1%, which must be 
allocated between the mechanical limitations of the 
17 
OSSA Review --Lunar Orbiter Program Status Report, 
July 7, 1964, pp. 1-2. 
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platen servomechanism and the errors in the infor-
mation supplied to it by the velocity/height (V/H) 
sensor.l~ 
Eastman Kodak held total responsibility for producing 
the photographic subsystem for Boeing. However, it sub-
contracted work for certain components of the subsystem to 
Bolsey Associates. One of these components was the V/H 
sensor. Although both Eastman Kodak and Bolsey had very 
qualified men to design and build the components, manage-
ment of their operations did not always run smoothly and 
adhere to schedule~ as will be discussed later. 
Two other problem areas became evident by September 
1964 when Boeing commenced tests on the thermal model of 
Lunar Orbiter. The first was an overload on the power 
system because of increased need for electricity during 
periods when the spacecraft could not use its solar panels. 
The Inertial Reference Unit placed the greatest demand on 
the power system, and tests revealed that a battery with 
a greater capacity was probably needed to meet the demand. 
Boeing and Langley engineers also examined the possibility 
of changing the orbit design to give the spacecraft a longer 
period of sunlight instead of having to go to a heavier 
battery. 
Review of the power system difficulties and subsequent 
18 
Kosofs.ky and Broome, "Lunar Orbiter ••• ," p. 775. 
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findings showed that under the planned night flying condi-
tions the Orbiter's l2-ampere-hour battery would require an 
excessive charging rate, approximately 4.5 amperes, to 
meet the power needs of the other spacecraft subsystems. 
This high rate could cause battery failure, and Boeing 
engineers had worked out three possible solutions: 1) 
install a heavier, higher capacity battery, 2) turn off 
some equipment during the night periods, and 3) increase 
the time of the spacecraft's exposure to the Sun by altering 
the orbital parameters to be approximately 1,850 kilometers 
at apolune and 46 kilometers at perilune. The third solu-
tion would affect the spacecraft's photographic capabilities 
because the increased period of orbit would necessitate 
a decrease in the spacecraft's orbital inclination to the 
19 
Moon's equator. 
During the Lunar Orbiter Program's First Quarterly 
Review at the Langley Research Center Scherer pointed out 
that, "if the initial orbit [of Lunar Orbiter] is made 
elliptical with a higher apolune, the day to night ratio 
20 
would be improved and could be used to solve the problem." 
Langley and Boeing adopted the third solution after Thomas 
Yamauchi, head of Boeing LOPO's System Engineering Section, 
19 Office of Space Science and Applications, NASA, Summary 
of First Quarterly Review, August 26-27, 1964, p. 4. 
20 
OSSA Review --Lunar Orbiter Program Status Report, 
September 1, 1964, p. 3. 
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had worked out the rationale for the orbit change. The change 
did not greatly affect photography and eliminated the need 
for a heavier battery. 
The second problem concerned the spacecraft's fuel 
and oxidizer tank~which Boeing was purchasing from the 
Bell Aero Systems Company. Off-the-shelf hardware 
developed for the Apollo Program, the tanks had failed to 
pass qualification tests because of repeated rupturing of 
their teflon bladders. These bladders held nitrogen gas 
under pressure, and it was apparently seeping through the 
thin-walled bladders and saturating the fuel for the velo-
21 
city control engine. The Lunar Orbiter Program required 
extra qualification tests of the tanks, but this threatened 
to triple their cost. Langley requested the Office of 
Advanced Research and Technology to review the problem of 
the tanks while it looked into possible alternative solu-
22 
tions. 
On August 26, 196~ the Langley Research Center held 
the First Quarterly Review of the program to discuss all 
known problems which had come to light since the Boeing 
contract had been signed. Boeing representatives summarized 
their operations for Langley and Headquarters officials on 
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the first day of the review and then devoted the second 
day to detailed presentations on specific areas of the 
program to NASA personnel working directly in each area. 
The Lunar Orbiter Program Office rated Boeing's total 
performance as very good, but noted that Boeing had treated 
its relationship with the Eastman Kodak and RCA subcontrac-
tors superficially. No representatives from EK of RCA were 
present at the Langley review, and officials of the Lunar 
Orbiter Program felt that a Boeing-Eastman Kodak-RCA team 
23 
presentation at subsequent reviews would be very desirable. 
Boeing, of course, was still in the process of signing con-
tracts with these two firms. 
During the review NASA and Boeing people treated the 
technical problem areas very thoroughly and discussed 
other difficulties related to spacecraft design and engineering. 
Boeing showed three more areas where work was required to 
attain the maximum functional efficiency in the spacecraft's 
configuration. The first was the spacecraft weight, a 
factor limited by the lifting capability of the launch 
vehicle. Boeing was aiming for a 370-kilogram spacecraft 
after separation from the Agena and before any midcourse 
manuever. The preliminary Lunar Orbiter design had indi-
cated a 390-kilogram spacecraft, but two major steps had 
23 
Summary of First Quarterly Review, August 26-27, 
1964, p. 1. 
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successfully reducec" this figure. First,Boeing had decided 
to use integrated logic circuits in the control assembly 
electronics, since this would save some 6 kilograms over 
the use of discrete parts and perform just as well. Second, 
the need to use one-pound thrusters in the attitude 
control subsystem to compensate for thrust vecvor misalign-
ment was eliminated when Boeing engineers redesigned the 
system. 
Originally the attitude control thrusters had been 
19cated on the solar panels to take advantage of the greatest 
moment. However, a close reexamination of this design con-
vinced Boeing and Langley engineers that controlling the 
thrust vector through the spacecraft's center of mass would 
be substantially more difficult with one-pound thrusters 
located far out on the solar panels. Attitude changes 
could be executed easily, but they would cause perturbations 
in the spacecraft's thrust vector which would have to be 
counteracted if the spacecraft were not to assume a slightly 
altered trajectory each time the thrusters were fired. The 
process of counteracting changes in attitude would require 
considerable fuel consumption on a thirty-day mission. 
Boeing solved this design problem by eliminating the 
four thrusters on the solar panels together with all of the 
plumbing necessary to get gas out to them. This reduced 
weight and the quantity of attitude control grs. Next the 
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velocity control rocket was gimbaled. The change required 
addition of two gimbals, their actuators, and bearings, 
but now the rocket's nozzle could be moved to compensate 
for any perturbations caused by the attitude thrusters. 
This resulted in a weight saving of about 3 kilograms. The 
attitude control thrusters were half-pound thrusters lo-
cated at the perimeter of the heat shield. They were 
coupled so that when one of the four fired in one direction, 
its opposite number would fire in the opposite direction 
with the same amount of thrust for the same duration, 
changing the spacecraft's attitude without affecting 
24 
the thrust vector. This design change brought Lunar 
Orbiter's overall weight at the time of the Langley review 
to approximately 382 kilograms. 
The participants of the review also tackled the pro-
blem of the Marquardt rocket motor, specifically the weight 
of the rocket's propellant versus the transit time from the 
Earth to the Moon and the specific impulse required to make 
the injection into lunar orbit. If the spacecraft was to 
achieve an initial elliptical orbit of 925 by 46 kilometers, 
it would require a total velocity change of slightly 
less than 1,100 meters per second. This meant that an Orbiter 
24 
Costello interview. 
25 
Summary of First Quarterly Review, August 26-27, 
1964, p. 3. 
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weighing about 370 kilograms at separation from the Agena 
would require a specific impulse of 290 seconds. The Mar-
quardt rocket, which had yet to pass qualifying tests for 
the Apollo Program, might not be able to achieve this 
high a specific impulse. (Although specific impulse is 
expressed in seconds, it is not a measure of duratio~. It 
is a measure of efficiency and indicates the thrust a 
rocket can provide at a certain rate of fuel consump-
tion per second.) One possible solution to the problem, 
if the specific impulse of the rocket proved indeed 
too low, was to reduce the total impulse and alter 
the spacecraft's trajectory in order to place it in a more 
convenient initial elliptical orbit before transfer to 
26 
final orbit. 
After reviewing the Marquardt rocket, the participants 
of the First Quarterly Review took up the examination of 
the last major problem to be considered at that time: 
Could the photographic system withstand the intense vibra-
tions of the launch? The Eastman Kodak Company claimed 
that the vibration test levels were too high and that flight 
data on the launch vehicle did not warrant the high levels 
which Boeing had stipulated in its Environmental Criteria 
document. Boeing and Langley Lunar Orbiter Project Office 
people decided to reexamine the flight data of the Atlas-
26 
Ibid., p. 4. 
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Agena launch vehicle before making a decision on Eastman 
~ 
Kodak's complaint. 
This action ended the intensive two-day review of the pro-
gram's major problem areas, and work proceeded. Two months 
later another review convened, and still more technical 
and engineering problems surfaced. They did not, however, 
threaten the comprehensive progress of the program toward 
its goals. 
~ 
Ibid. 
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CHAPTER VII 
BUILDING THE SPACECRAFT: PROBLEMS AND RESOLUTIONS 
Experiments for Lunar Orbiter 
The Lunar Orbiter spacecraft was designed not only 
to take photographs but also to carry out three non-
photographic experiments. A summary of these experiments 
will help to explain the direction of program thinking on 
scientific investigations of the lunar environment and show 
how the experiments presented problems for the total space-
craft configuration. The requirements of the Apollo Program 
and the weight limitations of the Agena rocket restricted 
the scientific payload of Lunar Orbiter to four experiments: 
photography, selenodesy, micrometeoroid, and radiation. 
During the period in which the Request for Proposals 
was being prepared, the Office of Space Science through its 
Space Sciences Steering Committee evaluated the kinds of 
experiments which would be most useful to the scientific 
investigation of the Moon as well as to immediate NASA 
objectives. The major work of this evaluation fell to the 
Planetology Subcommittee. l 
ISee Minutes of the Planetology Subcommittee of the 
Space Sciences Steering Committee in the NASA Historical 
Office Lunar Orbiter History files. The meetings of the 
Subcommittee were conducted periodically during the entire 
course of the Lunar Orbiter Program. 
J'RECEDING PAGE ELANK NOT FtLMG) 
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The Subcommittee narrowed the field of experiments 
to be included on Lunar Orbiter early in the program's 
history. It found that one indispensable experiment 
the program should conduct was the recording of se1enodetic 
information by tracking the spacecraft. The spacecraft 
would carry a transponder which would provide range and 
range-rate data, a necessity for mission control. Analy-
sis of the data would establish a profile of the space-
craft's orbital behavior over a thirty-day period and 
longer. At a meeting of the Planetology Subcommittee on 
September 24, 1963, Gordon MacDonald of the University of 
California at Los Angeles had explained to Lunar Orbiter 
Program officials why the data were scientifically valuable 
as well as indispensable for the safety of the spacecraft 
on the first and subsequent missions. 
He stated that if the Orbiters were to be flown in 
a low elliptical orbit around the moon, it would be man-
datory to track the spacecraft on the first mission and 
134 
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determine its behavior by accurate measurements. 2 A 
selenodesy experiment which could record data for a period 
of at least sixty days at an altitude of 256 kilometers above 
the Moon on the first mission could sufficiently confirm 
the safety of putting subsequent Orbiters into orbits which 
would go as low as 32 kilometers above the Moon. Moreover, 
2 
MacDonald's words understate the significance of the 
selenodetic data which the five Lunar Orbiters eventually 
gave. The discoveries made of the Moon's gravitational 
field by tracking the five spacecraft, especiallr Orbiter V~ 
revealed the existence of large mass concentrations under 
the ringed maria on the nearside of the Moon. This orbital 
data enabled NASA scientists to construct a gravimetric map 
of the Moon's nearside in 1968, and the discovery of "mascons" 
by scientists of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory confirmed the 
presence of gravitational anomalies for both the Lunar Orbiter 
Program and the Apollo Program. The orbital behavior data of 
the five Lunar Orbiters convinced Apollo Program management it 
should redesign the Apollo a mission and plan an orbital 
mission for Apollo 10 rather than a landing, so that more 
precise tracking data could ·be gained before actually land-
ing men on the Moon. 
For a precise summary of the "mascon" phenomenon 
see: "Mascons: Lunar Mass Concentrations," by P. M. Muller 
and W. L. Sjogren of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in 
Science, Vol. 161, No. 3842 (August 16, 19681 pp. 680-684. 
Refer also to the annotated bibliography in this history. 
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the selenodetic data gained in sixty days would be 
3 invaluable for the first Apollo lunar mission. 
Since its inception on May 4, 1962, the Lunar Sciences 
Subcommittee's Working Group on Selenodesy had developed 
information on lunar gravity and mass. 4 Originally the Group 
had provided major technical guidance for the Surveyor 
Orbiter Project at JPL. It made a timely contribution to 
Lunar Orbiter mission planning as a result of this earlier 
experience. The Group's chief concern was the design of 
the trajectory and orbits which the Lunar Orbiter would fly. 
Its work confirmed the limited extent of knowledge about 
the selenodetic environment and the potential hazards 
inherent in certain kinds of orbit designs. In its work it 
could little imagine the discovery in 1967 through the 
analysis of tracking data from Lunar Orbiter V of mass 
concentrations under the great maria of the Moon. The 
Working Group on Selenodesy provided MacDonald with a firm 
basis of fact for his argument that selenodetic data 
gathered by monitoring the Lunar Orbiter spacecraft in orbit 
would be very valuable for future orbital.Moonmissions. 5 
3 Lunar Orbiter Discussion with Dr. Gordon MacDonald, 
September 24, 1963, Memorandum to the Record, October 2, 1963. 
4 Minutes: Working Group on Selenodesy, NASA 
Headquarters, May 4, 1962. 
5 
~. 
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A group led by William H. Michael at the Langley 
Research Center designed the Lunar Orbiter selenodesy 
experiment, and its efforts were richly rewarded by the 
6 data acquired during the five Orbiter missions. Indeed, 
the selenodetic information that the program obtained 
substantially aided in extending the exploration of the 
lunar gravitational environment. When taken with the data 
from the five successfully landed Surveyors, these data 
provided the Office of Manned Space Flight very reliable, 
indispensable information for the Apollo Program. 
In addition to selenodesy the Planetology Subcommittee 
selected two other fields of scientific investigation for 
experiments on the first five Lunar Orbiters which made up 
7 Block I of the program. These were radiation and micro-
meteoroid flux in near lunar environment. The two experiments 
which Langley developed for the Orbiter were designed to 
measure the performance of the spacecraft as well as to 
provide useful data on potential hazards to manned missions 
to the Moon. 
6 Telephone interview with Dr. Samuel Katzoff, Langley 
Research Center, August 24, 1967. 
7 Originally the Lunar Orbiter Progra~ had envisioned 
two blocks of spacecraft, but the lack of funds ended the 
development of more sophisticated Orbiters of Block II. A 
sixth flight spacecraft existed and could have flown after 
Lunar Orbiter V, but funds did not permit the flights. 
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The radiation experiment was designed by Dr. Trutz 
Foelsche and had two objectives as outlined by him: 
The principal purpose of the lunar orbiter 
radiation-measuring systems was to monitor, in real 
time, the high radiation doses that would accumulate 
on the unprocessed film in case of major solar cosmic 
ray events. In this way it would be possible for the 
mission control to minimize the darkening of the 
film by operational maneuvers, such as stopping the 
photographic operation and acceleration of develop-
ment of the film in the loopers, and in case of more 
penetrating events, shielding the film in the 
cassette by the spacecraft itself and by the moon. 
Furthermore, the independent measurement of radiation 
doses would contribute to the diagnosis of ftlm 
failure due to other reasons. 
A second purpose was to acquire a maximum amount 
of information on radiation on the way to the moon 
and near the moon, insofar as this could ~e achieved 
within the weight limitation of 2 pounds. 
The danger that the film could be damaged by solar 
radiation had Dr. Foelsche and Dr. Samuel Katzoff worried 
because the Eastman Kodak photographic subsystem provided 
only aluminum shielding at two grams per square centimeter 
at the film cassette and at two tenths of a gram per square 
centimeter in the rest of the system. Foelsche desired 
thicker shielding, but the contractors maintained that the 
film would be safe. The amount of shielding was a calculated 
risk, trading shielding weight against the probabilities of 
solar flare intensities. 
8Trutz Foelsche, "Radiation Measurements in LO I-V 
(Period August 10, 1966 - January 30, 1968)," NASA Langley 
Research Center, paper to be presented at Manned Spacecraft 
Center Seminar, Houston, Texas, June 21, 1968, p.l. 
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Although he would have preferred to mount a more 
sophisticated experiment, Foelsche designed a measuring 
system to carry out the objectives described above, 
remaining within a one-kilogram weight limit. The system's 
sensors, their arrangement and shielding, the measuring 
principle and dynamic ranges were all developed at Langley. 
The Lunar Orbiter Project Office at Langley and the Boeing 
Company then determined the specifications for the hardware, 
and Texas Instruments built and calibrated the experiment. 9 
The micrometeoroid experiment was the last non-photo-
graphic experiment which the Planetology Subcommittee 
approved for the Block I Orbiters. Designed by Charles A. 
Gurtler and William H. Kinnard of Langley, it conSisted of 
twenty detectors mounted around the middle deck of the 
spacecraft, outside the thermal blanket. Each detector 
consisted of a pressurized semicylinder with a pressure-
sensitive microswitch inside. The cylindrical surface of 
the detector was 0.025 mm beryllium copper test material. 
Inside the semicylinder,gas pressure held the switch closed. 
When a puncture of the surface material occurred, gas would 
escape, opening the microswitc~which would register the 
puncture electrically. Whenever the condition of the 
9Ibid • See schematic diagram on following page. 
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detectors was telemetered to Earth, any new punctures would be 
indicated and previously indicated ones would be verified 
(see diagrams on following pages). 10 
Gurtler and Kinnard presented their experiment to 
the OSSA Space Science Committee on October 5, 1964. After 
reviewing i~ the Committee pOinted out that the instrumentation 
was omnidirectional and limited in the quantity of data it 
could acquire. The Committee requested Gurtler and Kinnard 
to examine the kinds of similar instrumentation which the 
Surveyor and the Mariner C spacecraft had and to ask 
w. Merle Alexander at the Goddard Space Flight Center in 
Greenbelt, Maryland,for specific assistance in the further 
study of the experiment's requirement~ since Alexander was 
the principal investigator for micrometeoroid instrumentation 
11 
on these two spacecraft. 
In the end, however, Gurtler and Kinnard's experiment 
was implemented in the form originally presented to the 
Committee. While the instrumentation could provide only 
limited data, it had the advantages of simplicity and freedom 
10 C. A. Gurtler and Gary W • Grew, "Meteoroid Hazard 
Near Moon," Science, Vol. 161 (August 2, 1968), p.462. 
11 Memorandum from Dr. Homer E. Newell, Associate 
Administrator for Space Sciences, to Dr. Floyd L. Thompson, 
Langley Research Center, October 23, 1964. 
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from ambiguity. 
The photographic experiment, which constituted 
the major means of implementing the program's objectives, 
has been discussed previously and will be referred to during 
the course of this narrative as the need arises. 
Other Potential Experiments 
Although the Block I spacecraft carried only the four 
experiments described above, the Lunar Orbiter Program Office 
was planning a greater number of more sophisticated 
/ 
scientific experiments for the Block II Orbiter. They 
included: 1) a gamma ray experiment to determine the 
presence and relative abundance of natural, long-lived 
radioisotopes on the surface of the Moon; 2) an infrared 
experiment for mapping the lateral variations in the Moon's 
surface temperature; 3) a bi-static radar experiment for 
determining the average radar cross-section, surface rough-
ness correlation functions, altitude measurements, 
reflectivity, and the dielectric properties of the lunar 
surface; 4) a photometry/colorimetry experiment to determine 
variations in the photometric function and the color of lunar 
surface materials; 5) a radiometer experiment for measurement 
and determination of lunar surface thermal gradients; 6) an 
X-ray fluorescent experiment to detect the relative abundance 
of iron and nickle on the Moon's surface; 7) a solar plasma 
experiment to study the spatial and temporal flux variation 
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and energy distribution of low-energy protons and electrons 
of the plasma; 8) an experiment to investigate the magnetic 
field in the vicinity of the Moon; and, finally, 9) a lunar 
ionosphere experiment to determine the presence of a low-
density ionosphere in the immediate vicinity of the Moon's 
12 
,surface. 
These experiments, spanning a wide range of scientific 
fields of investigation, demonstrated that the Lunar Orbiter 
Program envisioned in a second block of spacecraft a series 
which would conduct primarily scientific investigations and 
not necessarily more photography of the lunar surface. NASA 
had already designated the Block I Orbiters for missions 
which would gather photographic data of the lunar surface 
vital for mission planning of the Apollo Program. 
Moreover, the first Lunar Orbiters would explore some 
aspects of the Moon's environment and complement the work 
which the Surveyor spacecraft would carry out when they 
landed on the Moon. The Orbiter concept, expanded in a 
second series of spacecraft, could achieve major advances in 
knowledge about Earth's natural satellite, a philosophy 
consistent with the mainstream of thought in the Office of 
Space Science and Applications. However, lack of funds 
eventually precluded the Block II Orbiters and curtailed a ' 
l2Martin J. Swetnick, "Unmanned Lunar Scientific 
Missions, a Summary," November 17, 1964. Dr. Swetnick was 
a Lunar Program Scientist. 
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major U.S. scientific thrust in exploring the Moon. 
Preliminary Mission Planning Activities 
A third area of the Lunar Orbiter Program was mission 
design, and success in planning the missions to be flown 
depended heavily upon coordination among the various NASA 
and industry partiCipants. Implementation of the planning 
activities depended upon the establishment of schedules for 
the program's various task groups; in turn these had to be 
integrated with one another to effect the timeliest 
utilization of information within each specific area of the 
Lunar Orbiter Program. 
Although detailed consideration had been given to 
ways and means of utilizing NASA's capabilities to 
facilitate Boeing's work during the period of contract 
negotiation, the first major"meeting to discuss actual 
schedules and working relationships convened on April 15, 
1964, at the Langley Research Center. The meeting's purpose 
was twofold. First the participants from Headquarters, 
Langley, Lewis, JPL, and Boeing had to work out a basic 
agreement about the delegation of responsibilities which had 
not yet been assigned through any earlier agreements. This 
included tentative declarations by each party of its 
capabilities and limitations and what tasks each believed it 
could best perform to contribute to the success of the 
program. Secondly, the representatives of the various 
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centers and the prime contractor had to agree upon the 
implementation of the decisions in the first area of 
agreement. 13 
Thomas Yamauchi of the Boeing Company began the talks 
with a presentation of a condensed project schedule and 
noted the time intervals in which Boeing would require 
trajectory information from the Lewis Research Center and 
JPL concerning the launch vehicle and tracking and data-
acquisition needs. He outlined the kind of information 
14 
which Boeing would require from each. 
~r. Karl A. Faymon of Lewis responded by specifying 
approximately the times before each launch when Lewis could 
deliver various preliminary and final data on launch vehicle 
checkout and performance. He also explained the times at 
which Boeing would have to supply data to Lewis on launch 
constraints, detailed mission profiles, and updated weight 
estimates. The flow of information between Lewis and Boeing 
appeared not to present any serious problems at the time of 
the Langley meeting. 15 
While the job which Lewis would perform"for Boeing 
13 
Memorandum to the Record, Summary of Lunar Orbiter 
Trajectory Meeting, Langley Research Center, April 15, 1964 
(document dated April 17, 1964). 
14 Information was not enumerated in the document. 
15Summary of Lunar Orbiter Trajectory Meeting. 
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and the Lunar Orbiter Program concerned hardware, the role 
which the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the Deep Space 
Network would perform was much more complex. The services 
which JPL and the DSN would render fell into two categories: 
flight programs and tracking and data acquisition. Both 
required different kinds of organization. JPL had already 
committed the Deep Space Network facilities which the Lunar 
Orbiter Program would require, and these and their operation 
came under the auspices of the NASA Office of Tracking and 
D~ta Acquisition (OTDA). There was little trouble here 
between Langley and JPL. 
The work which JPL flight programs manpower could 
reasonably render the Lunar Orbiter Program was another 
matter. Before JPL could do anything, it had to know the 
amount and kind of resources which Langley desired that JPL 
commit to Lunar Orbiter. In this case JPL's ability to 
commit the resources depended upon its commitments to other 
flight programs: Ranger, Surveyor, and Mariner. These 
programs were all funded through the Office of Space 
Science and Applications, and any decision about an 
increased work load for JPL would have to take them into 
consideration. 16 
16 
Letter, Rechtin to Emrne, November 18, 1969. 
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When Langley had requested additional support from 
JPL on April 2, the request was not for work to be done by 
the DSN. It fell instead within the realm of flight pro-
grams, and JPL manpower was already spread thinly. On April 
2 Langley had requested of NASA Headquarters that JPL take 
on the responsibility "for the programming of all operational 
computer programs, including reviewing the physical and 
engineering problems they represent, their mathematical 
formulation, and the formal requests for programming." This 
was not all. Langley wanted JPL to "make a definitive study 
of Lunar Orbiter tracking data requirements, including the 
accuracy of realtime trajectory determination, considering 
tracking sites, data types, sampling rates, data noise 
biases, site errors, etc.,,17 
The Lunar Orbiter Project Office at Langley also 
wanted JPL to "check the Space Flight Manuever Specifications 
Tables; i.e., the guidance philosophy for midcourse, deboost, 
and retro firing, including numerical firing tables which 
,,18 
will be used in DSN operations. Boeing, at the same 
time, was to conduct a similar study of tracking and data-
17 Memorandum from Floyd L. Thompson, Director of the 
Langley Research Center, to Homer E. Newell, Subject: 
Request for additional support for Lunar Orbiter from Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory, April 2, 1964. 
18 
Ibid., p.l. 
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acquisition requirements and was to review all JPL support 
work. When Floyd L. Thompson had presented these expanded 
requests to Marshall Johnson, the Tracking and Data Systems 
Manager at the DSN, and Victor Clarke, also of JPL, they 
had reacted favorably but had stipulated that the Systems 
Analysis Section and the Computer Applications and Data 
Systems Section at JPL would require more manpower to 
19 perform the Lunar Orbiter work. However, Johnson and 
Clarke were part of the DSN, not the JPL flight programs 
operation, and they were not in a position to commit non-
DSN resources. 20 
At the April 15 Langley meeting JPL representatives 
proposed a multi-staged program to educate Boeing and 
Langley personnel about the capabilities of the DSIF and 
SFOF so that they, in turn, could use their manpower to 
perform the flight operation tasks necessary to the 
preparation and execution of each mission. JPL also 
suggested that Boeing set up a computer facility to 
"resemble" the Space Flight Operations Facility and run its 
own programming while having a private contractor check it" 
21 independently. 
19 Letter, Rechtin to Emme, November 18, 1969. 
20Ibid • 
21Summary of Lunar Orbiter Trajectory Meeting, 
pp. 1-2. 
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Langley and JPL proceeded to work out a compromise 
agreement to facilitate the timeliest integration of 
schedules. The actual problems of mission design and orbit 
determination remained in the hands of the Lunar Orbiter 
Project Office, specifically under the direction of 
William J. Boyer, the LOPO Operations Manager, and John B. 
Graham, in charge of operations integration. 
Robert J. Helberg at Boeing assigned Thomas Yamauchi 
to coordinate mission planning with the LOPO at Langley. 
On June 10, 1964, a major meeting convened at NASA Headquarters 
to review the status of Yamauchi's work, the proposed first 
mission, and the technical problems which placed constraints 
on the design of that mission. It had become apparent to 
Scherer, Kosofsky and Swetnick of the He::dquarters Program 
Office that a dichotomy existed between the requirements of 
the short-term photographic mission and the extended 
selenodetic mission of the spacecraft. This dichotomy 
affected design of the attitude control system, since its 
performance could determine the orbital parameters of the 
spacecraft during the long-life mission which was to last 
about one year after termination of photography and readout. 22 
Scherer outlined the first tentative Lunar Orbiter 
22 Memorandum to the Record from Martin J. SWetnick, 
Subject: Summary Minutes, Lunar Orblter Meeting at NASA 
Headquarters, June 10, 1964, document dated June 22, 1964. 
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mission to the participants of the meeting as an 
introduction to the areas of difficulty. Mission A, as it 
was later called, would inject an Orbiter into a nearly 
circular orbit approximately 925 kilometers above the Moon 
with an inclination of 210 to the lunar equator. The 
orbit was then to be changed to an ellipse ranging from 
925 kilometers at apolune to 46 kilometers at perilune, 
because this would be most satisfactory for high- and 
medium-resolution photography.23 
Dr. Gordon MacDonald of UCLA, a member of the OSSA 
Planetology Subcommittee, expressed some doubt about the 
safety of the spacecraft at such a low perilune over a 
period of one year. His reasoning was based upon the fact 
that the attitude control system, as it was then designed, 
would cause periodic perturbations in the orbit by repeated 
firing of its thrusters. (At this time the Orbiter had 
one-pound thrusters located at the tips of the solar panels. 
When fired they would change the spacecraft's attitude, but 
they would also cause some oscillations in the solar panels 
and would affect the spacecraft's thrust vector.) This 
could cause a three-meter change in the perilune per orbit, 
according to MacDonald. A Boeing study that Yamauchi had 
directed substantiated his conclusion. The change would be 
23 
Ibid. 
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too great for the spacecraft's velocity control subsytem 
to handle over the long run and could jeopardize the ex-
tended mission. MacDonald suggested that Boeing make a 
detailed analysis of the attitude control subsystem and 
its effects on the velocity and thrust vector control. 
The members of the meeting agreed that Boeing should 
examine the following questions: 
1. What dead zone can the Lunar Orbiter attitude 
control system accept on an extended 
mission? 
2. What will be the effects of the control jets on 
the motion of the Lunar Orbiter? 
3. Can the impulses on each control jet be 
measured and counted., even during the time the 
spacecraft is not within line of sight 
telecommunications to earth? 
4. What possible effects can an imbalance, such as 
the high gain antenna on the end of a boom, have 
on the attitude of the Lunar Orbiter over an 
extended lifetime mission? 
5. Is it Possible to modify the design of the 
attitude control sys~em to operate coupled 
p~tch and yaw jets?2 
Following the meeting,the Boeing, Company went to work 
on the design of the attitude control subsystem, and by the 
First Quarterly Review at the end of August, the spacecraft 
design was beginning a three-stage metamorphosis which 
would result in its final configuration in the spring of 
24 Ibid., p.5. 
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1965. 25 The metamorphosis through April 1965 can be briefly 
summarized. 
Initially the spacecraft had a photographic subsystem 
housed in a barrel-shaped "bathtub." The attitude control 
thrusters were located at the periphery of the solar panels 
with requisite plumbing to feed gas to them from storage 
tanks in the engine module. At stage two the spacecraft 
had a more efficiently shaped "bath tub" with a flat bottom 
for better thermal control. An arch from the equipment 
deck to the middle deck had been placed over the photographic 
subsystem to add strength, and the structure of the velocity 
control subsystem had been changed. However, the attitude 
control thrusters still remained at the tips of the solar 
panels. 
In the third stage stage of the metamorphosis the 
velocity control engine had been gimbaled, the change 
reducing its fuel requirement and allowing more room 
for the nitrogen tank to fit down into the center of the 
engine module. The attitude control thrusters had been 
reduced from one-pound to one-half-pound thrusters, 
and they had been relocated on the periphery of the upper-
most deck of the engine module. They had also been coupled, 
and the need for the plumbing to carry gas to the tips of 
25 . Summary of Flrst Quarterly Review, August 26-27, 1964. 
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the solar panels had been eliminated. The omni-antenna 
boom had been strengthened, and the micrometeoroid 
26 detectors had been placed around the middle deck. 
These changes raised technical design problems, 
but they also affected preliminary mission planning 
activities--as did the working arrangement estab-
lished between Langley and JPL. At the beginning of 
July 1964 officials from the two centers worked out the 
details for educating selected Langley and Boeing personnel 
in mission analysis, programming standards, and the review 
of existing programs that might benefit Lunar Orbiter. 
Training began on July 15 and afforded the Lunar Orbiter 
Program the opportunity to solve its own problems of 
analysis without unduly taxing JPL manpower.27 Boeing was 
very willing to learn from JPL, a fact which facilitated 
the implementation of the Langley-JPL working agreement 
and, indeed, overall mission success in the program. 
Testing Procedures and Program Reviews 
One important feature of the Lunar Orbiter space-
craft was that its design did not rely heavily upon 
26 
OSSA Review--April 13, 1965, p. 1. See diagram on 
the next page. 
27Memorandum from Lee R. Scherer, Lunar Orbiter 
Program Manager, to Oran W. Nicks and Edgar M. Cortright, 
Subject: Immediate need for JPL support for Orbiter, 
July 10, 1964. 
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redundant subsystems or components. Moreover, although 
the subsystems were integrated, they were not heavily 
interdependent and could function more independently of 
each other than the subsystems could in such spacecraft 
as Mariner. This design concept reflected Boeing's long-
standing traditions in aircraft, and it paid off handsomely. 
The testing philosophy of the Lunar Orbiter was one 
reason the design proved to be so successful. Several kinds 
of tests and reviews were used in the program. First was 
the Preliminary Design Review, conducted by NASA and Boeing. 
This form of review was always held to check any specific 
technical area or major subsystem before a final decision 
was made to freeze the design. When agreement was reached, 
Langley gave Boeing permission to fix the design, and then 
both parties met to hold a Critical Design Review. In this 
review the item, whether a component or a major subsystem, 
was picked apart or passed as acceptable for fabrication and 
testing. If approved, the item was procured or fabricated, 
and after approval Langley tried to hold changes to an 
absolute minimum. During the fabrication stage, various 
forms of reviews took place until the item was completed 
and tested. At the completion point, a formal NASA 
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Acceptance Review was conducted. 28 
The Langley-Boeing testing procedure was aimed at 
making the first mission a complete operational success. 
The procedure played a vital part in the program and re-
flected the positive attitudes throughout the entire 
Lunar Orbiter Program team. 
At the beginning of the whole testing sequence, all 
components of the spacecraft system went through a Flight 
Acceptance Test (FAT), which exposed them to "nominal"--
or expected --vibration, temperature, and vacuum conditions 
of operational environments. Three sets of each component 
were then divided into sets A, B, and C for more specific 
tests. SetA was used for qualification tests simulating 
overstress conditions. This kind of test was designed to 
push the component beyond expected endurance limits to de-
termine what punishment it could actually withstand. Set B 
underwent reliability demonstration tests that simulated two 
real-time missions at the FAT level. Finally, Set C compon-
ents made up subsystem assemblies that were tested and then 
28 ." Robert J. Helberg and Clifford H. Nelson, The Lunar 
Orbiter -- An Integrated Design," paper presented at the 
XVIII International Astronautical Congress, Belgrade, Yugo-
slavia, September 27, 1967, pp. 607. Helberg was Assistant 
Division Manager-Spacecraft Systems, Space Division, The 
Boeing Company, and Nelson was Lunar Orbiter Project Manager 
~t Langley Research Center. 
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integrated into a complete spacecraft (Spacecraft "C"). 
This first complete spacecraft system, minus the 
photographic subsystem, was subjected to compatibility 
tests with the Atlas-Agena launch vehicle; with the tracking 
and communications network at Goldstone, California; and 
with the Eastern Test Range tracking and communications 
29 facilities at Cape Kennedy. The idea to test the space-
craft for compatibility with the DSIF facility at Goldstone 
had been suggested by JPLj Langley accepted i~ and testing 
proved to be very useful in establishing biases between 
the Lunar Orbiter communications subsystem and the DSIF 
30 
receiving station. A test film was read out during dry-
run exercises there to check the accuracy in the transmitting 
and receiving equipment. 
Boeing built a total of eight Lunar Orbiter space-
craft for the program, including Spacecraft C. Following 
spacecraft C came Spacecraft 1 and 2. Number 1 underwent 
qualification tests at spacecraft level while Number 2 was 
subjected to thermal vacuum tests for a period covering the 
duration of two missions. The other five Lunar Orbiters (3, 
4, 5, 6, and 7) were put through Flight Acceptance Tests 
29Ibid • 
next page. See figure, Lunar Orbiter Test Program, on 
30Letter, Rechtin to Emme, November 18, 1969. 
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and then sent to the Eastern Test Range for their final 
checkout and launch. The chart below clarifies the 
sequence: 
Spacecraft Number 
C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Lunar Orbiter Grotuld V I II III Dr 
test 
space-
l-.:fission craft E/5 A/l B/2 C/3 D/4 
Clifford H. Nelson pOinted out to the participants 
of the XVIII International Astronautical Congress in 
Belgrade, Yugoslavia,that no serious problems or failures 
were experienced during all spacecraft-level tests in the 
program. This testified to the standards and the thorough-
ness which Boeing and Langley had used in testing at the 
component and subsystem level, and it also testified to the 
excellence of the spacecraft's design. Faulty equipment 
and poor designs had been effectively rooted out during the 
testing phase of the program when potential problems in 
31 
subsystem integration had been exposed. 
More interesting, however, was the fact that Boeing 
and Langley had agreed early on testing in a parallel mode 
rather than in a series mode. Tight schedules and a spartan 
31 
Helberg and Nelson, "The Lunar Orbiter -- An 
Integrated Design," p. 8. 
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economy were largely responsible for this. Thus, for 
example, the three sets of components (A, B, and C), 
Spacecraft 1 and 2, and the five Flight Spacecraft (3, 4, 
5, 6, and 7) were tested in periods that substantially 
overlapped. 32 Ira W. Ramsey headed a team of men in the 
LOPO which was responsible for the entire Lunar Orbiter 
testing program and for the success of the parallel mode 
despite its inherent risk. 33 
Problem Areas: Last Quarter 1964 to First Half 1965 
Several problem areas had developed by late 1964 
which threatened the original schedules of the program. 
Some of these have already been mentioned. Two more are 
noteworthy, however. At the Lunar Orbiter Preliminary 
Design Review held at Boeing on October 27 and 28, 1964, the 
status of the micrometeoroid and radiation experiments had 
somewhat alarmed Israel Taback, the Langley Lunar Orbiter 
Spacecraft Manager, and Martin J. Swetnick, the Lunar 
Orbiter Program Scientist from NASA Headquarters. They 
learned that the instrumentation which Boeing proposed to 
procure for the two experiments by letting bids to Space 
32 . 
Interview with Gerald Brewer, Chief of Mission 
Assurance, Lunar Orbiter Project Office, Langley Research 
Center, July 18, 1967. 
33Refer to Project Organization Chart in Appendixes. 
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Technology Laboratories or Texas Instruments, Inc., did not 
meet the actual specifications in the experiments document. 
Indeed Taback and Swetnick fel~ that even the specifications 
document which Boeing had drawn up did not demonstrate an 
understanding of the experiments which the Lunar Orbiter 
Project Office desired to have on board the spacecraft. 
SWetnick called a special meeting with Boeing 
representatives on October 29 for a detailed discussion of 
Boeing's approach to the experiments. He and Taback made 
clear to the contractor that Boeing's specifications document 
for the radiation experiment was very confusing because 
"it did not in any way provide the bidders with a 
description of the requirements for the radiation data, a 
statement of objectives, and a description of what should 
be done."34 Boeing's lack of knowledge about the radiation 
experiment surprised the two NASA officials, who 
urged Boeing to work out a more realistic approach to 
fabrication and testing of the experiment's instrumentation 
as Dr. Foelsche had designed it. 
The October 29 meeting revealed the existence of poor 
communications between Langley and Boeing in the area of 
experiments. Boeing did not lack 'he ability to carry out 
34 Martin J. Swetnick, Lunar Orbiter 
Report on Trip to Boeing on October 27-29, 
November 5, 1964, p. 2. 
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the work required or to obtain competent support for the 
work. Instead Boeing personnel responsible for the 
experiments had not understood precisely what Langley 
desired them to do. Boeing management officials realized 
that they needed to modify the specifications document to 
give their bidders a much clearer idea of the nature and 
objectives of the two experiments. They assured Taback 
that they would send the modified document to Langley for 
review and approval before submitting it to the bidders. 
The problem with the micrometeoroid experiment was 
different. Boeing had made certain design changes on it 
without notifying the principal investigator, Charles A. 
Gurtler at Langley. Taback and Swetnick were disturbed 
that Boeing had decided to locate the micrometeoroid pres-
sure cells on the periphery of the tank deck (middle deck) 
outside the thermal blanket, necessitating reduction of 
the number of cells from 20 to 15. Worse yet, the leads 
from the cells to the respective electronics would have to 
pass through the thermal blanket. Taback made it clear 
that Langley would have to examine this alteration very 
carefully before making a decision OQ the experiment's final 
deSign. 35 
35~., p.l. 
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SWetnick told the Boeing people that Gurtler did not 
believe that the e~eriment coulrl be useful with fewer than 
20 cells and any change in their location would require 
substantial redesign. Again the fact that Langley. 
officials were unaware of Boeing's thinking on the micro-
meteoroid experiment showed a surprising lack of communication, 
and steps were taken to strengthen ties between the Langley 
LOPO people and their Boeing counterparts. 
Another problem of note was the status of the 
Lockheed Agena D launch vehicle, its adapter, and the 
spacecraft shroud. The Lewis Research Center near Cleveland, 
Ohi~ had the responsibility for these pieces of hardware. 
Early in 1964 Lewis had insisted that Lockheed handle the 
entire integration of the booster-adapter-shroudhardware 
for Lunar Orbiter. Langley had proposed to have Boeing 
provide the adapter and the shroud. This arrangement had 
not been acceptable'to Lewis. Dr. Abe Silverstein, the 
center's director, had personally guaranteed that the 
adapter and the shroud would be delivered to the Boeing 
Company at the time stipulated in the contract. 36 By late 
1964 Lewis was confronted with the predicament that 
Lockheed, as sole vendor of the hardware, was not going to 
36Report of the LRC and LeRC Lunar Orbiter Shroud 
and Adapter Meeting, January 5, 1965, p.l. See also Lewis 
Research Center News Release 65-2, January 6, 1965. 
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meet the target dates for delivery. Moreover, to meet its 
schedule might cause it to overrun the original contract 
price by as much as 100%. Realizing t.his, Lewis desired 
to open the field to competitive bidding for the hardware, 
but it had to wait for a Headquarters review of the 
situation before making such a move. 37 
Scherer's office at NASA Headquarters was disturbed by 
the unforeseen turn of events at Lewis. Lockheed had failed 
to provide Boeing with an adapter master gauge on December 1, 
1964, as it had promised; and Boeing still did not have one 
by January 5. Worse yet Lewis had not finalized the adapter 
design by the beginning of 1965, and this would impinge upon 
program schedules unless NASA Headquarters quickly altered 
the situation. Boeing, meanwhile, had sent Lockheed a model 
of the spacecraft on January 4 for separation tests with the 
Agena, but it remained uncrated pending a decision by NASA 
to open the field for competitive bids for the adapter and 
38 the shroud. 
By February 8, 196~ Lewis had opened bidding for the 
spacecraft adapter, the Atlas SLV-3 and the Agena D launch 
vehicles. Headquarters gave Lewis permission to open 
37Ibid ., p.2. 
38 Ibid • 
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bidding on the shroud, and the bidding began on 
FebrUary 5. 39 On March 8 Lewis awarded Lockheed the 
adapter hardware contract, and in the interim Lewis 
40 delivered the Adapter M,aster Gauge to Boeing. Boeing, 
intent upon avoiding any delays or compatibility problems, 
bid for the spacecraft shroud and was awarded the contract 
by Lewis on April 1. Boeing would build two ground-test 
41 
shrouds and five flight shrouds for its Lunar Orbiter. 
On April 26 Lewis sent Boeing a shroud from the Mariner D 
spacecraft to be used as a "stand-in" for tests with 
42 
component sets A and C. These progressive actions by 
Lewis corrected a situation which could have caused 
substantial schedule slippage, possibly affecting the 
incentives in the Boeing contract. 
From February 24 through 2~Langley held the Third 
Quarterly Review. During the review three meetings convened 
to examine the status of the spacecraft, the results of the 
Critical Design Review and the interrelations of the 
39 Lunar Orbiter Project 
Center, Project Lunar Orbiter 
ary 8, 1965. 
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program's various systems: spacecraft, launch vehicle, 
and tracking and data acquisition. 
Boeing reported that the late availability of 
hardware from Eastman Kodak and RCA had necessitated a 
schedule adjustment moving prototype systems tests back 
eight weeks. Beginning in November 1964 Eastman Kodak had 
to rearrange its schedules with Boeing because its hardware 
deliveries would not come in time to undergo testing with 
the spacecraft component sets. Instead Boeing had to use a 
photographic subsystem simulator during the design verifica-
43 tion tests. 
By late January 1965 the photo subsystem was still 
experiencing delays. Eastman Kodak had problems in procuring 
high-reliability parts and in a power change for the sub-
system. The 610 mm lens was also a problem, because of 
difficulties in attaining the proper resolution; Kodak, 
however, succeeded in eliminating the error in the lens 
44 formula and proceeded with fabrication. The delays did 
not change the first launch date because the program used 
the parallel testing mode. However, Langley deleted the 
Flight Acceptance Test on Spacecraft 1 and established 
43 1!2.!£., December 9, 1964. 
44 
1£!£., January 25, 1965. 
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testing restraints to fit the schedule changes because of 
the delays at Eastman KOdak. 45 
Boeing also reported to the members of the Third 
Quarterly Review that all designing was essentially 
completed and a substantial amount of structural and thermal 
testing of components had been conducted. No serious 
failures or deficiencies in components had been uncovered 
during testing. Nevertheless a few hardware items did have 
problems: 1) the design and operation of the camera thermal 
door; 2) telemetry data handling during testing; 3) the 
photographic recording equipment at DSIF Site 71 (located 
at Cape Kennedy), and 4) several potential trouble areas in 
the spacecraft's film processing system. Work on these items 
did not threaten schedules or hinder the progress of other 
subsystems in any substantial way, largely because of the 
loose integration of all subsystems in the spacecraft 
system design. 
Boeing officials also noted at the review that the 
situation at Lewis was improving and being monitored by 
NASA Headquarters. Finally, the men present at the Third 
Quarterly Review decided to have Boeing conduct "qualification 
tests on sic 1, one mission simulation test on S)C 2, and 
45 
Third Quarterly Review, February 24-26, 1965, 
reported March 2, 1965, PP. 1-2. 
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phase one of the Goldstone Test on Sic 3 ... prior to the 
start of FAT on the first flight spacecraft.,,46 
By early March Langley had altered the testing 
program, removing several conservative features in the 
initial phase of testing to allow for further schedule 
compression. At the same time restraints were established 
which required that 1) the qualification and reliability 
tests of each component for a flight spacecraft had to be 
completed before the Flight Acceptance Test on the component 
could begin and that 2) no FAT of an entire flight space-
craft would commence before the completion of qualification 
tests on Spacecraft 1, of one mission simulation test on 
Spacecraft 2, and of the first phase of the Goldstone Test 
47 
on Spacecraft 3. These steps left little room for any 
major testing failures without causing serious schedule 
slippages. This was a risk, but one which was calculated, 
relying on testing procedures at the component level 
to catch and correct any design or fabrication anomalies 
before they could reach the subsystem integration level 
undetected and have a serious impact on the program's 
timetable. 
46 
Ibid., P. 2. 
47-OSSA Review -- March 9, 1965, p. 2. 
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One example of the early detection of such an 
anomaly had come to .light during the February 17 Photographic 
Subsystem Critical Design Review. Leon Kosofsky, Headquarters 
Program Engineer, reported to Israel Taback, Langley LOPO 
Spacecraft Manager, in a memorandum dated March 4 that "the 
film processor cannot be stopped indefinitely without the 
risk of losing the mission due to the sticking of the Bimat 
48 
web to the exposed film." 
This condition meant that either the processor or 
the mission design would have to be altered. At least some 
of the film would have to be wasted to keep the whole film 
and the Bimat processing web (film) advancing at a rate 
sufficient to preclude any sticking. 
The Lunar Orbiter Program Office had to know the 
time the Kodak SO-243 film and the Bimat could safely 
remain in contact during a non-photographic period. 
Kosofsky pOinted out that, as matters stood, if this time 
were 3.5 hours or less, then a typical mission such as that 
envisioned in Bellcomm report TR-65-211-1 (January 25, 1965) 
49 
would be impossible. If the safe time was between 3.5 
48 Memorandum from SL/Engineer, Lunar Orbiter Program, 
Lunar & Planetary Programs, to Langley Research Center, 
Attention: Mr. I. Taback, Lunar Orbiter Project Office, 
March 4, 1965. 
49D• D. Lloyd and R. F. Fudali, "Lunar Orbiter Mission 
Planning," Bellcomm TR-65-211-1, January 25, 1965. 
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and 6.33 hours, waste exposures would be required on 
every non-photographic orbit of the Moon, because of 
the forty-minute processing period which could be subtracted 
from the time requirement of a photographic and a non-
photographic orbit combined. Finally, a safe time of 7.5 
hours meant that wasted exposures would be required only on 
alternate orbits during non-photographic periods, while a 
10.5 hours safe time would allow two successive orbits 
during such periods without having to waste film. This 
problem presented sufficient potential impact upon Lunar 
Orbiter's mission capabilities to require immediate study 
of ways to reduce or eliminate film wastage regardless of 
the final processor safe time. 50 
The amount of time wasted in the readout process by 
blank pictures presented one of the worst aspects of 
the film advance problem. As of March 4, 1965, the design 
of the photographic subsystem precluded any rapid operation 
of the rewind drive. Unless changed, this problem would 
severely affect the critical readout process. Kosofsky 
instructed G. Calvin Broome, Chief of the Photo Subsystem 
Section of the Langley LOPO, to explore ways of overcoming 
the necessity to waste film and prolong the readout 
50 Memorandum from SL/Engineer, March 4, 1965. 
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process 51 . 
Except for several minor problems the Lunar Orbiter 
design phase was completed by April 13, 1965; over 80~ of 
the procurement had been started and over 60~ of the first 
sets of components had been delivered to the contractor. 
Development tests had begun and mission planning for 
Orbiter was just commencing. The Kent Testing Facility at 
Boeing in Seattle also neared completion. Boeing would use 
it for the spacecraft's mission simulation tests. It 
consisted of a major chamber with a working section 12 meters 
high by 9 meters in diameter, capable of having its internal 
pressure pumped down at twice the rate of the planned Lunar 
Orbiter ascent profile for the mission simulation·~ests. 
Other smaller chambers were also part of this testing 
facility.52 
By the middle of 1965 the Lunar Orbiter Program was 
well into its major development phase. The Program Office 
and the Project Office at Langley had maintained an 
equilibrium among the many different needs which had to be 
fulfilled, and among working groups at Langley, Boeing, 
51Ibid., P.2. See also memorandum from SL/Engineer, 
Lunar Orbiter Program, to SL/Manager, Lunar Orbiter Program, 
March 11, 1965. 
520SSA Review -- March 9, 1965, p. 1, and OSSA Review 
April 13, 1965. 
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the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Lewis, and the major 
subcontractors. Langley maintained tight control of its 
funds and the rate of funding required by Boeing as the 
program moved into the mission planning phase. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
LUNAR ORBITER MISSION OBJECTIVES AND APOLLO REQUIREMENTS 
OSSA and OM SF Planning Activities 
While Langley and Boeing accelerated the construction 
and testing phase of the program, the work of designing the 
Orbiter missions brought the Office of Space Science and 
Applications and the Office of Manned Space Flight to a 
long series of plenary meet~ngs and task group assignments. 
This work greatly assisted Langley in its own mission 
planning activities. 
The Lunar Orbiter Program was well into its third 
quarter of operations when Dr. George E. Mueller", Associate 
Administrator for Manned Space Flight, sent a memorandum to 
Bellcomm, a contractor to his office, requesting answers to 
two items fUndamental to Apollo site selection: 1) Who 
held the responsibility for lunar site selection and analysis? 
2) Who, where, and how were the films and other data gene-
rated by the Lunar Orbiter and the Surveyor Program going 
to be stored?l 
Mueller's November 3, 196~, memorandu~ brought a quick 
response from Bellcomm. It reviewed the status of work 
related to lunar site analysis aad selection. This became 
1 
Memorandum from Dr. George E. Mueller, Associate Admin-
istrator, Office of Manned Space Flight, NASA Headquarters, 
November 3, 1964. 
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the basis for the organization of the Surveyor/Orbiter 
Utilization Committee. On December 23 Bellcomm reported to 
Mueller's office that Apollo landing site selection was a 
function of OMSF. It had the responsibility of defining 
strategies, goals, schedules, and trajectories with OSSA. 
The report suggested that OMSF form a working group charged 
with: 
a. Examining the problem of lunar site analysis and 
selection. 
b. Recommending the initiation of any work necessary. 
c. Making recommendations on any new facilities needed 
for the adequate analysis and storage of the data. 
d. Examining the necessary funding and identifying the 
responsible organizations. 
e. Identifying the manner in which landing site selec-
tion should be accomplished. 2 
The proposed working group would consist of a chairman 
reporting either to the Associate Administrator for Manned 
Space Flight or to the Apollo Program Director, Maj. Gen. Samuel C. 
Phillips. The Office of Space Science and Applications would 
assign representatives from the Surveyor and the Lunar Or-
biter Programs. The Manned Space Flight Center would assign 
representatives from the Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, 
the Flight Operations Division, and the Flight Crew Opera-
tions Division. Manned Space Flight Operations and Manned 
2Memorandum from T. H. Thompson, Bellcomm, Inc., to Dr. 
G. E. Mueller/Gen. S. C. Phillips, December 23, 1964. 
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Systems Engineering in the Office of Manned SpaceFlight, with 
the Bellcomm Site Survey Group, would also appoint representa-
tiv~s. Lastly, the Bellcomm memorandum to Mueller recommended 
that Myron W. Krueger, the OMSF man responsible for lunar 
3 
photographic data, be assigned. This would form the nucleus 
of the more formal Surveyor/Orbiter Utilization Committee 
which came into being at a later date. 
As of December 23, 196~ the Office of Manned Space 
Flight had no organization to accept and store Surveyor 
or Lunar Orbiter data. No organized group existed to per-
form lunar site analysis and selection. The Apollo Project 
Development Plan stated the need for a working group to 
make recommendations to the appropriate groups within OMSF 
on the optimum utilization of data, but no such group had 
been set up. On the other hand the Lunar Orbiter Project 
Office had already set up a working group to make recommen-
dations on the form of data and its storage and retrieval. 
And Bellcomm's Site Survey Group monitored site survey 
programs for Lunar Orbiter and Surveyor and developed strat-
egies for the use of systems in these programs. 4 The time 
had come for the Office of Manned Space Flight and the Office 
of Space Science and Applications to form firmer working 
relations. 
3Ibid • 4-
Ibid., Attachment A--Review of Current Status of Work 
Relate~ Lunar Site Analysis and Selection. 
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On September 22, 1964, Oran W. Nicks had informed 
the Apollo Program Director, General Phillips, about the 
mission planning effort that the Lunar Orbiter Program was 
undertaking at Langley. This effort could possibly influ-
ence Apollo hardware design. Nicks suggested that OMSF 
make a study of specific Lunar Orbiter missions in support 
of Apollo. The recommendations of the study would aid 
the Lunar Orbiter Program Office in developing guidelines 
for actual mission planning activities at the Langley 
Research Center and at Boeing. Nicks pointed out that 
Bellcomm had very qualified men to make such a study for 
5 
OMSF. 
Nicks's memorandum resulted in a Bellcomm study for 
OMSF during the remainder of 1964. On February 18, 1965, 
Phillips sent Nicks the report of the study, "Lunar 
Orbiter Mission Plannin&" by Douglas D. Lloyd and Robert 
F. Fudali of Bellcomm. Phillips expressed a willingness to 
have further joint study done if Nicks agreed that it was 
6 
necessary. 
The Lloyd-Fudali report explained that Lunar Orbiter 
could take nearly identical photographs in different ways. 
5 
Memorandum from SLjDirector, Lunar and Planetary Pro-
grams,to MA/Maj. Gen. Phillips, Office of Manned Space Flight, 
September 22, 1964. 
6 
Memorandum from MA/Apollo Program Director to SL/Lunar 
and Planetary Programs Director, February 18, 1965. 
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Two simulated missions were described in the report, one 
in a posigrade orbit, the other in a retrograde orbit. 
Further, the ~tudy had reached the following conclusions: 
1. The strategy of contiguous high-resolution photo-
graphy of multiple targets should be used. This 
would permit successful site survey with only a 
single Lunar Orbiter. 
2. To allow the above, the camera sequencer control 
should be changed to include a quantity control 
for providing eight consecutive photographs. 
3. The quantity of gas made available for tile attitude 
control system should be sufficient for a minimum 
of sixteen separate photographic manuevers. 
4. To achieve at least I-meter optical pair resolution, 
photographs should be taken from a nominal height 
of 46 km or less. 
5. To avoid the possible problem of orbital insta-
bility for the above low-altitude orbit, because 
of the uncertainties in knowledge of the moon's 
spherical harmonic terms, the orbit should b~ in-
clined no more than 7° to the lunar equator.·f 
Further Bellcomm research during March 1965 produced 
a paper entitled "Apollo Lunar Site Analysis and Selection," 
which was transmitted to General Phillips. Pointing out that 
Lunar Orbiter and Surveyor were the two prime data-gathering 
systems for Apollo, it recommended that OMSF and OSSA set 
up a joint Site Survey Steering Committee. Its major task 
7 
''Lunar Orbiter Mission Planning," Bellcomm, Inc., Jan-
uary 25, 1965, p. ii. 
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would be the definition of the objectives and use of 
Lunar Orbiter and Surveyor for the Apollo Program's needs. 
The committee would have the responsibility for target 
selection, launch schedules, choice of measurements, measure-
ment priority and instrument complement, control of data 
handling, and recommendations on data analysis for each 
8 
Lunar Orbiter and Surveyor mission. 
On May 10 Brian T. Howard of Bellcornm reporte~to 
General Phillips that, in addition to earlier recommendations 
for Lunar Orbiter and Surveyor tasks in Apollo site selec-
tion, Bellcomm had considered two more proposals related 
to the organization of cooperative OMSF-OSSA activities 
in site analysis and selection. First, it seemed highly 
desirable to set up a joint OMSF-OSSA Lunar Surface Working 
Group. It would report to the Apollo Program Office and to 
the Lunar and Planetary Programs Office. It would coordi-
nate mutual planning activities concerning site survey 
requirements and the ways in which they could be satisfied. 
Second, Bellcornrn recommended that the Manned Space Flight 
Center's Data Analysis Division subcontract with JPL for 
the prime responsibility of gathering, analyzing, and eval-
9 
uating data. 
8 
"Apollo Lunar Site Analysis and Selection," BellcoDUn, 
Inc., March 30, 1965. 
9 
Memorandum from B. T. Howard, Bellcomm, to Maj. Gen. 
S. C. Phillips, NASA/MA, May 10, 1965. 
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Developing Mission Designs 
While Bellcomm was advising OMSF,the Langley Lunar 
Orbiter Project Office carefully studied and compared the 
proposed missions that Bellcomm had developed (i.e., in the 
Lloyd-Fudali report) with the one developed by Boeing. 
Thomas Young of the Langley LOPO informed Norman L. Crabill 
on May 7 of the conclusions pertaining to the reliability 
of each proVosed mission. His memorandum stressed the 
differences in reliability in the studies performed 
by Bellcomm and Boelng. The Bellcomm mission required 4.5 
days longer to accomplish than did that of Boeing, but the 
10 
variation in resulting data was minimal. 
Young's LOPO mission planning study group continued 
to analyze Lunar Orbiter capabilities and concluded in a 
report to Crabill on June 14 that Apollo and Surveyor re-
quirements permitted variable Lunar Orbiter missions, 
ranging from a concentrated to a distributed photographic 
mission, depending upon primary requirements for the two 
programs. For photographic missions with sites distributed 
within the Apollo zone, a set of trajectories could be 
defined that were generally independent of the exact loca-
tions of the sites. They could be planned by plaCing mild 
10 
Memorandum from A. T. Young to N. L.Crabill, Langley 
Research Center, May 7, 1965, Subject: Mission Reliability 
Analyses and Comparison for the Bellcomm Mission and TEC's 
S-110 Mission. 
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restrictions on the latitude range of the sites. Thu~ for 
Missions I, II, and III (with prime sites in the Apollo 
zone), trajectories could be defined without consideration 
of the exact site locations. Mission II sites were to 
be selected from the review of the results of secondary 
sites of Mission I, and Mission III sites were selected 
11 
from all results of the first two missions. However, 
the Langley Project Office considered the establishment of 
mission objectives a prerequisite to further mission 
12 
planning. 
On Friday, June 25, representatives from OSSA, OMSF, 
the Langley Lunar Orbiter Project Office, the Manned Space 
Flight Center, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and Bellcomm 
held the initial coordination meeting to establish a pre-
liminary plan for utilizing Lunar Orbiter's mission capa-
bilities with the first Lunar Orbiter mission, the first 
Surveyor mission, and with Apollo mission requirements. 
During the meeting it was agreed that the Lunar Orbiter 
could best aid Surveyor by screening sites and defining 
targets which had a high probability of being smooth. The 
11 
Memorandum from Norman L. Crabill, Mission Analysis 
and Design Engineer, Viking Project Office, Langley Research 
Center, to NASA Code EH, Attention: Dr. Eugene M. Emme, 
December 9, 1969. 
12 
Memorandum from A.T. Young to N.L. Crabill, Langley 
Research Center, June 14, 1965, Subject: Lunar Orbiter 
Mission Planning Study, pp. 1, 6. 
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representatives from the Apollo Systems Engineering Office 
stated that Lunar Orbiter could photograph a landed Surveyor 
spacecraft from an altitude of 46 kilometers with I-meter 
resolution because of the Surveyor's shadow at a prescribed 
Sun angle and the high albedo of the spacecraft. Lunar 
Orbiter had originally been targeted to screen Surveyor sites. 
After a Surveyor had successfully landed, the Orbiter was to over-
fly it and photograph it through the 610 mm high-resolution 
camera lens. The increased capabilities of the Lunar Orbiter 
photo subsystem now allowed it to combine screening and 
13 
overfly tasks in the high-resolution mode. 
The Apollo Systems Engineering Office and the Manned 
Space Flight Center preferred that Lunar Orbiter fly a 
distributed mission; this offered a sampling technique 
better able to find an area suitable for an Apollo landing, 
to define suitable areas for further coverage on later 
Orbiter flights, and to increase the flexibility of the 
Apollo launch window by finding suitable sites spread 
across the Apollo zone of interest. Both the Manned Space 
Flight Center and Bellcomm recommended that Lunar Orbiter 
photograph the Ranger VIII impact point located in the 
Apollo zone because possibly it could serve as a future 
13 
Minutes: Lunar Orbiter Target Objectives Meeting at 
Langley Research Center, June 25, 1965, recorded by A. 
Thomas Young, pp. 2-3. 
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14 
Apollo orbit anchor point. 
The June 25 Langley meeting provided the Lunar Orbiter 
Project Office with information concerning mission objectives 
from the Apollo and the Surveyor Program Offices. This 
assisted Langley in its mission planning activities, and 
it, in turn, was better able to guide the Boeing Company 
15 
in its work. Moreover, the meeting produced the basis 
for efficient coordination between the NASA offices re-
quiring Lunar Orbiter data and enabled the Lunar Orbiter 
16 
Program to develop preliminary mission plans. 
From July 13 to 15 a preliminary mission definition 
meeting for Lunar Orbiter convened at Langley. The men 
17 
present defined preliminary mission types on the basis 
of decisions arising out of the June 25 meeting at Langley. 
These mission types depended upon three basic flight objec-
tives: 1) gathering significant topographic information 
of the Moon's surface for selection of Surveyo:' and Apollo 
14 
Ibid., pp. 4-6. 
15--
Memorandum for File, from Dennis B. James, Bellcomm, 
Inc., June 30, 1965, Subject: Trip Report: Lunar Orbiter 
Mission Planning Meeting -- Langley Research Center -- June 
25, 1965. 
16 
OSSA Review -- July 2, 1965, p. 3. 
17 
Attendees were: D. D. Viele, Boeing; Douglas D. Lloyd, 
Bellcomm Leon J. Kosofsky, NASA Lunar Orbiter Program Office; 
Clifford H. Nelson, Norman L. Crabill, Gerald W. Brewer, and 
A. Thomas Youn&Lunar Orbiter Project Office, Langley. 
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sites; 2) providing selenodetic data on the size, shape, 
and gravitational properties of the Moon necessary for 
determining orbit lifetime of a Lunar Orbiter sufficiently 
long to allow adequate time for readout; and 3) providing 
measurements of micrometeoroid and radiation flux in the 
18 
lunar environment. 
By the end of July the Lunar Orbit~r Program Office 
in Washington had the results of the Langley LOPO and Bell-
comm preliminary mission studies. Four mission types had 
been formulated on the basis of requirements and recommen-
dations from Apollo, Surveyor, and Lunar Orbiter Program 
Offices. Briefly summarized they were: 
Type I --Site sampling, a distributed mission 
allowing eleven single passes over different 
terrains (i.e., highlands, maria, rilles). 
Type II --wide-area coverage for Surveyor of only 
three separate sites. 
Type III --Surveyor location mission to pinpoint 
landed Surveyor at one-meter resolution. 
Type IV '--a combination mi~~ion for more sophisticated 
work later in the program. ~ 
A joint OSSA/OMSF Site Survey Meeting was held at 
NASA Headquarters on August 4 to review the status of the 
Surveyor, Lunar Orbiter, and Apollo Programs and to discuss 
18 
N. L. Crabill and A. T. Young,"preliminary Lunar Orbiter 
Mission Types,nLunar Project Office, July 16, 1965, p. 1. 
1905SA Review -- July 30, 1965, pp. 2-3. See also 
Crabill and Young, IIPreliminary Lunar Orbiter Mission Types." 
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preliminary mission planning for Lunar Orbiter and selec-
tion of Surveyor landing sites. Clifford H. Nelson, Lunar 
Oruiter Project Manager, summarized the status of the Lunar 
Orbiter Program and pOinted out that the program expected 
to meet its original launch schedule but that slips in 
subsystems, especially the photographic subsystem, had 
necessitated further compression of the testing schedule 
20 
in order to hold the launch schedule. 
After Nelson's report and the Apollo status report, 
Norman L. Crabill presentee the preliminary planning for 
the first two Lunar Orbiter mission types. He outlined 
the ground rules for the Type I mission: 
Ground Rules 
1) Photograph two sites of each smooth-looking-
terrain class up to a total of eleven sites 
within the Apollo area of interest. 
2) Photograph Ranger VIII and any landed Surveyors. 
3) Photograph et h site using a single pass W1~n 
sixteen contiguous l-meter-resolution frames per 
pass. 
4) Read out up to four frames between passes. 
5) Define mission for the Boeing Company by tne 
fall of 1965. 
And for the Type II miss~on: 
Objectives 
1) Topography mapping for possible Surveyor sites. 
20 
SSA/MSF Site Survey Meeting, Minutes, August 4, 1965, 
docume';t datedJ.gust 12 965, Bellcomm File, pp. 3-4. 
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2) High-precision selenodetic data. 
3) Lunar environmental data. 
Ground Rules 
1) Photograph three sites spread 300 of longitude 
apart. 
2) Use four passes per site. 
3) Use sixteen high-resolution contiguous frames 
per pass. 2l 
At the August 4 meeting Lee R. Scherer proposed the 
establishment of a Lunar Photographic Analysis Steering 
Group which would act as a sounding board for suggestions 
and requests from the various programs involved in lunar 
exploration. It would also establish priorities and serve 
as coordinator for NASA-wide activities related to obtaining 
photographic data of the Moon. The group could coordinate 
such activities as control of Earth-based lunar mapping, 
direction and planning in the analysis of Lunar Orbiter 
data, monitoring of pertinent work for other government 
agencies, planning with the OSSA planetology group, 
handling agreements for data processing priorities, and 
coordinating Apollo needs with other requiremen~s. No 
final action was taken on Scherer's proposal at the meeting, 
but it stimulated discussion on these aspects of mission 
. 22 
planning and data utilization. 
21 
Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
22-
Ibid., p. 8. 
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The Ad Hoc Surveyor/Orbiter Utilization Cormnittee (SOUC) 
All of the previously discussed plenary meetings 
served as the basis for setting up the OSSA/OMSF Ad Hoc 
Surveyor/Orbiter Utilization Committee, which held its 
23 
first meeting on August 20, 1965. At this time Scherer 
reviewed the Lunar Orbiter photographic format and described 
the photographic subsystem in detail. Following this he 
stressed these major points which had to be considered in 
Orbiter mission planning: 
1) Resolution and area coverage are directly pro-
portional to orbital altitude. 
2) A photographic pass requires an altitude manuever. 
3) The system can take 1, 4, 8, or 16 pictures on a 
single pass. 
4) The system is capable of taking 192 pictures total. 
5) The last 4 pictures in the take-up spool can be 
read out on cormnand anytime during the mission. 
6) The system is capable of reading out one frame 
during each orbit. Pictures cannot be taken during 
the readout. 
7) The thread-up distance from the camera to the 
readout is 18 frames. 
8) Total readout will be accomplished after com-
pletion of all photography; the last photograph 
taken will be the first read out. 
23 
Members of the Surveyor/Orbiter Utilization Committee 
were: Edgar M. Cortright (Chairman), OSSA; Samuel C.Phillips 
(Apollo Program Office), OMSFj Edward E. Christensen (Manned 
Operations),OMSF; William A. Lee (Asp01 OMSF; William E. 
Stoney (Data Analysis), MSC; Oran W. Nicks (Lunar and Planetary 
Programs), OSSA; Urner Llddel (Lunar and Planetary Science), 
OSSAj Lee R. Scherer (Lunar Orbiter Program1 OSSA; Benjamin 
M1lwitz~ (Surveyor Program), OSSA; Victor Clarke (Surveyor 
Project1 JPLj Israel Taback (Lunar Orbiter Project1 Langley. 
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9) Gravity perturbations and latitude width of good 
lighting both increase with orbital inclination. 
There will have to be some trade-off studies made in 
this area; what's good for se1enodesy doesn't produce 
the best pictures. 24 
Norman L. Crabill followed Scherer with an updated out-
line of the four mission types which Langley had developed 
for Lunar Orbiter: 
Type I -- Photographs ten evenly distributed target 
sites in the Apollo zone of interest and covers each 
site in high- and low-resolution stereo photography 
(1 meter and 8 meters). 
Type II -- Photographs four sites to screen for Sur-
veyor landing sites in Apollo zone. 
Type III -- Photographs to i-meter resolution an 
area containing a landed Surveyor to learn as much 
as possible about the surrounding terrain~ 
Type IV -- Obtains a variety of topoEraphicdata 
not obtained by other mission types.c~ 
The ordering of these mission types reflected the 
conservative philosophy of OSSA and Langley covering the 
Lunar Orbiter. mission objectives. It was vital to 
obtain reliable, accurate data for the Apollo Program 
before attempting to do anything else. Thus the first 
mission type was entirely devoted to Apollo's needs. Also, 
the mission planners had to take into consideration the 
24 
Ad Hoc Surveyor/Orbiter Utilization Committee Minutes 
First Meeting, Washington, D.C., August 20, 1965, pp. 2-3. 
25 
Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
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possibility of a spacecraft or mission failure, in which 
case they wanted to have as many remaining Orbiters to 
carry out the Apollo photographic reconnaissance mission 
as possible. Were the 'Lunar Orbiter Program strictly 
pursuing scientific objectives unrelated to Apollo, a 
general survey mission of the entire Moon from a high 
polar orbit would have been preferable as the first 
26 
mission. This was not the case. 
The SOUC agreed to let Scherer define the decisions 
and the dates for the next meeting. The Committee requested 
him to tell Boeing to concentrate on studies of multiple 
and distributed targets instead of studying models for 
large block photography of the Moon's surface. The Committee 
also asked Scherer to hold a working meeting of representatives 
from the Apollo, Surveyor, and Lunar Orbiter Programs to 
determine the preliminary plan for the first Lunar Orbiter 
mission. The Committee favored a distributed Type I mission 
and asked that a presentation of the first mission plan be 
made within thirty to forty-five days.27 
The prime role in mission planning was carried out by 
26Recorded Interview with Israel Taback, former Lunar 
Orbiter Spacecraft Manager, Langley Research Center, July 7, 
1970. 
27Ad Hoc Surveyor/Orbiter Utilization Committee 
Minutes •.• August 20, 1965,p. 1. 
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the Langley Research Center while the SOUC acted in an 
advisory way, coordinating activities among the various 
centers connected with the Lunar Orbiter Program. The 
working meeting requested by SOUC took place at Langley on 
September 8 and 9. It had the following major objectives: 
1) To gain understanding of Orbiter and Surveyor 
mission design problem~ 
2) To review available data on the lunar surface. 
3) To produce lists of lunar sites which would 
satisfy APOl~g, Surveyor, and Lunar Orbiter 
constraints. 
At the meeting Scherer pointed out that Homer E. Newell, 
NASA Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications, 
would have to make the final decision on the first mission plan 
for Lunar Orbiter and that he would rely on recommendations 
from Langley and SOUC. Therefore, the Lunar Orbiter Program 
Office would be required to present a detailed, well-defined 
plan to the Surveyor/Orbiter Utilization Committee. 29 
The Apollo Spacecraft Program Office (ASPO), 
represented by James Sasser from the Manned Space Flight 
Center, Houston, Texas, expressed its desire for a Lunar 
Orbiter distributed mission and concurred on the sampling of 
28 Lunar Orbiter Mission Planning Meeting, Langley 
Research Center, Bldg. 1251, Hm. 105, September 8-9, 1965, 
Minutes recorded by A. T. Young. 
29 Ibid., p.l. 
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different terrain types within the Apollo zone of interest 
with emphasis on the areas of greatest apparent smoothness. 
However, ASPO did not want the Lunar Orbiter restricted to 
sampling Surveyor-size landing areas or sites accessible 
only to the Surveyor spacecraft. As a result Sasser 
accepted an action item to provide the Lunar Orbiter 
Project Office with a letter confirming the bounds of the 
Apollo zone of interest. 30 
Lawrence Rowan of the United States Geological Survey 
made a presentation to the members of the meeting in which 
he discussed the USGS lunar terrain analysis based upon the 
newest lunar map from the Aeronautical Chart and Information 
Center (ACIC) with a scale of 1:1,000,000. Rowan talked 
about the various sources of data that went into making the 
lunar map and then gave an interpretation of terrain types 
on the Moon. The USGS terrain analysis enabled Rowan to 
present a list of nine terrain types to be sampled 
photographically by Lunar Orbiter: 1) dark mare, 2) mare, 
3) mare ridges, 4) mare rays, 5) upland Unit-I, 6) deformed 
crater floors, 7) upland Unit-II, 8) crater rims; 'and 
31 9) sculptured highlands. Rowan's information formed part 
of the basis for the site selection process which fOllowed. 
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The members of the meeting subsequently developed 
two Orbiter missions based upon the USGS terrain map and 
the following assumptions: 1) orbital inclination of 
spacecraft equals 12.50, 2) descending-node photography to 
be employed, 3) orbital spacing to be based on Goudas's 
model of the Moon, 4) lighting band to be based on a 
spherical Moon, and 5) lighting band to be initially 
centered about the lunar equator at 00 10ngitude. 32 
Two preliminary mission plans resulted. Members 
at the meeting subsequently picked them apart and criti-
cized various aspects. Their major criticism W8B 
that the plans included too many samples of mare terrain 
types. They generally agreed that on the first mission 
Lunar Orbiter should photograph only the Apollo zone of 
interest unless a Surveyor landed outside of it. 33 The 
results of the Langley meeting formed the foundation of the 
Lunar Orbiter Mission A plan. 
Presentation of Mission A 
On September 29, 1965, the Lunar Orbiter Project 
Office at Langley formally presented the Mission A plan to 
the Surveyor/Orbiter Utilization Committee. It would be a 
32Ibid., pp.4-7. 
33Ibid • 
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Type I mission, sampling various lunar surface areas in the 
Apollo zone of interest. Lunar Orbiter's camera would 
assess selected sites for their suitability for Apollo and 
34 Surveyor landings. An excerpt from the OSSA Review 
briefly describes Mission A: 
A few pictures will be taken on the initial orbit. 
The location could range from 600 east to 1100 east 
and will be deter.mined later. In the final orbit, 
ten separate sites will each be covered by a single 
photographic pass. Briefly, site one is the only 
example of a dark mare in the Apollo areas of 
interest. Dark mare are considered the smoothest of 
the various terrain types. Site two is a highland 
site with smooth basins. Site three is in the same 
longitude as Ranger VIII. It is a ray mare probably 
not quite as rough as shown by Ranger photographs. 
Site four is a highland site which will contain 
photographs of each of the four highland terrain 
units. Site five, in Sinus Medii, has high 
potentiality for Apollo and Surveyor landing areas. 
Site six contains upland units and a deformed crater 
floor. Site seven is a good example of a mare with 
sinuous ridges. Site eight is a smoother mare with 
linear ridges. Site nine is located in the old 
crater floor Flamsteed and is probably the prime 
Surveyor landing site at this time. Site ten is 
outside of the Apollo area but is a dark mare and 
may be utilized for Surveyor.35 
Langley had done a thorough Job of screening each area for 
compatibility with Apollo and Surveyor needs and with 
Lunar Orbiter photographic capability. The Committee 
approved the plan. 
34Lunar Orbiter Project Office Recommendation for 
Lunar Orbiter Mission A, presented to the Ad Hoc Surveyor/ 
Orbiter Utilization Committee, September 29, 1965. 
350SSA Review--October 5, 1965, p.l. 
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After winning the SOUC's approval for Mission A 
Scherer made a presentation to a meeting of the Planetology 
Subcommittee of the OSSA Space Science Steering Committee 
on October 21 and 22. With him were Harold Masursky and 
Lawrence Rowan of USGS. Scherer reviewed the procedure for 
selecting the ten areas on the lunar surface which the first 
Lunar Orbiter would photograph. He stressed that the 
mission's objective was to obtain detailed topographic data 
for assessing the suitability of specific areas as possible 
Apollo and Surveyor landing sites. 36 
M~sursky explained in detail how the Lunar Orbiter 
Program could apply the methods of structural and 
stratigraphic geological mapping developed for Earth 
studies when these were augmented by telescopic observations 
and the Ranger pictures of the Moon. Rowan outlined recent 
findings concerning crater densities, surface roughness, 
and albedo of the Moon. He specifically described the ten 
selected areas which Lunar Orbiter would photograph on 
Mission A. He also stressed that the USGS work had led him 
to conclude that crater density measurements were not too 
useful in the selection of landing sites, but they aided in 
distinguishing between rayed and non-rayed surfaces. ThiS, 
he pointed out, suggested a relationship between surface 
36Summary Minutes: Planetology SUbcommittee of the 
Space Science Steering COmmittee, October 21-22, 1965, P.S. 
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roughness and albedo. 37 
Following this meeting the Planetology Subcommittee 
drew up a resolution, based upon the Lunar Orbiter Program 
Office's reports and the USGS information, which it 
forwarded to Oran W. Nicks. Although the resolution did 
not influence mission plans for the first Orbiter, it 
showed the Subcommittee's direction of thinking: 
The Planetology Subcommittee is disturbed that there 
are no scientific missions planned to take advantage 
of the unique capabilities of Lunar Orbiter for 
conducting investigations of the Moon, after the five 
flights in support of Apollo and Surveyor lunar 
landing site selection. In view of the opportunity 
to perform certain experiments (geodesy, gamma ray, 
x-ray{ magnetometry, microwave, and non-imaging 
radar) in orbit about the Moon before the Apollo 
Applications Program, the Subcommittee recommends 
that every effort be made to undertake Lunar Orbitey 
scientific missions at the earliest possible date.3b 
The Subcommittee did recognize the priorities which 
placed Apollo and Surveyor requirements before any purely 
scientific objectives in the Lunar Orbiter Program and at 
its Spring 1966 meeting recommended "that major attention 
be given to photography of sites of scientific interest, 
following the initial, successful Lunar Orbiter flight. 
These data are of particular importance in the planning and 
37 Ibid., pp.8-9. 8-3 Memorandum from SL/Chairman, Planetology Subcommittee (Dr. Urner Liddel), to SL/Director, Lunar and Planetary 
Programs, Subject: Resolution on Lunar Orbiter Scientific 
MisSions, November 5, 1965. 
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ultimate scientific value of both manned and unmanned lunar 
surface missions.,,39 
Mission planning activities continued to develop 
Lunar Orbiter's role in fulfilling Apollo and Surveyor 
requirements during the remainder of 1965 and the first 
quarter of 1966. Funding and hardware problems in the 
program made up the other significant activity during 
1965. 
Funding and Technical Problems--1965 
During the course of 1965, funding and technical 
problems exerted significant influence upon the Lunar Orbiter 
Program's schedules. Already in April 1965 the total 
proJected cost of the program was up by $10 million, of 
which $4.5 million was required in fiscal 1965. Scherer 
expressed surprise at this increase because NASA had been 
40 
maintaining very close communications with Boeing. 
Langley had known ea~ly in February that the total 
estimated cost of the Boeing contract was about $94.8 
million, of which $4 million was to be spent for authorized 
changes and $10.3 million for estimated overruns. 41 By 
39Planetology Subcommittee of the Space Science 
Steerin~ Committee, Meeting No. 4-66, May 9-11, 1966, p.16. 
°OSSA Review--May 6, 1965, P. 1. 
41proJect Lunar Orbiter 
Research Center, February II ~ 
Analysis, Langley 
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mid-March the cost picture had changed slightly: $96.4 
million for the Boeing contract, $4.4 million for 
authorized changes, and $11.5 million for estimated 
overruns. 42 By the ena' of March Langley had changes under 
review amounting to $7.9 million which were not yet 
authorized. 43 The situation did not seem to reach a 
plateau and level off, and on April 26 Langley and Boeing 
began discussions to curb rising costs and keep 
expenditures within planned funding levels. 44 
One problem in the funding situation had arisen in 
communications between Boeing and the two major subcontractors: 
Eastman Kocak and RCA. The majority of the overruns were 
occurring in their o~ rations. Eastman Kodak projected 
an increase of 26% in costs and RCA a 32% increase over 
original estimates. The estimates reflected a basic under-
estimation by Boeing management of the costs of the hardware 
the two subcontractors were obligated to supply. Boeing 
had had inadequate communications with the two companies 
during contract negotiations, and the talks had taken an 
unusually long time to reach f.al agreements. Langley 
realized that the situation could be controlled only 
42 
Ibid., March 17, 1965. 
43 Ibid., March 31, 1965. 
44 Ibid., April 28, 1965. 
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through vigorous cost reduction efforts among all 
participants in the program. As things stood, the program 
had $49.5 million for FY 1965, which meant that $5.8 
million in unfilled orders would carry over into FY 1966. 45 
Boeing also realized that in order to protect its incentives 
in the contract, it would have to make an effort to reduce 
the pace of expenditures while tightening up schedules with 
Eastman Kodak and RCA. 
NASA Headquarters directed Langley to conduct specific 
cost reduction studies to combat surprise jumps in the 
expenditure rate. Langley requested the same of Boeing. 
Both actions were initiated at the beginning of May. By 
May 4 the Lunar Orbiter Project Office had turned up 32 
items where potential cost reduction might be possible. At 
the same time Langley and Boeing officials visited Eastman 
Kodak and RCA. Their purpose was to bring under control the 
costs of these two subcontractors, to prevent surprises such 
as the $lO-million jump which had occurred in April, and to 
submit recommendations for cost saving items which would 
not affect schedules or disturb performance inc~ntives. 
Boeing officials conferred with Langley on May 11 
and 12. They informed Langley that Boeing was assigning one 
450SSA Review--May 6, 1965, p. 2. 
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assistant project manager to RCA and one to Eastman Kodak. 
These two officials would control changes in negotiations 
for changes and keep completely informed of cost projections. 
Moreover, Boeing would send Langley and NASA Headquarters 
weekly cost project statements. The assistant project 
managers assigned to RCA and Eastman Kodak were answerable 
directly to Robert J. Helberg, the Boeing Lunar Orbiter 
Program Manager. 46 
In addition to strengthening its management Boeing 
submitted 53 specific items for cost reduction consideration. 
Nelson and Scherer were pleased at the rapidity and extent 
of the Boeing probe for ways to cut costs. The 53 items 
totaled approximately $8.8 million, of which, by June, 
NASA had accepted over $4 million. There was still $1 
million in items being reviewed for possible cost reduction. 
Some specific examples of major items deleted or 
reduced were: 1) The program ended the requirement to 
use the RCA test chamber as a back-up for the Boeing 
chamber at the new Kent facility in the testing phase, 
saving $280,000. 2) The need for, and frequency of, 
certain kinds of documentation was reduced, saving $40,000. 
3) The redundancy of photo-receiving equipment at the Deep 
46 6 OSSA Review_-June 7, 19 5, p. 1. 
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Space Instrumentation Facility sites was reduced, saving 
$250,000. 4) The need to perform burn-in on all electronic 
parts of the photographic subsystem at Eastman Kodak was 
altered to encompass burn-in of certain selected parts 
where this process had merit, further saving $350,000. 47 
Boeing and Langley program representatives met at 
Langley on May 11 to discuss cost reductions. Langley 
decided that because of funding problems in FY 1965 it 
would fund Boeing on the basis of actual costs for the 
remainder of the fiscal year which ended on June 30. 48 
By the third week in June Langley and the contractor had 
reached agreement on 22 specifi~ items for cost reduction 
at an estimated savings of $4 million. Other items were 
undergoing further cost reduction review. 49 
The decision to reduce by one the number of test 
spacecraft was a major change in the development phase. While 
it was part of the cost reduction efforts, this change 
increased the risk of an operational failure. As originally 
planned, Set C of the components was to be built up into 
subassemblies for system testing. After this use, it was to 
become a complete spacecraft for system design verification 
47 Ibid., pp.1-2. 
48~ect Lunar Orbiter, Narrative Analysis, Langley 
Research Center, May 12, 1965. 
49 ~., June 23, 1965. 
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(SDV). Qualification testing was to be performed with 
Spacecraft 1. Spacecraft 2 was to be used for mission 
simulation tests, an~'Spacecraft 3 was scheduled for per-
formance tests at the Goldstone DSIF site and for integration 
tests at the Eastern Test Range at Cape Kennedy. The change 
would have the last two tests performed with the spacecraft 
built from the Set C components. Spacecraft 3 would be 
assembled according to the existing schedule. It woul~ 
become a flight spacecraft unless required for further 
testing. Should it be required for either of the last two 
tests, it would, nevertheless, be refurbished and used later 
as a flight spacecraft. Boeing agreed to this, making it 
possible to build one less spacecraft at a saving pf $1.8 
million. 50 
Lunar Orbiter Program Manager Scherer felt that the 
entire cost reduction effort of April, May, and June had 
proved valuable for the program. The schedule was very 
tight and events in the program were moving faster. This 
effort had forced people to re-evaluate themselves, their 
procedures, and the requirements of their jobs, and it had 
generated a new resp~ct for cost effectiveness. Exactly 
how much would be saved in the long run was unpredictable, 
but Scherer believed that the impact of the cost reduction 
effort would certainly increase the likelihood that the 
500SSA Review--June 7, 1965,- pp. 1-2. 
204 
!.~ , 
program would meet its launch schedule dates and that 
planning and management would become more effective. 
The Quarterly Review of mid-June at the Boeing 
Company indicated that the program would indeed keep its 
original launch date schedule. Boeing had brought hardware 
problems under control, save for the line scan tube which 
had already caused a three-week schedule slip in the photo 
subsystem. 51 T~e photographic subsystem still remained the 
pacing item of the program. Boeing and NASA were completing 
required test and storage facilities on schedule while twenty-
eight of the thirty-three major Lunar Orbiter components were 
in their testing programs. 
The critical testing phase of the program would tell 
whether or not the original launch dates could be met. 
During the summer, while Mission A was being developed, 
several significant hardware problems arose to hamper 
progress. The line scan tube of the readout subsystem had 
been failing tests, but by the end of July a new assembly 
procedure had eliminated the cause of failure. Excessive heat 
during the sealing of the glass envelope had been damaging 
the drum'bearing on which the tube rotated~ causing the 
. ~ 
electric motor to stall after a few hours of operation. A 
new tube was fabricated once the problem had been pinpointed, 
510SSA Review--July 2, 1965,and July 30, 1965. 
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and it successfully completed a 200-hour test. This delay 
affected sqhedules of the ground spacecraft"but did not 
alter the flight spacecraft schedules. 
The propellent tanks of the velocity control engine 
also presented a problem. Bursting during pressure storage 
tests at the Bell Aero Systems Company, they seemed to show 
significant stress corrosion of the' titanium alloy by the 
oxidizer. This complication necessitated a major meeting 
among Orbiter, Apollo, and Bell officials at North American, 
the prime contractor for Apollo, to review the history of 
the tanks. The Apollo Program, the prime user of these 
tanks, would have to find the reason for failure before 
Lunar Orbiter Program officials could accept the tanks for 
use in their spacecraft. In the meantime Boeing decided to 
use boiler plate oxidizer tanks whenever possible during the 
testing program to avoid further delays.52 
ay September 9 Boeing was conducting its own testing 
program of the Bell tanks, subjecting ten of them to tests 
in various configurations to determine their safety margin 
for Orbiter applications. OSSA also requested NASA's Office 
of Advanced Research and Technology to perform basic research 
t define the specific phenomenon causing the tanks to burst. 
52 Project Lunar Narrative Analysis, Langley 
Research Center, Augus 
• 
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Despite tests the tanks remained an unresolved problem. 
The problem could not be pinpointed quickly, and early in 
November the Lunar Orbiter Program Office reluctantly decided 
to decrease stress levels by installing heavier, thicker-
walled tanks with a weight penalty of two kilograms. 53 
Fortunately this addition did not absorb the remaining weight 
margin for the spacecraft, which was relatively generous by 
design. 
A problem of leakage in the nitrogen tank was more 
easily overcome during the same period. Nitrogen, a 
gas of low atomic weight, was detected leaking through teflon 
bladders and saturating the oxidi~er for the velocity control 
engine. The bladders were subsequently coated with a layer 
. 54 
of aluminized mylar which eliminated leakage. 
Progress was also hindered when Boeing Lunar Orbiter 
personnel discovered excess drift in the inertial reference 
unit (IRU) of one of the ground spacecraft. An investigation 
revealed dirty gyros. The discovery necessitated examination of 
all gyros for the IRUs in the remaining spacecraft, a task 
which would hold up completion of the attitude control 
subsystem by thirty days. Boeing disassembled nine of twenty-
53 OSSA Review--September 9, 1965, pp. 1-2, and 
November 2, 1965, p. ,2. 
54 
Costello interview, July 9, 1970. 
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nine gyros that Sperry Rand, the fabricator, had delivered. 
All nine were found to be badly contaminated. 55 By the 
beginning of November Sperry Rand had reworked four of the 
nine, but this rate was insufficient if an impact on the 
schedules was to be avoided. Yet the time factor would be 
doubled if NASA decided to procure gyros from another vendor, 
a fact which clearly revealed that Boeing and Langley were 
all but frozen to their present course. 56 
These setbacks had not yet jeopardized the schedules 
of the flight spacecraft, and overall progress was good. 
The major exception by November was the delivery of Flight 
Spacecraft 3. Delays in the delivery of the photographic 
subsystem had caused slippage in its delivery. By late 
October Lunar Orbiter management had narrowed the reason 
behind Eastman Kodak's failure to meet schedules to two 
hardware items: the shutter for the 60-mrn-focal-length lens 
and the Velocity-over-Height (V/H) sensor. Both of these 
were being manufactured by a subcontractor to Eastman Kodak, 
Bolsey Associates, Inc. 
Langley sent James S. Martin, the Lunar Orbiter 
Assistant Project Manager, to talk with Eastman Kodak and 
55 Boeing Quarterly Technical Progress Report, July to 
September, 1965, Section II, p. 17. 
56 
OSSA Review--November 2, 1965, p. 2. 
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Bolsey officials about schedules. Martin found that although 
Eastman Kodak and Bolsey had very qualified people performing 
the work for Lunar Orbiter, their management did not seem 
to place great significance on meeting schedules. Bolsey, 
a small firm of about 80 people, had only the V/H sensor 
and the focal plane shutter as its two major jobs on a 
cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. The company had absolutely 
no financial incentive to accomplish its work on time. Bolseyls 
work affected the work at Eastman Kodak, which in turn impacted 
upon the delivery date of Spacecraft 3. 57 
Martin insisted on major corrective actions in coordina-
tion and control by Boeing and Eastman Kodak management. 
Subsequently, Eastman Kodak assigned six full-time persons 
to the Bolsey plant. The Lunar Orbiter Project Office at 
Langley followed up Martinis initial visit with a complete 
schedule review on November 5 and followed this with another 
visit to Bolsey on November 10. 58 Martinis investigations 
revealed that each firm had the technical competence to 
do the work, but neither was particularly devoted to com-
pleting its work within the given time. This situation 
caused extensive delays, permitting the photographic 
57 
Martin interview, July 7, 1970. 
58 
OSSA Review--November 2, 1965, and Project Lunar 
Orbiter, Narrative Analysis, November 12, 1965. 
209 
~. 
C·} '-
...<-
subsystem to be integrated with the flight spacecraft only 
at Cape Kennedy facilitie~ very late in the prelaunch 
schedule ~f activities. 59 
The status of the Boeing Contract 
While Boeing and NASA Lunar Orbiter management took 
steps to improve the delivery schedules at the subcontractor 
level, Scherer's office was becoming more anxious about the 
total effect which the various hardware, management, and 
funding problems could have upon the incentive provisions of 
the Boeing Lunar Orbiter contract. In the original contract, 
signed May 7, 1964, the target cost for the entire program 
had been $75,779,911. The target fee had been $4,736,244. 
The contract stated explicitly that "in no event shall the 
sum of the fee, adjusted pursuant to paragraphs (b) and (c) 
below, be more than fifteen percent (15%) of target cost nor 
less than zero percent (0%) of target cost.,,60 Paragraph 
(b) further stipulated how the actual cost was to be 
established and how the target fee was to be revised. 
Explicitly the contract read: "(A) If the cost is equal to 
the target cost, the fee to be paid shall be the target fee. 
59 
Ibid. 
60-
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Nego-
tiated Contract No. NAS 1-3800, May 7, 1964, Part II, Fee 
Incentives, p. 1. 
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(B) If the cost is less than the target cost, the fee to be 
paid shall be increased by ten percent (10%) of the amount 
by which the cost is less than the target cost. (C) If the 
cost is greater than the target cost, the fee to be paid 
shall be decreased by ten percent (10%) of the amount by 
61 
which the cost is greater than the target cost." 
The crucial part of the Lunar Orbiter incentive-fee 
contract hinged upon the provisions defining the incentives. 
Two specific items determined the incentives: delivery and 
performance. An Evaluation Board composed of the Associate 
Administrator of the Office of Space Science and Applications 
the Director of the Langley Research Center (or their nearest and 
equivalents) and a chairman appOinted by the Associate 
Administrator of NASA, would be responsible for evaluating 
the contractor's performance and delivery of the spacecraft 
in accordance with predetermined schedules. The contract 
stated that NASA would penalize the contractor "up to a 
maximum of $10,000 for each individual delivery date, for 
each calendar day, including Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, 
by which actual accomplishment of delivery and acceptance 
shall have been later than the target date as set forth 
below. Spacecraft deliveries to the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration will be effected in a sequential 
manner as follows: 
61 
Ibid., P. 2. 
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Flight Spacecraft No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Delivery Date 
May 7, 1966 
May 7, 1966 
July 21, 1966 
October 21~ 1966 62 
December It5, 1966" 
These provisions were tempered by two other stipula-
tions that held the reduction in fee for any individual 
delivery to a maximum of $300,000, the equivalent of a deliv-
ery thirty days late. Moreover, the total penalty for all 
delays or late deliveries resulting from "causes beyond the 
control and without the fault or negligence of the Contractor 
as defined in Clause 12, Excusable Delays (September 1962), 
of the General Provisions attached hereto," was the 
responsibility of NASA. 63 
The history of the Lunar Orbiter Program until the 
last quarter of 1965 showed several constraints which 
possibly threatened delivery and over which Boeing had little 
or no control. The funding situation has previously been 
discussed as one of these constraints. Another one was the 
failure of NASA to couple delivery of ground spacecraft with 
flight spacecraft in the incentive provision of the contract. 
This failure created an awkward situation by October, which 
Scherer outlined in a memorandum to Clifford H. Nelson and 
Sherwood L. Butler at Langley. As certain hardware diffi-
culties, the V/H sensor and the 610-mrn-focal-length camera 
212 
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lens shutter for example, caused delays stretching into 
weeks, the testing programs for the ground spacecraft 
suffered. However, these delays did not hold up fabrication, 
testing, and delivery of flight spacecraft because, as defined 
by the contract, the flight spacecraft could be delivered to 
NASA without the contractor having performed adequate 
prototype testing. 
Thus, the delivery schedule incentive was in danger of 
losing its meaning. In fact, this condition in the contract's 
structure--allowing flight spacecraft deliveries without their 
being contingent on the development and testing of ground 
spacecraft--constituted a major loophole for Boeing, and 
Scherer urged that Langley Research Center compensate for 
it immediately.64 
Scherer pOinted out that when the time came for the 
three-man Evaluation Board to perform its tasks, the con-
tractor would naturally be prepared to offer "the~strongest 
possible justification of schedule delays based on government 
actions, such as late government furnished equipment or 
facilities and conflicts that will likely develop between 
Orbiter and other programs in the DSN.,,65 It was absolutely 
necessary for the Lunar Orbiter Program to substantiate the 
64 
Memorandum from Manager, Lunar Orbiter Program, to 
Langley Research Center, Attention Mr. C. H. Nelson and Mr. 
S. L. Butler, October 28, 1965. 
65 
Ibid., p. 1. 
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arguments of the Evaluation Board with verified documentary 
evidence pertaining to all aspects of the incentive provi-
sions in the contract. 
Spacecraft Compatibility with Launch and Tracking Facilities 
On April 20, 1965, representatives from Boeing, 
Lockheed, Langley, JPL, and Goddard Launch Operations had 
met at Kennedy Space Center for a major status review of the 
spacecraft and the preliminary mission plans. Boeing had 
presented its plans for using the Eastern Test Range 
facilities to conduct compatibility tests with a ground 
spacecraft. At this time it had also requested that it be 
allowed to evaluate checkout and operating procedures at ETR 
with the spacecraft's compliance to range requirements. This 
request necessitated the use of a launch vehicl~which the 
Lewis Research Center was to supply through Lockheed. 66 NASA 
approved Boeing's request. 
As part of the evaluation, Boeing and Lockheed coordi-
nated their efforts with the Goddard Launch Operations facility, 
Greenbelt, Maryland, to develop spacecraft flow data for 
Launch Complex 13 at Cape Kennedy. They completed this 
activity by May 10. NASA and Boeing further evaluated the 
requirements of the Deep Space Instrumentation Facility and 
66 
Boeing Quarterly Technical Progress Report, April to 
June 1965, Section IV, p. 64. 
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the Space Flight Operations Facility, whose stations around 
the world would be used in Lunar Orbiter flight operations. 
On June 16 Boeing and Eastman Kodak officials met with 
personnel of the DSN to establish the interface between 
Eastman Kodak equipment and the DSN. Once this was completed 
Boeing assisted the DSIF in the development of an activation 
plan for flight operations. The Deep Space Network was to 
67 
concur on the plan before it could be implemented. 
During the remainder of 1965 and the first half of 
1966 major reviews took place in all areas of the Lunar 
Orbiter Program: spacecraft subsystems, testing and inte-
gration with launch facilities,. and compatibility with Apollo 
and Surveyor requirements. The Deep Space Network, meanwhile, 
had committed the Goldstone Echo site (DSIF 12) to the Lunar 
Orbiter Performance Demonstration Test throughout 1965. 
During this time Spacecraft C was given basic compatibility 
tests to check its systems design with the DSN. 68 
One thorny problem was left to threaten the completion 
of Lunar Orbiter testing at Goldstone. The Pioneer 
Mission A had placed a claim on Goldstone facilities that 
67 
Ibid., pp. 65-66. 
68-
Memorandum from Lunar Orbiter Program Engineer, Leon 
Kosofsky, to Lunar Orbiter Operations Working Group (SL), Sub-
ject: Potential Conflict in Goldstone Support of Lunar Orbiter 
Performance Demonstration Test and Pioneer Mission A, November 
22, 1965. 
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required that the DSN station provide "coverage of one pass 
per day for each of the first 30 days after launch.,,69 
Moreover, Goldstone would track the Pioneer space probe on 
one pass per day for three days a week for the time 
of launch plus thirty days to six months--a sUbstantial 
amount of time, impinging on the Lunar Orbiter Performance 
Demonstration Test still in progress. 
The period from December 13, 196~ to February 3, 1966, 
had been designated by Boeing for the final test phase. 
Once Spacecraft C had finished the Goldstone tests, it 
would be shipped to Cape Kennedy for further tests in the 
Hangar S facility. As things stood the Pioneer launch 
threatened to delay Spacecraft C in the Goldstone tests, 
and this was something over which Boeing had no control. 
Thus a delay here would be charged to NASAls account in the 
final evaluation of whether the contractor met the incentive 
requirements of the contract. 
Kosofsky made the Flight Operations Working Group aware 
of the potential conflict and requested that it strive to 
minimize any delays in the Performance Demonstration Test. 
Some testing of the Lunar Orbiter could be conducted at 
Hangar S with Spacecraft 3, but it would lack the photographic 
subsystem. 
69Ibid • 
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The situation at the Deep Space Network was the result 
of scheduling within the Office of Space Science and 
Application~which held the responsibility for Lunar Orbiter, 
Surveyor, Mariner, and Pioneer and their use of the DSN 
facilities. The DSN did not overcommit its available time 
or facilities; instead it had to play the juggler, 
compensating for the schedule slippages in the various 
programs which relied on DSN. Marshall Johnson, DSN Manager 
for Lunar Orbiter, attempted successfully to rectify the 
time-sharing, computer-sharing needs of each program and 
thus avoided an impact on Lunar Orbiter's schedules. 70 
While Johnson took action at the DSN with the 
Surveyor, Mariner, and Pioneer projects to compensate for 
real and antiCipated schedule slippages, Scherer continued 
to prod Eastman Kodak and its subcontractor Bolsey to meet 
their schedule delivery dates. In a brief memorandum to 
Oran W. Nicks he explained that he, Clifford H. Nelson, and 
Eugene Draley at Langley had conferred on the status of the 
EK/Bolsey situation. They had recommended to Floyd L. 
Thompson, Langley Director, that Thompson talk t'o Eastman 
Kodak management officials by telephone about the schedule 
71 
situation instead of paying them a top-level visit. 
70 
Letter, Rechtin to Emme, November 18, 1969. 
71Memorandum from SL/Manager, Lunar Orbiter Program, 
to SL/Director, Lunar and Planetary Programs, March 7, 1966. 
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In addition to Scherer's recommendation, Newell, NASA 
Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications, 
notified NASA Deputy Administrator Seamans early in March of 
the Lunar Orbiter Program's schedule difficulties. 
Newell asked Dr. Seamans to release a telegram to 
the Boeing Company in an effort to bring the continual series 
of small schedule slips under control before they escalated 
into a costly launch delay. The telegram, released by 
Seamans on March 10, was addressed to Vice President Lysle 
Wood at Boeing. Showing top-level concern at NASA Headquarters 
over the threatened status of the Lunar Orbiter schedules, it 
read: 
The schedule of lunar orbiter is one of the highest 
priority to NASA. Both unmanned and manned lunar 
landing missions need the data to be obtained from 
successful lunar orbiter missions in order that our 
lunar exploration program can proceed as planned. 
Scheduled launch dates are requiring firm commitments 
for world wide network operations. Severe conflicts 
and delays may occur unless these launch dates can be 
adhered to. 
In view of these facts I have become very concerned 
about the pattern of delays in deliveries of certain 
items for the orbiter, such as the photographic 
system and the inertial reference unit. 
I want to emphasize the national importance of this 
program, the necessity for firm schedule adherence, 
and to inform you of my ~ersonalinterest and 
concern in this matter. '(2 
72 
Memorandum from S/Associate Administrator for Space 
Science and Applications to AD/Deputy Administrator, March 9, 
1966, with telegram attached. 
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Seamans indicated in his telegram to Boeing the kind 
of collision between various programs dependent upon the 
same facilities which delays could cause. Early in April 1966 
further minor delays in deliveries of the photographic 
subsystem occurred. There had been film alignment problems 
on the first flight-configured photo subsystem, delaying 
delivery by one week. The viR sensor in the first flight-
unit photo subsystem had developed troubles which threatened 
to delay the delivery of this vital component until June 15. 
To compensate for this Boeing recommended that the viR sensor 
from Spacecraft 2 be substituted on Spacecraft 4. This 
change would ensure delivery of the first flight spacecraft 
by June 1, but it would reduce the time for the mission 
-
simulation testing of the photo subsystem on Spacecraft 2. 
Yet under the existing constraint of a July launch it was the 
best alternative. 73 
Flight Spacecraft 4, the first Orbiter destined for 
the Moon, was undergoing match-mate with the adapter and the 
shroud at Boeing by April 7. Boeing would subject it to 
vibration and thermal vacuum tests which it would complete 
on April 19. Then, if all went well, Boeing would ship it 
to NASA facilities at Cape Kennedy by May 10. Complementing 
these tests were two other items that had reached successful 
completion: the software demonstration tests (i.e., computer 
i73Memorandum from SL/L. R~ schereri to SL/O. W. Nicks concern ng Update of uroiter sta~us, Apri 7, 1966. 
219 
l '1 , 
..i-
programming for flight trajectory analysis and tracking) 
and inter-station compatibility tests. These activities 
led to the next major item on the schedule: formal mission 
simulation test~ which were due to begin on April 11.74 
Flight ReCol"ding Equipment 
On April 4 Leonard Reiffel of the Apollo Program. 
notified Or an W. Nicks that Apollo requirements for Lunar 
Orbiter data made it highly desirable, if not necessary, to 
have sufficient magnetic recording facilities to record 
incoming data on magnetic tape. He stated that quantitative 
photometric work made the use of magnetic tape superior to 
film because: "1. the quality of the data is degraded in the 
ground phot()graphic process, and 2. magnetic tape provides 
higher data processing convenience and speed.,,75 
74Ibid. 
75Memorandum from MA-6/L. Reiffel to SL/O. W. Nicks, 
Subject: Project Apollo Requirements for Lunar Orbiter Data, 
April 4, 1966. See also Bellcomm Technical Memorandum 
65-1012-6, "Tape Recording of Lunar Orbiter P:::.ctures," by 
C.J. Byrne, July 6, 1965. Recording on film of raw data 
transmitted by Lunar Orbiter presented certain limitations. 
First, film had a very limited dynamic range and did not lend 
itself easily to enhancement. Second, it was much more 
difficult to computerize data from a film source than from 
magnetic tapes. Data recorded on tapes were the di~ect input 
signals from the spacecraft. This method of record:..ng also 
eliminated any film processing errors and provided a greater 
dynamic range for analytical purposes. Once the tape-recorded 
data were computerized they could be enhanced by eliminating 
known and suspected interferences before reconstructing the 
pictures of the lunar surface with such detail that slopes 
could be accurately determined wit) .. n the constraints of Apollo 
requirements. F.ilm-recorded data did not afford this flexibilit~ 
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Reiffel emphasized the necessity to have back-up 
recorders to record all data and avoid irretrievable losses. 
If, however, this were not possible, he suggested that a 
tape change schedule be set up which would allow tapes on 
primary recorders to be changed during times when low-
resolution frames were being received at Deep Space Network 
facilities. He further requested of Nicks a firm commitment 
on the availability of recorders, including those for the 
first mission. He stressed that Apollo site selection 
analysis depended heavily on magnetically recorded data, and 
he reques~ed more specific information on the Lunar Orbiter 
Program's plans for automatic data processing and, validity 
tests of processed data. 76 
Nicks replied to Reiffel's memorandum on April 26. 
He concurred that a meeting between technical specialists 
from both programs should be called to discuss the problem of 
magnetic recording of data, the availability and cost of 
extra recorders, and the best way to secure Lunar Orbiter 
data in a form that the Apollo Program cOllld use at the 
earliest possible date. He also pointed out that the 
Deep Space Network had received three Ampex FR 900 recorders 
but that their necessary amplifiers would not be delivered 
before June 1. This late delivery, the period of installation 
and testing, and the training of personnel to operate the 
76Ibid. 
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recorders kept the Lunar Orbiter Progr.am from making a firm 
commitment to Reiffel for the first flight. 77 
Nicks stated that the problem of back-up recorders 
had been investigated and the results showed that the 
contractor, Ampex, could deliver three units by the end of 
October if an order were placed by May 15, 1966. The earliest 
date for their operation would be February 7, 1967, and the 
estimated cost would be about $600,000. Until the Lunar 
Orbiter Program had more reliable information on the 
performance of the FR 900 in the field, Nicks did not believe 
it was advisable to ask the Deep Space Network to purchase 
additional recorders. However, Boeing had been investigating 
the feasibility of changing tapes during reception of low-
resolution data, and it had indicated that this probably 
could be done. 78 
A Change in Delivery Incentive 
Other areas of major concern existed. One was in the 
NASA-Boeing contract and the funding relationship. During 
March and April 1966, the Lunar Orbiter Project Office at 
Langley negotiated a new delivery incentive with the Boeing 
grams, 
77 
Memorandum from SL/Director, Lunar and Planetary Pro-
to MA-6/L. Reiffel, Apollo Program Office April 26, 1966. 
78Ibid • . 
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Company because of the necessity of moving the first launch 
date from early June to mid-July. The new delivery date was 
June 20, and the change relieved some of the pressure that 
schedule delays, especially on the photographic subsystem, 
had caused in the timetable. In addition NASA officials 
had taken the opportunity to correct previous weaknesses in 
the incentive clause of the contract. 79 
Scherer reported to Nicks on April 7 that the Lunar 
Orbiter Program was close to meeting its obligations ac-
cording to plan, but that accrued costs were about $10 million 
behind the plan. The completion costs for RCA were expected 
to end up one half to one million dollars below the level 
planned. In addition the Machinists' Union at Boeing had 
not reached a new contract settlement with the company by 
the April 7 deadline, and a strike appeared likely. If the 
union struck before April 30, negotiations would move to 
Washington, D.C. A strike would affect Lunar Orbiter opera-
tions at Cape Kennedy.80 
Langley had reported to Headquarters at the end of March 
that the program was proceeding toward a launch readiness 
79 Memorandum, Scherer to Nicks, April 7, 1966. 
80Ibid • 
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date of July 11, 1966, despite several technical problems 
that continued to hold up testing. The major problems 
were in the photographic subsystem. The shutter mechanism 
for the 610 mm lens and the VIR sensor had not yet been 
perfected, and their absence was delaying vital tests of 
the subsystem at the flight spacecraft level. 81 The prob-
lem continued to persist almost to the actual launch date. 
Indeed, the July launch date had to be canceled because the 
photographic subsystem was not availabl~ and it was not 
until the second week in August that the program was able to 
launch a spacecraft. 82 
81 Project Lunar Orbiter, Narrative Analysis, Langley 
Research Center, April 22, 1966. 
82Taback interview, July 7, 1970. 
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CHAPTER IX 
MISSIONS I, II, III: APOLLO SITE SEARCH AND VERIFICATION 
Preparations for the First Launch 
NASA launched five Lunar Orbiter spacecraft to the Moon 
between August 1966 and August 1967, and all five success-
fully performed their missions. This record set a precedent in 
the Office of Space Science and Applications in lunar ex-
ploration. Not every Orbiter proved an unqualified success, 
but each one obtained valuable photographic data that 
subsequently aided the Apollo Program in site selection for 
the manned lunar landings of Astronauts Neil A. Armstrong 
and Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr. (Apollo 11, July 20, 1969); Charles 
Conrad, Jr., and Alan L. Bean (Apollo 12, November 19, 1969); 
and later missions. Moreover, Lunar Orbiter photos enabled 
Surveyor Program personnel to verify landing sites and to 
place Surveyors in highly significant areas on the Moon's 
surface to perform their missions. 
One major reason for the impressive record of five 
successful missions was the philosophy motivating the many 
individuals in the program. The men who had spent long 
months of preparation and training for the Lunar Orbiter 
flights had developed emergency procedures for many non-
standard situations which might arise. It was, however, 
obviously impossible to anticipate or simulate all possible 
failure modes in these training exercises, and only a limi-
225 
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ted set of contingencies were practiced. The experience 
gained from these sessions proved invaluable in detecting 
and eliminating "bugs" in the operational systems, improving 
detection and correction of potential catastrophes during a 
mission and the probability of squelching problems in their 
embryonic stages. l 
NASA and Boeing had designed Lunar Orbiter to be 
"tweaked." It was not launched and sent on its way to the 
Moon and then left alone to perform its mission automatically 
and expire. On the contrary, it was designed to operate with 
the assistance of ground controllers to overcome risks in each 
mission, potential failures in subsystems, and the external 
nazards of space. Built to function for a thirty-day minimum 
lifetime and an extended period of operation after the 
termination of the photographic mission, each of the five 
Lunar Orbiters proved successful in fulfilling its mission 
assignments. 
The missions, in addition, proved the usefulness of 
the orbiter concept in unmanned lunar and planetary explor-
ation. Lunar Orbiter--unlike Ranger, which was designed to 
send back television pictures of the Moon as it raced to-
ward a terminal impact point on its surface--had the greater 
1. 6 Memorandum, Crabill to Emme, December 9, 19 9, p. 2. 
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advantage of orbiting its target for an extended period. 
Ground control operators thus had time to analyze any 
problems which arose and to prepare commands to the space-
2 
craft to solve each problem. Although risk was a constant 
companion, the Lunar Orbiters had a new dimension of flexi-
bility once they were in orbit around the Moon. The greatly 
extended time of an orbiting mission over an impact 
mission allowed flight operations personnel the luxury of 
compensation if a command was wrong or sent at the wrong 
time. 
Twenty-eight months of industrious work and planning 
since tbe time when NASA Administrator James E. Webb had 
officially approved the program brought all activities to 
the eve of the first launch. During the months from April 
to August 1966 Langley and Boeing completed the final tasks 
which preceded the launch. On July 25 program officials 
conducted the Flight Readiness Review at Cape Kennedy, and 
on July 26 Langley accepted the spacecraft from Boeing, 
3 
certified ready for launch. 
2 
Interview with Lee R. Scherer, Program Manager, at 
Cape Kennedy, July 31, 1967. This was part of a discussion 
between various members of the Lunar Orbiter Program--includ-
ing Clifford H. Nelson, Israel Taback, A. Thomas Young, 
Robert P. Bryson, Dr. Martin Molloy, and the author--at the 
home of Mrs. Mary Bub, a journalist, in Cocoa Beach, Florida. 
3 
pro8ect Lunar Orbiter, Narrative Analysis, Langley 
Research enter, August 3, 1966. 
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The First Launch 
The launch of Surveyor I on May 31, 1966, and its need 
of the Deep Space Network,together with delivery problems 
of the photographic subsystem for the first flight Lunar 
Orbiter at Eastman Kodak,caused the tentative July 11 launch 
date to be slipped to August 9. Ey August 1 the photo sub-
system had arrived and had been installed on board Lunar 
Orbiter I. On August 2 the spacecraft was transferred to 
Launch Pad 13 and mated with the Atlas-Agena launch vehicle. 
Following the mating, project personnel tested the compatibility 
of the spacecraft with the DSIF Station 71 at the Cape. 4 
On August 9 the Boeing-Lockheed-NASA team at the Eastern 
Test Range Launch Complex 13 and at support facilities near 
Hangar S counted the spacecraft down to T minus seven minures. 
Then, with the launch only a short time away, an anomaly 
in the Atlas Propellent Utilization System caused a postpone-
ment of the mission until the launch window of the following 
5 
d~. 
Lunar Orbiter I, weighing 853 pounds, roared into space 
atop the Atlas-Agena D launch vehicle at 19:26 Green-
wich Mean Time on August 10. Launch operations personnel 
injected the Agena and the spacecraft into a parking orbit 
4 
Ibid. 
5-
Boeing Quarterly Technical Progress Report, Lunar 
Orbiter Program, July to September 1966, Section IV, p. 35. 
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at 19:31 GMT, and at 20:04 the Agena fired its rocket once 
more to inject the Lunar Orbiter into a trajectory toward 
the Moon. 6 Lunar Orbiter I deployed its solar panels and 
antennas as planned and acquired the Sun (the first celestial 
reference for establishing cruise attitude). The mission 
continued exactly according to the preflight plan until the 
time of initial acquisition of the second celestial refer-
7 
ence, the star Canopus. 
The Canopus star tracker sensor proved to be one of two 
major problems during the Earth-Moon transit of the space-
craft. On August 11 at 02:14:57 GMT, flight operations 
personnel at the Deep Space Network facilities at JPL com-
manded the Canopus sensor to turn on. When it did,it indi-
cated excess voltage,1.5 times stronger than the preflight 
calculated signal voltage. Acquisition of Canopus failed. 
The reason for the failure was chought to be excess light 
reflected from some part of the spacecraft's structure, stim-
ulating undue response from the sensitive sensor. This pro-
blem should have been detected during system testing, but it 
had not been. However, flight operations attempted a number 
6 
Ibiq., p. 36. 
7 The Boeing Company, Lunar Orbiter Final Mission Report, 
Vol. III, Mission Operational Performance, Boeing Document 
D2-100727-3, p. 6. 
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of tests and experiments to correct or circumvent the anomaly. 
The necessity for an attitude-stabilized spacecraft like 
Lunar Orbiter to acquire proper stabilization in reference to 
the Sun and the star Canopus cannot be overstressed. Unlike 
a spin-stabilized spacecraft, Lunar Orbiter I depended on 
proper orientation along its yaw, pitch, and roll axes to 
arrive in the Moon's vicinity in the correct attitude to be 
injected into lunar orbit. After the failure of the Canopus 
sensor to acquire a fix on Canopus, flight operators were 
able to save Lunar Orbiter I's mission by developing an alter-
nate procedure. At the time of the midcourse maneuver, they 
commanded the spacecraft to establish a roll reference by 
pOinting the Canopus sensor at the Moon. 8 
This maneuver was executed successfully and, after the 
sensor locked on the Moon, the flight controllers were reason-
ably sure that it was operating correctly. They developed a 
procedure that used the Canopus sensor during periods of 
occultation of the Sun to verify or correct the spacecraft's 
orientation.9 
The other major problem encountered during the cislunar 
journey was overheating of the spacecraft. This did not 
8KOSOfSkY interview. 
9BOeing, Lunar Orbiter I Final Mission Report, III, p. 6. 
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become serious until after the midcourse maneuver. To per-
form this manuever despite the trouble with the Canopus star 
tracker, Lunar Orbiter flight operators used the Moon as 
the roll reference. The midcourse maneuver was executed 
to correct the spacecraft's translunar trajectory in pre-
paration for deboosting it into orbit around the Moon. A 
second manuever was executed to orient the spacecraft 36° 
10 
off-Sun for a period of 8.5 hours. The purpose of this move 
was to lower the spacecraft's temperature on the equ~pment-
mounting deck during transit. 
The coating on the exterior of the deck was degrading 
under solar radiation at the expected rate, and no acute 
overheating was experienced unti~ Lunar Orbiter I was already 
in orbit around the Moon. Nevertheless, the planned heat 
dissipation period when the spacecraft was flown 36° off-
Sun did not seem to retard overall degradation of the ther-
mal coating on the exterior of the equipment deck. 
The need to regulate the spacecraft's temperature and 
to investigate the Canopus sensor anomaly necessitated pitch 
and yaw manuevers every few hours. These added small accel-
erations to the spacecraft, all approximately in the same 
direction. Their effect on the prediction of the spacecraft's 
position at the time of deboost was minimal, and the flight 
operators successfully worked around the effects of the per-
10 
~., p. 7. 
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turbations resulting from the off-Sun maneuvers. The posi-
tion of Lunar Orbiter I at the time of the deboost maneuver 
into initial orbit around the Moon was estimated to bless 
than ten kilometers off the planned insertion point and pre-
sented little difficulty for flight controllers. ll 
Controllers began a series of commands at 15:22:56 GMT 
on August 14 to place the spacecraft in orbit. Before in-
sertion the spacecraft executed another thermal relief 
maneuver, which lasted 7.5 hours. The maneuver provided 
the optimum temperature conditions before the critical in-
sertion. The final sequence of commands for insertion was 
carried out without any problems, and Lunar Orbiter I was 
ready to begin the major work of its mission. 12 
The photographic mission of Lunar Orbiter I was entirely 
Apollo-oriented. 13 Once the spacecraft had been placed in 
its initial orbit, with an apolune of 1,866.8 kilometers and 
a perilune of 189.1 kilometers, ground control checked out 
the sUbsystems. The necessity to fly off-Sun and the extra 
number of maneuvers required because of the Canopus sensor 
problem had affected. the interrelationships of the spacecraft 
IlJ. R. Hall, ed., TDS Final Report, Vol. II, Mission A 
summahi' No. 608-17, Tracking and Data System Report Series 
for t e Lunar Orbiter Project, November 15, 1969, Jet Pro-
pulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, California, p. 4-15. 
12 Boeing, Lunar Orbiter I Final Mission Report, III, p. 8. 
See also Boeing Qualcerly Technical Progress Report, July to 
September 1966, Section IV, P. 36. 
13Interview with G. Calvin Broome, Langley Research 
Center, July 19, 1967. 
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subsystems, and flight controllers had to make compensations, 
especially in the power system to avoid overtaxing the 
batteries. 
On August 15, during the sixth orbit, ground control 
successfully commanded Lunar Orbiter I to read out the 
Goldstone test film. This film, being the leader on the 
supply of film for the mission, had been pre-exposed and 
checked out through tests of the readout subsystem at the 
DSIF station in Goldstone, California, before the mission. 
The same data we~ now read out again and compared to the 
known results of the Goldstone tests in order to check 
the performance of the readout and communications subsystems 
on board the spacecraft. 
At the time of the Goldstone test film readout the 
thermal problem became acute. The coating on the exterior 
of the equipment deck was supposed to radiate excess heat 
during periods of solar occultation. It did this approxi-
mately as predicted, but heat levels continued to rise, 
probably because of more rapid degradation in the pig-
ment of the coating than had been expected. However, on 
August l~ during the twentieth orbit,a power transistor 
in the shunt regulator array failed, with a compensating 
effect on battery temperatures. The failure placed an extra 
load of 1.2 to 1.5 amperes on the power system, increasing 
the battery discharge rate during occultation of the Sun. 
The extra load meant that the off-Sun angle of 360 could 
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be reduced slightly at the time when sufficient power for 
14 
readout was required of the power system. The an'alys is 
and compensatory action for this problem reflected out-
standing flight operations. 
After orbiting the Moon for four days and twenty-three 
hours Lunar Orbiter I began the first operation of its 
photo subsystem since the readout of the Goldstone test 
film. Eleven frames were advanced and processed during 
the twenty-fifth orbit at 12:12:13 GMT on August 18, bring-
ing the unexposed film into position for the first photo-
graphic sequence, which was to begin on orbit 26. 
The photographic subsystem, which Eastman Kodak had 
designed and built, was put together with the precision of 
a Swiss watch. Every component of the subsystem was tightly 
housed in an aluminum "bath tub" a little larger than a 
large round watermelon. A precision instrument with 
a very complex task to perform, the photo subsystem opera-
ted like a thrashing machine. The film, which had to go 
through three plane changes, was drawn from the supply 
spool, clamped in a movable platten, moved and exposed 
simultaneously, and advanced farther to make room for a 
new film--all in a matter of a few seconds. lS 
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Boeing, Lunar Orbiter I Final Mission Report, III, p. 9. 
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The first site to be photographed, Site I-O fa portion 
of Mare Smythii), was covered by the Orbiter's dual lens 
camera as planned. Photo subsystem telemetry to Earth 
appeared to be normal. The photos were taken as follows. 
Ground control commanded the spacecraft to open the camera 
thermal door. Two photo sequences were then executed: one 
of sixteen frames in the high-resolution mode and one of 
four frames in the medium-resolution mode. They were 
made at an altitude of 246 kilometers above the Moon 
while the spacecraft's velocity relative to the lunar sur-
face was 6,400 kilometers an hour. Exposure time for each 
shutter was 1/50 of a second, and simultaneous mediu~ and 
high-resolution pictures were made every ten seconds. After 
the sequences, the thermal door was closed and the film was 
processed. 16 
Five hours later the readout process began, at 19:50:52 
-
GMT on August 18. All the medium-resolution frames were 
of excellent quality, but reconstruction of four high-
resolution frames revealed severe image smearing. The 
first high-resolution frame contained some unsmeared data, 
but George Hage, the Boeing Lunar Orbiter Program Engineer, 
recognized it to be a double exposure. The first exposure 
16 
Lunar Orbiter Program Of£ice, NASA, Lunar Orbiter I 
Mission Status Report 8, Status as of 11:30 EST, August 
18. 1966. Note: all times for the five missions are given 
exactly as they appear in the mission status reports. The 
time used was local time at the site where the mission was 
being monitored, with the exception of Mission I. 
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of the frame contained unsmeared data and proved to have 
been taken prematurely of a feature east of the planned 
target area when the V/H sensor was turned on. 17 Apparently 
the shutter of the 610 mm lens was out of synchronization 
with the V/H sensorj further investigation demonstrated 
that this supposition was true. 18 
Flight operators in charge of mission photography set 
up an experiment to examine the possible causes of the 
smearing. After completion of the Site I-O photography 
ten more exposures were made with the 610 mm lens for pur-
poses of evaluating exposure 26, the first picture of the 
four-frame sequence after photographing Site I-O. One 
test involved the use of different exposure rates with and 
without the V/H sensor turned on. A second test was used 
to determine if, in fact, the V/H sensor was causing abnor-
mal shutter operations. It consisted of three steps: 
1) The camera thermal door was opened and the V/H 
sensor was turned on. 
2) The sensor was left on for approximately 2 minutes 
and then turned off. 
3) The camera thermal door was then closed and the 
camera shutter was commanded to take a picture with 
the door closed and to move fresh film into the 
camera for the next photograph. 19 
17 Memorandum from Dennis B. James, Bellcomm, Inc., to 
Dr. Eugene M. Emme, Subject: Comments on manuscript "Lunar 
orbiti§: A Preliminary History," November 17, 1969, p. 3. 
Lunar Orbiter I Mission Status Report 9, Status as of 
9 a.m. EDT, August 19, 1966. 
19 Lunar Orbiter I Photographic Mission SummarY, NASA 
CR-782, April 1967, p. 46. 
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The second test confirmed that the abnormal operation 
occurred when the V/H sensor was on; a high-resolution exposure 
was made with the thermal door open and no shutter command, 
but no medium-resolution picture was taken when the shutter 
command was given. Despite the problem, flight controllers 
made no deviations from the flight plan, and the spacecraft 
was transferred to its lower, final orbit at 09:49:58 GMT 
on August 21. 20 The new orbital parameters were: apolune, 
1,855 kilometers; perilune, 58 kilometers; inclination to 
the lunar equator, 12.320.21 
Just before the orbit transfer, Lunar Orbiter I took 
two frames of medium- and high-resolution pictures of the 
Moon's far side at an altitude of 1,497 kilometers. The 
V/H sensor was off, because there was no need for image-
motion compensation at such a high altitude. After the 
frames were read out, they revealed high-quality pictures 
of the lunar surface in both medium- and high-resolution 
modes, without smearing. 22 
Another problem occurred before the final orbit trans-
fer, requiring the photo subsystem to take additional un-
planned photographs. The Bimat apparently was sticking. 
20Lunar Orbiter I Final Mission Report, III, p. 10. 
21 Lunar Orbiter I Mission Status Report 11, Status as 
of 8:30 a.m. EDT, August 22, 1966. 
22Ibid • 
.............. 
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The original plan had called for fresh Bimat to be placed 
on the processing drum at least every 15 hours. This meant 
that two frames would be processed every four orbits. How-
ever, evidence of Bimat stick in the early frames precipi-
tated the decision to use additional film which would per-
mit processing during every orbit. Eight extra pictures 
23 
were to be taken. This change and the extra diagnostic 
pictures taken to evaluate the high-resolution shutter pro-
blem forced a revision in the planned photographic coverage 
of the remaining sites. The result was that only eight ex-
posures would be taken of Sites 4, 6, and 8, while the 
24 
other sites would receive the original 16-frame coverage. 
The trouble in the high-resolution camera lens shutter 
continued to plague photography when the V/H sensor was 
operatin&despite the increase in output voltage which 
Eastman Kodak technicians had recommended during analysis 
of the problem. Further analysis revealed that the logic-
control circuitry of the 610-mm-lens focal-plane shutter was 
susceptible to electromagnetic interferences which caused 
it to trip at the wrong part of the image-motion compensa-
tion cycle. It was not possible to solve this problem 
by modifying procedures, and low-altitude high-resolution 
23 
. Lunar Orbiter I Photographic Mission Summary, NASA 
CR-782, p. 46. 
24 
Ibid. 
-
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photography on the first mission proved a failure despite 
further attempts to correct the problem. 
Nitrogen gas, used by the attitude control subsystem 
to manuever the spacecraft, had been expended in greater 
amounts than originally planned because of the difficulties 
in the Canopus star tracker and alterations of planned 
photography caused by the shutter problems and the evi-
dence of Bimat sticking. Moreover, thermal relief maneuvers 
and excess attitude update maneuvers, together with the 
failure of a gas regulator, increased the rate of nitrogen 
usage. Between August 23 and 31 an average of 0.17 kilograms 
of nitrogen was expended per day. Flight controllers 
tried an economizing procedure. They commanded the spacecraft 
to fly off-Sun on its pitch axis and to update its attitude 
on the pitch and yaw axes using the coarse Sun sensors and 
on its roll axis using the Canopus sensor. This change re-
sulted in an expenditure of 0.04 kilograms per day between 
25 
September 1 and 14. 
From the final orbit perilune of 58 kilometers,Lunar 
Orbiter I was deboosted successfully to a lower altitude 
of 40.5 kilometers for further photography on August 25. 
This move was the result of an analysis of the V/H sensor 
in a duplicate Lunar Orbiter photo subsystem on the ground 
25 
Boeing, Lunar Orbiter I Final Mission Report, III, p. 11. 
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by Eastman Kodak engineers on August 24. They had concluded 
that there was a possibility that the camera would operate 
26 
normally below an altitude of 51 kilometers. They reasoned 
that, since the ratio of velocity to height would be higher 
in the new, lower orbit, the image-motion compensation mech-
anism might be forced into synchronization with the 610 mm 
lens's focal-plane shutter. Synchronization was, unfor-
tunately, never attained, but there was some reduction in 
smearing because a higher solar lighting angle permitted a 
27 
change in shutter speed from 1/50 to 1/100 second. 
By August 29 Lunar Orbiter I had completed its photo-
graphic acquisition, with a total of 205 exposed frames. 
Of these, 38 frames had been taken in the initial orbit; 
167 were made in the lower orbits. The spacecraft photo-
graphed all nine potential Apollo landing sites. Pictures 
of eleven sites on the far side of the Moon and two Earth-
Moon pictures were also taken. The complete readout of the 
28 
photographs began on August 30. 
Despite the malfunctions in the photographic subsystem 
the spacecraft succeeded in taking many historic pictures. 
Command and maneuver requirements were developed to take, 
26 
Lunar Orbiter I Mission Status Report 14, Status as 
of 9 a.m. EDT, August 24, 1966. 
27 Lunar Orbiter I Mission Status Report 18, Status as 
of 10 a.m. EDT, August 29, 1966. 
28 
Lunar Orbiter I Mission Status Report 20, Status as 
of 11 a.m. EDT, September 1, 1966. 
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in near real-time, such pictures as those of the morning and 
evening terminator on the lunar surface, the Earth as seen 
from the Moon's vicinity, numerous farside pictures, and 
additional photographs of sites of interest on the near side. 
Lunar Orbiter I photographed such areas as potential targets 
for Mission B, major craters, and mare and upland areas useful 
as Apollo navigation landmarks and was mostly able to sat-
isfy the requirements to take these photographs. 29 
Of all the pictures which Lunar Orbiter I made, one of 
the most spectacular was the first photograph of the Earth 
taken from the vicinity of the Moon. This picture was not 
included in the original mission plan, and it required that 
the spacecraft's attitude in relation to the lunar surface 
be changed so that the camera's lenses were pointing away 
from the Moon. Such maneuvering meant a calculated risk 
and, coming early in the flight, the unplanned photogr>aph of 
Earth raised some doubts among Boeing management about the 
safety of the spacecraft. 
Robert J. Helberg, Boeing's Program Manager for Lunar 
Orbiter, opposed such a hazardous, unnecessary risk. 
The spacecraft would be pointed away from the Moon so that 
29 
Lunar Orbiter I Photographic Mission Summary, NASA 
CR-782, p. 46. 
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the camera's lenses could catch a quick view of Earth tan-
gential to the lunar surface. Then, once the pictures were 
made (flight controllers would execute two photo sequences 
on two different orbits), Lunar Orbiter I would disappear 
behind the Moon where it would not be in communication with 
ground control. If, for some reason ground control failed 
to reestablish communications with it, the Apollo-oriented 
mission photography would probably remain undone. Moreover, 
Boeing had an incentive riding on the performance of the 
spacecraft, and Helberg did not think it prudent to 
commit the spacecraft to a series of maneuvers for which 
30 
no plans had been made. 
The understandably conservative Boeing stance was 
changed through a series of meetings between top NASA pro-
gram officials, including Dr. Floyd L. Thompson, Clifford 
H. Nelson, and Lee R. Scherer. They convinced Helberg that 
the picture was worth the risk and that NASA would make 
compensation in the event of an unexpected mishap with the 
spacecraft. After agreement had been reached, Lunar Orbiter 
flight controllers executed the necessary maneuvers to point 
the spacecraft's camera away from the lunar surface, and on 
two different orbits (16 and 26) it recorded two unprece-
dented, very useful photographs. 
30 -
Taback interview. See also Transcript of Proceedings--
Discussion between Nicks, et al., and members of National Acad-
emy of Public Administration, pp. 111-112. 
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The Earth-Moon pictures proved valuable for their 
oblique perspective of the lunar surface. Until these two 
photographs, all pictures had been taken along axes perpen-
dicular or nearly perpendlcular to the Moon's surface. On 
subsequent Lunar Orbiter missions oblique photography was 
31 
planned and used more often. 
Lunar Orbiter I began its extended mission on septem-
ber 16 after completion of photographic readout. During 
this period non-photographic data was telemetered to Earth 
at regular, planned intervals. Flight controllers monitored 
the orbital behavior of the spacecraft, the micrometeoroid 
detectors, and the condition of the power, attitude control, 
and communications SUbsystems. 
By October 28 the condition of Lunar Orbiter I had 
deteriorated significantly. Scherer issued a status report 
which pointed out the following: 1) very little gas remained 
for attitude control (0.4 kilograms at 7 kilograms per square 
centimeter--100 psi ... pressure); 2) estimated stabilized life of 
spacecraft was two to five weeks; 3) the battery was losing 
power because of prolonged overheating, and if it fell below 
15 volts, the onboard flight programmer would lose essential 
31 
For a detailed technical description of the Earth-
Moon photographs refer to Lunar Orbiter I--Photography, 
NASA CR-847, prepared by the Boeing Company, Seattle, Wash-
ington, for the Langley Research Center, August 1967, pp.64-
71. 
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parts of its memor:".~ 4) the transponder was responding er-
ractically, and the inertial reference unit was losing its 
ability to keep the spacecraft stable. The program manager 
and his staff realized that loss of control over communi-
cation transmission from Orbiter I could jeopardize the 
mission of the second Lunar Orbiter. They conferred with 
members of the Langley Lunar Orbiter Project Office who, in 
turn, decided to command the spacecraft to impact on the 
far side of the Moon during its 577th orbit on October 29. 
This maneuver, successfully executed, brought the first 
32 
mission to an end. 
Results of the First Mission 
Lunar Orbiter I photography was subjected to numerous 
analyses, photometric enhancement processes, and evaluations 
by technicians and scientists at the Langley Research 
Center. Following this a more extensive screening process 
of Mission I photography was made by specialists from Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory, the Manned Spacecraft Center, NASA 
Headquarters, Boeing, the United States Geological Survey, and 
Langley. They studied very carefully all Orbiter I photo-
graphs and generated preliminary terrain and geologic maps 
and screened photographic data for acceptable Apollo sit s. 
32 
Memorandum from SL/Manager, Lunar Orbiter Program,to 
the File, October 28, 1966, Subject: Lunar Orbiter I situa-
tion. See also Astronautics and Aeronautics t 1966, NASA 
sp-4007, Washington, D.C., 1967, pp. 332-333. 
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This effort started the major process of Apollo site selec-
33 
tion and data analysis. 
Some of the most significant problems which the first 
mission photography revealed were the following: 1) photo-
graphic imperfections due to mechanical operation in the 
photo subsystem (for example, partial dryout of the Bimat 
because of pressure variation of a roller in the processor 
mechanism produced a narrow strip of incorrectly processed 
film); 2) density variations caused by the Ground Recon-
struction Equipment kinescope tubes; 3) smear of high-
resolution photographs caused by inadvertent triggering of 
the focal-plane shutter of the 610 mm lens. This problem 
34 
has been previously discussed. 
Prelude to Mission II 
At the time of launch of Lunar Orbiter I the status of 
the other spacecraft was as follows. Spacecraft 5, the 
second flight spacecraft, was in storage at Cape Kennedy. 
Its photo sUbsystem was due to be delivered at KSC on 
September 4, 1966. Spacecraft C, a ground-test spacecraft, 
was at JPL for display purposes, and no further work was 
planned for it. Spacecraft 1, also a ground-test spacecraft, 
33 
Langley Working Paper: Preliminary Terrain Evaluation 
and Apollo landing site analysis based on Lunar Orbiter I 
Photography. 
34 
Lunar Orbiter I--Photography, NASA CR-847, pp. 11-17. 
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was at Boeing in Seattle. It had completed formal testing 
and was being used as a flight-test unit. During Mission I 
Boeing used" it to duplicate problems encountered on Lunar 
Orbiter I as an aid to their resolution. Spacecraft 2 
was also at Boeing,awaiting its photography subsystem so 
that it could begin mission simulation tests. Spacecraft 
3, the fifth flight spacecraft, was in the clean room at 
Boeing waiting for various hardware components to be in-
stalled. Major testing of this spacecraft was due to begin 
on November 7. Spacecraft 6, the third flight spacecraft, 
was scheduled for preshipment review on August 19 followed 
by shipment to Cape Kennedy on August 20. Spacecraft 6 
would then serve as a back-up for the second flight space-
craft. Finally, Spacecraft 7, the fourth flight spacecraft, 
was in storage at Boeing awaiting preenvironmental flight 
35 
checkout, scheduled to begin on August 29. 
The second Lunar Orbiter mission had run into difficul-
ties during May 1966, six months before the tentative November 
launch date for Lunar Orbiter II. On May 20 NASA and Boeing 
program officials conducted a preshipment review of Space-
craft 5 at the Boeing Company. This spacecraft was to 
serve as back-up for the first mission and was to be launched 
on the second mission in the event that all went as planned 
35 
Project Lunar Orbiter, Narrative Analysis, Langley 
Research Center, August 17, 1966. 
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on the first. After reviewing the history of Spacecraft 5, 
NASAls review team refused permission to ship it to Cape 
36 
Kennedy facilities without further testing. The Boeing 
Lunar Orbiter Program officials objected to this, but the 
history of Spacecraft 5 revealed a need to overcome inade-
quate operations of important equipment. 
Having been subjected to the same tests as Spacecraft 
4, Spacecraft 5 was considered ready for shipment with one 
major exception. The camera thermal door had failed to 
open during thermal vacuum testing. The other thermal 
vacuum tests were completed, save for this one. Again it 
was attempted. The thermal vacuum chamber was pressurized 
and the command for the door to open was sent. Again it 
remained closed. Next the operation of the thermal door 
was visuaUyobserved, and after some of the thermal insu-
lation had been pulled loose the door operated correctly 
through several cycl"es. The door and its motor mechanisms 
were then removed from the spacecraft for special thermal 
vacuum tests. 37 
Boeing officials wanted to ship the spacecraft to Cape 
Kennedy without the door while it underwent further tests. 
36 
Memorandum from SL/Manager, Lunar Orbiter Program, to 
the File, May 24, 1966, Subject: Preshipment Review of Sec-
ond Lunar Orbiter Flight Spacecraft. (The NASA review team 
consisted of Lee R. Scherer, Clifford H. Nelson, Israel 
Taback, Kenneth L. Wadlin, James B. Hall, and Messrs. Jackson 
and Eckhard.) 
37 
Ibid • 
.............. 
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Once the cause of failure was isolated, it could be corrected, 
and the door could be reinstalled at the Cape. NASA officials 
declined this suggestion because of the long history of de-
velopment troubles with t·he door mechanism. Nevertheless, 
Boeing officials still wanted to ship the spacecraft, 
saying that they would be merely effecting a transfer 
from Boeing-Seattle to Boeing-Florida. Boeing's major 
reason was the delivery deadline for the second flight 
spacecraft: June 22. A contract incentive depended upon 
meeting this date. However, NASA officials still disagreed 
with Boeing's line of reasoning and insisted that the facts 
were clear. The spacecraft had failed a specified test. It 
was necessary to retest the whole spacecraft. Reluctantly 
Boeing management accepted this verdict and issued instruc-
tions to return the spacecraft to the test chamber on May 
38 
21. 
The Plan for Mission II 
While Boeing reworked the camera thermal door, the 
Lunar Orbiter Project Office at Langley continued to formu-
late plans for the second mission. Original planning for 
Mission B had only photographic data from Earth-based tele-
scopes and Ranger spacecraft to rely upon because Lunar 
Orbiter I had not yet flown. On May 6, 196~ representatives 
38 
Ibid., p. 3. 
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from Bellcomm and the Apollo, Surveyor, and Lunar Orbiter 
Program offices convened at Langley for the Mission B Planning 
Meeting. The information and requests which they provided 
enabled Langley mission planners to set up the following 
guidelines for Lunar Orbiter Mission B: 
1. Distributed sampling with a string of sites 
in the northern part of the Apollo zone. 
2. Sampling of both mare and highland with greatest 
number of samples in the mare. 
3. Sites spaced consistent with the lighting of LEM 
landing constraints. (Present value of sun eleva-
tion of 7 to 20 degrees would be used, resulting 
in optimum spacing equaling 11 degrees, plus or 
minus 2 degrees.) 
4. One of the mare sites to be the Ranger VIII impact 
point. 
5. The availability of a landed Surveyor or any new 
data to necessitate a review of any mission design. 
6. Mission B sites to be selected whose terrain to 
the east appeared to be consistent with the Apollo 
landing approach constraints, where possible. 59 
The members of the several organizations at the meeting 
aided Langley officials in producing a Mission B plan which 
the Lunar Orbiter Program Office in Washington presented to 
the Surveyor/Orbiter Utilization Committee on June 1. The 
plan had three primary goals based upon Ranger and Earth-
39 
Minutes of the Lunar Orbiter Mission B 
Meeting, Langle~ Research Center, May 6, 1966 
A. Thomas Young), pp.5-6. 
Planning 
(recorded by 
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telescope data and performance evaluations of th~ Lunar 
Orbiter spacecraft subsystems: 
A. Photographic-- To obtain detailed lunar topographic 
and geologic information of various lunar areas to 
assess their suitability for use as Apollo landing 
sites. 
B. Selenodetic-- To provide trajectory information 
which will improve the definition of the lunar 
gravitational field. 
c. Environmental--To provide measurements of micro-
meteoroid and radiation flux in the lunar environ-
ment for spacecraft performance analysis. 40 
Apollo requirements had priority as on the first mission. 
The area to be covered was a swath along the front side of 
the Moon ranging from +50 to _50 latitude and +450 to -450 
longitude. Topographic considerations affecting the mis-
sion plan dictated that Lunar Orbiter B (Lunar Orbiter II) 
look for areas smooth enough for the Apollo Lunar Module 
to land on. The approaches to these areas had to be free 
of obstacles over a certain height to allow satisfactory 
41 
performance of the Lunar Module landing radar. Because 
the Apollo missions would operate in a retrograde lunar 
orbit instead of the posigrade orbit of the Lunar Orbiter 
missions, the landing approach zone would be east of the 
40 
Lunar Orbiter Project Office, Langley Research 
Center, Lunar Orbiter Mission B Description, June 1, 1966. 
41 
Ibid., p. 7. 
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42 
landing site. 
The Lunar Orbiter Project Office at Langley selected 
eleven sites pertaining to Apollo missions to be photographed 
on the second Orbiter mission. In order to keep the mission 
simple the spacecraft would execute a minimum number of 
attitude maneuvers. There would be one photographic pass 
per site, and high orbit photography would be eliminated. 
Lunar Orbiter II would carry out contiguous high-resolution 
vertical photographic coverage between adjacent orbits. This 
called for an inclination of 11° to 12° to the lunar equator. 
Surface lighting conditions had to be such that photography 
could detect cones of two-meter diameter and one-half meter 
43 
height and slopes of 7° in an area of seven meters square. 
On September 29 the tentative Mission B plan was amended. 
The photography and spacecraft performance evaluations 
of Lunar Orbiter I--in addition to further inputs from Bell-
comm, the U.S. Geological Survey, the Army Map Service, the 
Manned Spacecraft Center (Houston), NASA Headquarters Office 
of Manned Space Flight, and the Surveyor Project Office--con-
firmed tentative mission objectives for the second Lunar 
Orbiter flight more than they altered them. As of October 
42 
Apollo had to operate in a retrograde orbit--that is, 
an orbit whose direction was counter to the rotation of the 
Moon--in order to have the safety option of a free Earth-
return trajectory in case of an emergency such as occurred 
later on Apollo 13 in April 1970. Lunar Orbiter operated in 
a poslgrade orbi t-- that is, in the direction of the Moon's ro-
tation--because it did not have to plan for this contingency. 
43 
Lunar Orbiter Mission B Description, p. 12. 
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26 these objectives were: 
Primary -- To obtain, from lunar orbit, detailed photo-
graphic information of various lunar areas, to assess 
their suitability as landing sites for Apollo and Sur-
veyor spacecraft, and to improve our knowledge of the 
Moon. 
Secondary -- To provide precision trajectory information 
for use in improving the definition of the lunar gravi-
tational field. 
To provide measurements of micrometeoroid flux and radi-
ation dose in the lunar environment, primarily for 
spacecraft performance analysis.44 . 
During the process of site selection for the second 
Orbiter mission a hypothesis based upon Earth-telescope 
photography and the very useful Ranger VII pictures exerted 
a particular influence on the choice of sites. Data from 
these two earlier sources tended to show that bright rays 
extending from younger craters were actually heavily cra-
tered, making landings very hazardous or impossible in such 
areas. To test thia,Lunar Orbiter I had photographed sec-
tions in lightly rayed areas. Specifically, photographs of 
Site A-3 in Mare Tranquillitatis revealed smooth areas where 
a Lunar Module could land. Orbiter I Frame M-IOO of Site 
A-3 showed an area in a light ray where cratering was in-
sufficient to rule it out as a landing site. The ray in 
this photograph was faint and probably had its origins in 
44 
Lunar Orbiter Project Office, Langley Research Center, 
Lunar Orbiter Mission II Description, as amended on September 
29, 1966, issued October 26, 1966, p. 3 
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45 
the crater Theophilus but had subsequently been filled in. 
Planners concluded from Orbiter I photography that some 
ray areas were possibly smooth. Moreover, photography from 
the first Orbiter had actually previewed certain targets in 
the second mission. Thus planners decided to change several 
sites in Mission B and to have Lunar Orbiter II look at the 
ray areas between the lunar craters Copernicus and Kepler, 
extending north of the western Apollo zone. The Mission B 
plan was thus substantially revised as a result of the di-
vergences between Ranger VII and Lunar Orbiter I photographs 
46 
of crater rays. 
The Second Mission 
Less than three months elapsed between the launch of 
the first Orbiter and that of Lunar Orbiter II. On Novem-
ber 6, 196~ the second mission began,with the launch of the 
spacecraft at 23:21 GMT. The cislunar transit went as 
planned, with no trouble in the Canopus star tracker. One 
reason for success was that the solar panels and parts of the 
antenna booms had been painted black to reduce the surface 
area which could reflect light. A small midcourse correct-
ion was made approximately 44 hours after launch, and the 
initial high lunar orbit was established after 92.5 hours of 
45 Discussion with Dennis B. James, Bellcomm, Inc., July 
25 and 28, 1969. The author and Mr. James studied photographs 
of Site A-3 and Frame M-IOO and Mr. James pointed out the sig-
nificaoce of these pictures to Mission II planning. 
46Ibid. Compare Mission B Description document with that 
for Mission II. 
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cislunar transit time. The orbital parameters were: apo-
lune, 1,850 kilometers; perilune, 196 kilometers. The 
Deep Space. Network tracked Lunar Orbiter II for several 
days to obtain data for a more accurate analysis of the lunar 
gravitational effects on the spacecraft. After 33 orbits the 
spacecraft was transferred to the photographic orbit with a 
47 
perilune of 49.7 kilometers. 
On November 18 Lunar Orbiter II commenced its photogra-
phic work. The photo subsystem performed well during all 
phases of the mission and covered each of 13 primary and 17 
secondary sites as planned. Only Secondary Site II S-10.2 
had to be rescheduled in the photographic plan, to avoid 
operating the spacecraft on batteries during photography, 
a procedure which would have violated a design restriction 
and resulted in a power shortage. 
Several changes had been made in the photo subsystem 
of Lunar Orbiter II as a result of the first Orbiter mission: 
1. The addition of an integrating circuit in the focal-
plane-shutter control circuits to ensure that an 
output signal represented a valid command pulse 
(containing amplitude and duration) and was not 
caused by an electrical transient. 
2. The addition ofa filter on the 20-volt line to 
minimize electromagnetic interferences and possible 
triggering of photo subsystem circuits. 
47 Hall, TDS Final Report, Vol. III, Mission B Summary 
(No. 608-18), November 15, 1969, pp. 1-2, 1-3, 1-4. 
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3. The platen clamping spring tension was increased 
to ensure immobility of the film during exposure, 
improve film flatness, and maintain focus. 
4. Reseau marks were pre-exposed on the spacecraft 
film in a specific pattern to assist in compen-
sating for any non-~~nearities in the optical-
mechanical scanner. ~ 
The medium- and high-resolution photography was excel-
lent in quality and indicated that the operation of the 
photo subsystem during exposure, processing, and readout 
was very good for the first portion of the film. 
On November 20 Lunar Orbiter II photographed the im-
49 
pact point of Ranger VIII (Site II P-5). On November 
23 it recorded one of the most spectacular pictures of the 
lunar surface. The picture was taken as a result of the 
threat of Bimat stick and the need to move new film and 
Bimat onto the processor drum at regular intervals. A 
certain amount of the film would be wasted if no exposure 
were made and a choice arose as to the use of this 
"film-set" frame. One mission ground rule called for the 
frames to be used to take pictures of any areas in the 
Apollo zone of interest, should the spacecraft be over one 
at the time. On the other hand, Douglas Lloyd of Bellcomm, 
48 
Lunar Orbiter II Photographic Mission Summary, NASA 
CR-883, prepared by the BOeing Company for Langley Research 
Center, October 1967, p. 33. 
49 
Boeing Quarterly Technical Progress Report, October 
to December, 1966, p.5. 
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Inc., had suggested during mission planning that this par-
ticular "film-set" frame be used to take a photoi::~raph of the 
crater Copernicus when the spac,:raft passed due south of it 
at a distance of 240 kilometers and a vertical altitude of 
45 kilometers above the lunarmrface. Twice his suggestion was 
turned down by NASA officials because of the Apollo ground 
rule. However, upon Lloyd's third suggestion Program 
officials consented, and the decision to make the picture 
came during actual mission operations. 
The Lunar Orbiter's camera made a telephoto exposure 
through the 610 mm lens of the crater from a long, low, oblique 
angle to the lunar surface when lighting conditions were 
optimum for best contrast. The resultant picture revealed 
geographic and topographic features of the central portion 
of this 100-kilometer-wide crater which had never before 
been discerned. Dominating the center of the photographic 
frame were mountains rising over 300 meters from the crater 
floor. Behind them a ledge of bedrock and the crater's 
rim could be seen. Behind all of this the Gay-Lussac Promon-
tory in the Carpathian Mountains towered 1,000 meters above 
the lunar surface on the horizon. 
This and the oblique pictures of the Marius Hills and 
Reiner Gamma proved to be extremely valuable to the photo-
grammetrists, astrogeologists, and other scientists connec-
.ed with tho Lunar Orbiter and Apollo programs. The nation's 
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news media described the Copernicus picture as "one of the 
50 
great pictures of the century." 
Lunar Orbiter II ended its photographic acquisition on 
November 26, 1966, and flight controllers concluded the 
readout on December 7. Only one setback marred an otherwise 
unqualified success. The traveling-wave-tube amplifier 
(TWTA) failed on the final day of readout, and half of the 
photographs of secondary Site II S-l were not obtained. 
This area was located at 41.1° east longitude and 3.20 north 
51 
latitude in Mare Tranquillitatis. However, priority read-
out of the wide-angle photo coverage of this site had pre-
viously been conducted, minimizing the seriousness of the 
loss. 
The spacecraft's twenty micrometeoroid detectors re-
corded three impacts during nineteen days of the mission. 
These hits did not affect the performance of the spacecraft. 
Lunar Orbiter I had registered no hits, and program scien-
tists believed that the Lunar Orbiter II hits may have been 
52 
the result of the annual Leonid meteor shower. 
50 
Walter Sullivan, "Orbiter 2 Transmits Spectacular 
Close-ups of Moon," New York Times, December 1, 1966, p. 1. 
Douglas Lloyd's contribution to the planning of the Coperni-
cus shot deserves recognition. His persistent belief that 
it could be done resulted in one of the program's outstand-
ing photographic achievements. (Interview with Douglas Lloyd, 
Bellcomrn, Inc., Washington, D.C., August 11, 1970.) 
51 Lunar Orbiter II Photographic Mission Summary, NASA 
CR-883, pp. 61, 86. 
52 Ibid., p. 86. 
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Lunar Orbiter II demonstrated its ability to obtain high-
quality oblique photography of the near and far side of the 
Moon. It ~lso obtained experimenta1 convergent stereo tele-
photo pictures of one site, demonstrating the ability of the 
photographic subsystem to employ the stereo technique. More-
over, it showed that not all crater rays on the lunar sur-
face were necessarily heavily cratered but that the Coperni-
cus-Kepler region was unfit for landing sites. These achieve-
ments attested to the accuracy and precision with which the 
flight controllers were able to position the spacecraft for 
53 
photographing specific objectives. 
Finall~ the problem of overheating which had made more 
attitude control maneuvers necessary during the mission of 
the first Lunar Orbiter was overcome on the second mission. 
With the addition of a coating of S-13G paint, degradation 
of the thermal paint on the equipment deck of Lunar Orbiter 
II was substantially reduced. Thermal control of the space-
craft by planned thermal relief maneuvers was better inte-
grated into the total flight operation plan for the second 
mission, and the spacecraft performance proved markedly 
54 
better than that of the first Lunar Orbiter mission. 
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The Third Orbiter Mission 
The third mission differed slightly from the first two 
because it concentrated its photography on Apollo and Sur-
veyor site confirmation instead of site search. To permit 
confirmation photography of sites both north and south of 
the lunar equator the spacecraft's orbital inclination was 
increased to 21°. The convergent stereo photography of 
Mission II had proved successful and potentially useful to 
the Apollo and Surveyor programs. It consisted of making 
two "footprints" of the same area on two successive orbits. 
To accomplish this at the higher orbital inclination, the 
camera would necessarily be tilted during one of the two 
sequences. Resolution of a convergent stereo picture pair 
was slightly degraded because of the camera tilt, and a 
loss of one-meter to two-and-one-half-mete~ or perhaps 
55 
three-meter, resolution resulted. 
The Air Force Aeronautical Chart and Information Cen-
ter (ACIC) and the Army Map Service had evaluated the Mission 
II convergent stereo photography and had concluded that 
"this type of photography increases the topographic knowledge 
56 
that can be obtained concerning potential landing sites." 
55 
Charles W. Shull and Lynn A. Schenk, U.S. Army TOPO-
COM, "Mapping the Surveyor III Crater," Photogrammetric 
Engineering, Vol. XXXVI, No.6, June 1970, pp.547-554. This 
article gives a detailed analysis of how stereoscopic photo-
graphy was utilized in site selection for Surveyor III. 
56 
Lunar Orbiter Project Office, Langley Research Center, 
Lunar Orbiter Mission III Description, January 25, 1967, p. 15. 
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The Lunar Orbiter Project Office at Langley planned to in-
clude more convergent stereo coverage on Mission III as a 
result of the ACIC and Army Map Service (since January 1970, 
u.S. Army TOPOCOM) evaluations. 
On November 15, 1966, a technical interchange meeting 
convened at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory to assess the 
various methods of calibrating the Lunar Orbiter's 610mm 
high-resolution camera for the new photographic tasks. Pre-
cise geometric calibration was mandatory if stereo photo-
graphy was to be conducted succesfully on the three remain-
ing missions. The calibration was to be done at the photo-
graphic subsystem level, and the members of the meeting 
57 
determined the method to use. Leon J. Kosofsky coordi-
nated the calibration activities. 
Although primarily a reconnaissance photographic sys-
tem, rather than a mapping system, the Lunar Orbiter photo 
subsystem was upgraded after Mission I. The Aeronautical 
Chart and Information Center and the Army Map Service had 
previously argued that the use of reseau marks on the camera 
film or a grid on the camera lens would greatly facilitate 
the utilization of photographic data for purposes of lunar 
mapping. Langley accepted the idea of pre-exposing reseau 
marks on the camera film for Mission II and all subsequent 
57 
Memorandum from Lee R. Scherer to Clifford Nelson, 
Langley Research Center, Subject: Geometric Calibration 
of High Resolution Camera for Mission C, December 20, 1966. 
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missions. 
On January 5 the photo subsystem for Spacecraft 6 (the 
third flight spacecraft) was installed, and Boeing conducted 
the functional check-out with the Deep Space Instrumentation 
Facility. The spacecraft's inertial reference unit (IRU) 
was taken out, tested, and reinstalled and the actuator for 
solar panel 3 was replaced. Retesting at Hangar S was 
accomplished by January 13 in preparation for mating with 
58 
the launch vehicle. 
Meanwhile, on January 5 the Ad Hoc Surveyor/Orbiter 
Utilization Committee of OSSA had approved the plan for the 
third Lunar Orbiter mission: 
Mission III is primarily designed to photograph promi-
sing areas that have been identified by screening 
Lunar Orbiter I and II photographs and for which 
additional data is needed to confirm their adequacy 
as Apollo and/or Surveyor landing sites. In addition 
Mission III will provide photography of broad scien-
tific interest as did Missions I and 11.59 
The mission would also obtain precision trajectory 
information to be used in improving the definition of the 
lunar gravitational field and measurements of micrometeoroid 
flux and of radiation dosage levels in near-lunar environ-
ment for use in evaluating the spacecraft's performance. 
58 
Project Lunar Orbiter, Narrative Analysis, Langley 
Research Center, January 
59 
Lunar Orbiter Mission III Description, p. 1. 
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Finally Lunar Orbiter III would serve as a target for the 
Manned Space Flight Tracking Network and the Orbit Determi-
60 
nation Program. 
The Launch Readiness Review for Lunar Orbiter III 
and for the back-up (Spacecraft 7) was held at the Eastern 
Test Range facilities on January 17. Both Orbiters were 
found to be ready for launch, and personnel working with 
Spacecraft 6 proceeded with the preparations for that event. 
61 
The tentative date for launch was February 3. 
Boeing and Eastman Kodak were attempting to resolve the 
problems which had caused minor film processing defects 
on the first two missions. Manufacturing irregularities 
and bubbles in the Bimat had been the chief causes of these 
defects. As it turned out, localized Bimat processing 
defects continued to appear on some photographs from all 
five missions, despite attempts to correct the condition. 
Still unresolved as the third launch approached was the 
failure of the TWTA aboard Lunar Orbiter II. However, Boeing 
engineers were modifying this component so that excess heat 
build-up could be removed during the flight, thus prolonging 
the tube's lifetime. Readout times would also be reduced in 
the event of a heat build-up, and flight controllers would 
60 
Lunar Orbiter C Mission Objectives, unsigned memoran-
dum, January 24, 1967. 
61 
---J -- -- - -- n_" _. ___ -____ Analysis, Langley 
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monitor the flow of electrical current through the traveling-
wave-tube amplifier, since program scientists considered 
any irregularities in the flow to be an indication of pend-
ing trouble in it. 62 
Lunar Orbiter III lifted off of Pad 13 at the Eastern 
Test Range at 01:17 Greenwich Mean Time on February 5, 
1967. (The February 3 launch window had been canceled be-
cause of problems encountered in the ground power-supply sys-
tem at Launch Complex 13.) Despite numerous pre-launch prob-
lems the liftoff was successfully accomplished on a flight 
azimuth of 80.8° at the start of the February 5 launch 
window. Ground control placed the Agena-spacecraft combi-
nation in a parking orbit for approximately ten minutes 
63 
before injecting it into a cislunar trajectory. 
Following injection the spacecraft separated from 
the Agena, deployed its solar panels and antennas, and ac-
quired the Sun as an attitude reference. Seven hours into 
the missionJflight controllers commanded Lunar Orbiter III 
to turn on its Canopus star tracker and give a star map be-
fore Canopus acquisition. It executed this command success-
fully. On Monday, February 6, at 37 hours into the mission 
62 
Memorandum from SL/Manager, Lunar Orbiter Program,to 
SE/Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Science and 
Applications (Engineering), January 24, 1967. 
63 
Hall( TDS Final ReEort, Vol. IV, Mission C Summary 
(No. 608-19), March 1, 19 9, p. 1-2. 
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the Space Flight Operations Facility tracking Lunar Orbiter 
III commanded a midcourse correction maneuver to adjust the 
spacecraft's cislunar trajectory in order to hit the pre-
planned aiming point for deboost into lunar orbit. As on 
previous missions, the midcourse maneuver was so accurate 
64 
that no second maneuver was required. 
At 4:54 ,p.m. Eastern Standard Time on February 8 Lunar 
Orbiter III fired its 100-pound-thrust rocket engine for 9 
minutes, 2.5 seconds to decelerate the spacecraft into its 
initial orbit. The parameters were: apolune, 1,801.9 
kilometers; perilune, 210.2 kilometers; inclination, 
20.930 ; period of orbit, 3 hours 25 minutes. 65 Ground 
control tracked the spacecraft in the initial orbit for 
approximately four days (25 orbits) to obtain data for analy-
sis of the lunar gravitational effect. Following this the 
spacecraft was transferred to a new orbit with a low peri-
66 
lune of 55 kilometers and an apolune of 1,847 kilometers. 
67 
Inclination to the lunar equator was 20.9° 
As Lunar Orbiter III had executed its deboost maneuver 
Lunar Orbiter II was still in orbit around the Moon. On 
February 6 ground control began tracking both spacecraft 
64 
Boeing Quarterly Technical Progress Report, January 
to March 1967, p.4. See also Status of Lunar Orbiter III 
(as of 8 a.m. ESTh February 7, 1967. 
65 
Status of Lunar Orbiter III, February 9, 1967, p. 3. 
66 
Hall, TDS Final Report, IV, pp. 1-2, 1-3, 1-4. 
67 Boeing Quarterly Progress Report, January to March 
1967, p. 4. 
264 
.1... 
{>\ , 
L.. 
~ 
simultaneously, thus demonstrating its ability to track two 
spacecraft in different orbits around the Moon at the same 
time. This exercise greatly extended the usefulness of each 
mission by providing simultaneous telemetry on the two orbit-
ing spacecraft. Monitoring showed that all Lunar Orbiter II 
68 
subsystems were operating normally. 
Lunar Orbiter III began its photographic mission on 
February 15 over primary Site III P-l at 35°15" east longi-
tude, 2°55" north latitude, near the crater Maskelyne F in 
the southeastern region of Mare Tranquillitatis. The first 
readout in the primary mode revealed photographs of excel-
lent quality. A solar flare occurred at 12:54 p.m. EST on 
February 13. Though it had a high amount of optical activity, 
there was little of the proton activity that could have 
69 
presented a danger to the film on board the spacecraft. 
The first readout revealed no fogging of the film and in-
dicated that all subsystems were working normally. 
The film advance mechanism in the readout section of 
the photo subsystem of Lunar Orbiter III began to show 
erratic behavior even during the mission's photographic 
phase. Because of this, program officials decided to begin 
final readout earlier than planned. Ground control at the 
68 
Status of Lunar Orbiter III, February 9, 1967, p. 4. 
69 
Status of Lunar Orbiter III (as of 3:30 p.m. EST), 
February 13, 1967; and Status of Lunar Orbiter III, February 
16, 1967. 
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DSN decided not to photograph secondary Site S-32, an oblique 
shot of the Grimaldi crater area. A total of 211 out of 212 
planned frames had been exposed when, at 1:36 a.m. EST on 
February 23, flight controllers commanded the spacecraft to 
cut the Bimat, closing out the photographic portion of 
the third mission. By March l,readout had been completed for 
114 frames of photograph~ or 54% of the total. Film advance 
through the readout gate was intermittently hampered during 
this time, but no no photography was 10st. 70 
Then suddenly on March 4 readout ceased. Of the 211 
frames, 72 still remained to be read out, but the worst 
had happened. The film advance motor had burned out, 
and the 72 frames remained on the take-up reel. Program 
engineers concluded that an inexplicable electrical tran-
sient had scrambled the photo system's logic, causing the 
motor to run out of control. Nonetheless, 75% of the photo-
graphic data had been transmitted to Earth before this 
failure. The decision to begin readout earlier than 
71 
planned had proved very prudent indeed. 
Mission III photography displayed the finest overall 
quality thus far obtained in the program. The quality was due ir 
70 
Status of Lunar Orbiter III, February 23, 1967; and 
March 1, 1967. 
71 
Boeing Quarterly Technical Progress Report, January 
to March 1967, p. 4. See also Lunar Orbiter III Photography, 
NASA CR-984, prepared by the Boeing Company for Langley 
Research Center, February 1968, p. 108, for a detailed re-
port of the failure. 
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part to the use of more diversified photographic procedures, 
including the use of precisely oriented camera axis over a 
wide range of tilt angles and azimuth. The exposure sequen-
cing modes were varied and used more extensively. Relaxa-
tion of earlier photographic constraints, higher orbit in-
clination,and extended stereoscopic photography resulted in 
greater coverage over a wider range of latitude and success-
72 
ful photography under extreme illumination conditions. 
Among other important sites Lunar Orbiter III photo-
graphed the Surveyor I landing area, permitting the loca-
tion and identification of the spacecraft on the Moon's 
73 
surface in Telephoto Frame 194 of Site III P12a. This and 
other accomplishments proved the reliability, accurac~ and 
versatility of the spacecraft in its lunar exploration mis-
sion and gave program officials the confidence to attempt more 
complex precision photography on the two remaining missions. 
72 ' Lunar Orbiter II Photography, NASA CR-984, p. 120. 
73 
Ibid. 
.~. 
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CHAPTER X 
MISSIONS IV AND V: THE LUNAR SURFACE EXPLORED 
The first three missions essentially satisfied the 
Apollo requirements for photographic data of potential 
landing sites. This opened the two remaining missions to 
other work. Photography could concentrate on specific areas 
of the Moon which scientists from various disciplines wished 
to explore more closely. It could also enable NASA cartog-
raphers to compile a much more nearly complete lunar atlas 
than any then in existence. 
Preparing for the Fourth Mis~ion 
As approved by the Ad Hoc Surveyor/Orbiter Utilization 
Committee on May 3, 1967, Mission IV would attempt to 
accomplish some of the objectives not directed towards 
fulfilling Apollo needs. Specifically it would "perform a 
broad systematic photographic survey of lunar surface 
. 
features in order to increase the scientific knowledge of 
their nature, origin, and processes, and to serve as a basis 
for selecting sites for more detailed scientific study by 
subsequent orbital and landing missions."l 
This mission, unlike the first three, required that 
Lunar Orbiter IV fly a nearly polar orbit. In such an orbit 
lLunar Orbiter Project-Office, Langley Research Center, 
Lunar Orbiter Project Mission IV Description, April 26, 1967, 
p. 3. 
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the spacecraft would acquire contiguous photographic cover-
age of a minimum of 80% of the front side at 50 to 100 
meters resolution. It would photograph as much of the Moon's 
far side as possible at the best possible resolution. The 
spacecraft's photographic subsystem would carry enough film 
for 212 frames, and ground control planned to read out all 
photography in the priority mode immediately after processing 
as a precaution against any mechanical failure in the 
subsystem. A final readout would be available if necessary.2 
In preparation for the fourth mission the Lunar Orbiter 
Project -and Program Offices conducted a flight readiness 
review on April 13, 1967. On March 13, Spacecraft 7 (the 
fourth flight spacecraft, or Lunar Orbiter IV) had been re-
moved from storage at the Kennedy Space Center to begin 
Hangar S integration and checkout tests. Launch readiness 
was scheduled for May 4, and no problems were encountered 
during the Hangar S activities. 3 The flight readiness 
review found Lunar Orbiter IV and the backup (Spacecraft 3) 
4 
ready for launch. 
Because the fourth Orbiter would fly a high polar 
orbit, it would be exposed to the Sun almost the entire 
2 Ibid., p. 4. 
3~ect Lunar Orbiter, Narrative Analysis, Langley 
Research Center, March 15, 1967, and April 17, 1967. 
4 Memorandum from SL/Manager, Lunar Orbiter Program,to 
SE/Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Science and 
Applications (Engineering), April 14, 1967, pp. 2-3. 
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mission, necessitating certain changes on the spacecraft. 
A modified charge-controller component was installed to 
reduce the rate of charge in the power system. Boeing 
engineers covered about 20% of the exterior of the 
equipment deck with mirrors to increase its heat rejection 
capability. A damaged micrometeoroid detector was removed 
and another unit installed. Finally the Inertial Reference 
Unit was removed for replacement of a failed capacitor. 
After reinstallation it successfully completed two attitude 
control system tests. 5 
During the weeks before the fourth launch the Program 
Manager showed some concern over the failure of NASA's 
Applications Technology Satellite (ATS II)- to achieve its 
6 
planned circular orbit around the Earth on April 6. NASA 
officials attributed the improper orbit to failure of the 
Agena rocket to reignite in orbit. Unofficially ATS program 
management said the cause for the reignition failure was fail-
ure of the Agena's Propellant Isolation Valve (PIV) to close 
after the first burn. Scherer hoped the PIV for the Lunar 
Orbiter IV Agena would test out successfully before April 27, 
the planned date for the mating of the Agena with the Atlas 
5Ibid • 
6NASA, Executive Secretariat, Program and Special Re-
ports Division, Space Flight Record, 1958-1968, December 31, 
1968, p. 25. 
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booster. 7 Lewis Research Center personnel responsible for 
the Agena took corrective actions and installed a reworked 
valve in time for the launch. The reinstallation took less 
than one month to complete, and it did not jeopardize the 
launch date. 
Two areas involving previous mission and ground test 
problems also pertained to the successful performance of the 
fourth and fifth missions. The traveling-wave-tube ampli-
fier aboard Lunar Orbiter II had experienced high helix 
current. Ultimately it had failed to turn on during the 
final readout phase, and some data were lost. The TWTA 
onboard Lunar Orbiter III had also experienced overheating 
from high helix current and power output variations from 
temperature changes. Worse yet,the TWTA in the ground 
spacecraft for the Mission D Simulation Test failed to 
perform successfully under mission conditions. The 
component was undergoing close examinations to determine the 
mode of failure. A delay of the fourth mission would hinge 
upon the seriousness of the test findings and the difficulty 
in resolving theproblem. 8 
Failure in the photographic subsystem presented the 
other area of questionable spacecraft performance. Readout 
7 
Memorandum, SL/Manager to SE/Deputy Associate Admin-
istrator, p. 1. 
8 Ibid., p. 2. 
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problems had marred the success of Lunar Orbiter III with 
unwanted repetition in readout and the inability of the 
film transport system to move film. Program investigators 
had not pinpointed the causes of these failures. However, 
the ten-day Mission D Simulation Test, just completed on 
April 12, partially compensated for these failures. During 
the test no problems involving readout had occurred, in-
creasing the likelihood of a successful fourth mission. 
The Fourth Orbiter Mission 
Last minute tests did not reveal any problems of a 
magnitude serious enough to delay a launch, and on May 4 
Lunar Orbiter IV rode into space atop its Atlas-Agena D 
launch vehicle at 18:25 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) 
from Launch Complex 13 at Cape Kennedy on an azimuth of 
100.80 • About thirty minutes after liftoff the Agena 
injected the spacecraft into a cislunar trajectory. Early 
tracking data indicated that it was on course, and the first 
midcourse maneuver was scheduled for 13:00 EDT on 
May 5. 9 
Early in Lunar Orbiter IV's journey to the Moon the 
Canopus star tracker experienced difficulty acquiring 
Canopus. Glint from the Sun and earthshine probably were 
9 Lunar Orbiter Program Office, NASA, Post Launch Mission 
Operation Report (MOR) No. S-814-66-04, Lunar Orbiter IV Post 
Launch Report #1, May 5, 1967. 
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the causes of this trouble. The star tracker did lock onto 
a celestia~ body, but flight controllers were not sure if it 
had acquired Canopus or the planet Jupite~which was also in 
its field of view. Program operators planned to correct this 
situation by staging a roll reference maneuver during the 
10 first midcourse correction. 
Passing through the Van Allen Bel~ Lunar Orbiter IV 
experienced a higher dose of radiation than had the previous 
Orbiters: 5.5 rads recorded by the radiation dosimeter for 
the film supply cassett~versus 0.75 rads on earlier Orbiters. 
Howev~r, the dosimeter for the camera storage loopers 
registered 0.0 rads when it was turned on after the 
11 
spacecraft had traversed the Van Allen Belt. 
Shortly after noon EDT on May 5 Lunar Orbiter IV 
executed the planned mid course maneuver to line the space-
craft up with the aiming point before deboost into orbit 
around the Moon. At 11:08 EDT on May 8 the spacecraft's 
rocket burn deboosted the Orbiter into an initial near-
polar orbit around the Moon, with 6,111-kilometer apolune, 
2,706-kilometer perilune, 85.50 inclination to the lunar 
equator, and 12.01-hour period of orbit. 12 
May 9, 
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All subsystems performed well and within acceptable 
temperature limits up to this point. Flight controllers at 
the Deep Space Network facilities commanded the spacecraft 
to scan the Goldstone Test Film at 7:30 p.m. EDT on May 9 
in order to check the readout and communications subsystem. 
The DSN stations at Goldstone, California, and Woomera, 
Australia, read out the film and received data of excellent 
quality. The TWTA onboard the spacecraft had been turned 
on for readout and would remain on for the duration of the 
mission. The spacecraft would execute thermal control 
maneuvers to suppress any overheating tendency of the TWTA 
during the mission. Readings of the radiation dosimeters 
for the film storage cassette continued to stand at 5.5 rads, 
while the dosimeter for the storage loopers indicated a 
change from 0.0 to 0.5 rads. Ground control attributed this 
to background radiation from spac~which did not threaten 
13 the film. 
In its sixth orbit around the Moon Lunar Orbiter IV 
began its first photographic pass at 11:46 a.m. EDT on May 11. 
As the spacecraft sped from south to north the photo sub-
system exposed five sets of four frames each at intervals 
ranging from 30 to 40 minutes. At the high altitude, 
image-motion compensation did not enter into the photographic 
13 Ibid., Lunar Orbiter Post Launch Report #4, May 11, 
1967. 
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process. Passing over the vicinity of the lunar north pole, 
the spacecraft dropped out of sight and radio contact with 
Earth. How could it conduct farside photography without 
direct communication with flight controllers? The key to 
the Orbiter IV farside photography as well as to all farside 
photography of the five Lunar Orbiter missions was the 
Flight Programmer, previously discussed. 
Originally Boeing had designed the Programmer for a 
command storage capacity of sixteen hours, twice the 
length of time in which any of the DSN ground receiving 
stations would be out of line-of-sight communications with 
the spacecraft. This represented a safety margin of eight 
hours, should one of the stations fail to acquire the 
spacecraft. The storage capacity mean that flight program-
mers could store commands to be executed up to sixteen 
hours following storage without any further command from 
Earth. Thus,during the periods when the spacecraft was out 
of sight of the Earth, it was already programmed to conduct 
photography of the lunar far side. 14 
Heading south from the north pole Lunar Orbiter IV 
took one frame of the Moon's far side as it reached apolune 
(6,111.3 kilometers). By 8:40 p.m. EDT May 11, it had 
exposed a total of 27 frames, and flight controllers 
commanded the readout of this photography to begin. The 
14 Costello interview. 
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first high- and medium-resolution pictures turned out 
excellently. 15 
Despite this apparent success, the spacecraft had 
already developed a serious problem which threatened to 
jeopardize the whole mission. Telemetry data indicated 
that after the second set of four frames had been e~posed, 
the camera thermal door failed to close until ground control 
had sent additional commands to close it. After the third 
set of four frames had been made, spacecraft telemetry did not 
confirm if the door had opened sufficiently. Flight 
controllers initiated a preliminary corrective action by 
commanding the door to open far enough in advance of the 
fourth set's exposure time to allow for additional commands 
if required. 
NASA and Boeing engineers began immediately to 
analyze the problem. The danger of the thermal door's fail-
ing in the closed position and making all further photog-
raphy impossible forced flight controllers to fly the space-
craft with the door open. The open door created a danger of 
light leakage, which could fog portions of the film. Flight 
controllers had to strike a delicate balance between 
prohibiting light leaks and preventing the temperature within 
the subsystem from dropping below the dew point of the gas 
15 
Post Launch MOR S-814-66-04, Lunar Orbiter IV Post 
Launch Report #6, May 12, 1967. 
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which pressurized it. Too Iowa temperature could cause 
moisture condensation on the camera lens window and thus 
reduce the contrast and resolution of the photographs. 
Maintaining a balance between these two conditions led to 
16 
extra attitude control maneuvers. 
The danger of light leakage revealed itself early on 
May 13 during the readout of the exposures which the space-
craft had made since ground control had initiated contingency 
measures to cope with the camera thermal door problem. 
Portions of the photographs were light struck. NASA 
enginee~s deduced the mishap by comparing readout results 
of film that had been kept in the spacecraft's camera 
storage looper for one half hour with film that had been 
there five hours and longer. The quality of the exposures 
declined with the length of time the film had been in the 
looper before readout. 17 
Lunar Orbiter Program personnel from Langley, Boeing, 
and Eastman Kodak attempted to solve the problem of the door. 
Flight controllers devised and executed several tests to 
assess its reliability. These showed that the door could be 
partially closed, then reopened. Further tests placed the 
spacecraft in several orientations to the Sun with the door 
16Ibid • 
17Ibid., Lunar Orbiter IV Post Launch Report #7, May 15, 
1967. -
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partially closed. Ground control monitored the thermal 
response of the camera lens window and commanded the 
spacecraft to take photographs. On May 16 these photographs 
were read out, and they indicated that light leaks had 
ceased. Program officials concluded that their procedures 
were effective. However, the low contrast of some pictures 
indicated probable fogging of the lens window due to moisture 
condensation at lower temperatures. Ground control maneuvered 
the spacecraft to raise the temperature of the lens window 
on orbit 14 and subsequent orbits. 18 
As of May 19 Scherer could report to NASA Administrator 
James E. Webb that the Langley/Boeing flight operations team 
had the photographic fogging problem under control. The 
team had established the following subjective grading system 
for Orbiter IV pictures: 1) excellent quality, 2) light 
fogging, 3) heavy fogging, and 4) blank. The most recent 
high-resolution photographs fell into the first or second 
categories, with most being graded excellent. A preliminary 
analysis of the photographic coverage during the first 600 
of lunar longitude arc indicated that 64% of this area had 
19 been covered by grade 1 or 2 photography. 
Early on Saturday morning, May 20, ground control 
18 Ibid., Lunar Orbiter IV Post Launch Report #8, 
May 17, 1967. 
19 Ib1d.,#9, May 22, 1967 
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picked up an anomaly during readout. The readout drive 
mechanism turned off in a normal manner without being 
commanded to do s Ground control restarted it, but after 
scanning a short segment of film it stopped abruptly. 
Throughout the day this start-stop situation repeated itself; 
I 
the distance scanned varied from 5 to 30 centimeters. 
Langley and Boeing engineers suspected the readout encoder was 
falsely indicating a full readout looper. They began to 
analyze the problem while primary readout proceeded. Pictures 
obtained through readout proved that the new operational 
procedures for the camera thermal door continued to be 
effective, and no change in photography schedules was neces-
20 
sary at that time. 
By 8:00 a.m. EDT on May 25 Lunar Orbiter IV was in 
its thirty-fourth orbit around the Moon and had photographed 
its surface as far as the 100e west meridian. Ground control 
had recovered photographs up to about the 750 west meridian. 
The sector from 900 east to 450 east meridian, whicL the 
Orbiter had first photographed, had been phot 5raphed again 
from apolune because fogging had degraded the quality of the 
perilune pictures. While photography proceeded well, flight 
controllers believed that' ;'ley had brought the premature 
1967. 
20 ~., Lunar Orbiter Post Launch Report #10, May 22, 
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termination of readout under control. They used a repeti-
tive series of commands to prevent the noisy encoder from 
stopping readout until c9mmanded to do so.2l 
Between May 21 and May 25, while problems with the 
thermal door and the readout encoder were being resolved, 
Lunar Orbiter IV experienced increased radiation dosage from 
solar flare particle events. Trutz Foelsche, primary inves-
tigator for the Lunar Orbiter radiation experiment, was able 
to make preliminary conclusions about the potential hazards 
to Lunar Orbiter IV based upon early data which the Space 
Flight Operations Facility had obtained from the spacecraft's 
two dosimeters. On May 21 a solar particle event had produced 
low-energy protons whose energy levels did not exceed 20 Mev. 
Since they had little energy these protons would hardly 
affect the camera film. Moreover, he concluded, the May 21 
event was much less serious than the event of September 2, 
196~which Lunar Orbiter II had encountered, and the Orbiter had 
22 
experienced no film fogging. 
21 
Ibid., Lunar Orbiter IV Post Launch Report #11, 
May 25, 2~967. 
Memorandum from Martin J. Swetnick, SL/Scientist, 
to File, June 1, 1967, Subject: Status of assessment of 
Lunar Orbiter IV radiation detector data. See also: Trutz 
Foelsche, "Radiation Measurements in LO I - V (Period August 10, 
1966- January 30, 1968)," Langley Research Center, fora de-
tailed analysis of the data on radiation doses returned to 
Earth by the five Lunar Orbiter spacecraft. 
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On the thirty-fifth orbit around the Moon Lunar 
Orbiter IV experienced worsening readout difficulties. These 
brought a quick decision to cut the Bimat to escape the 
high probability that the Bimat would stick to the film, 
thus ending the photographic mission. At this time the 
photographic subsystem had exposed and processed 163 frames. 
Ground control successfully commanded Lunar Orbiter IV to 
cut the Bimat, but final readout presented more problems. 23 
The erroneous encoder signals hindered film transport 
from the take-up spool considerably, and ground control had 
to improvise a non-standard procedure to get around this 
condition. Sending false picture-taking commands; mission 
controllers inched the film towards the take-up spool and 
then moved short segments of film back through the readout 
gate. USing this procedure they successfully recovered 13 
additional frames at the end of the film which might other-
wise have remained between the processor and the readout 
looper. Then ground control sent commands to the spacecraft 
to apply tension throughout the film system. Following this 
the system responded normally to readout operations. Only 
30 of the 163 frames which had been exposed remained to be 
recovered. NASA ground stations completed final readout on 
June 1.24 
23post Launch MOR S-8l4-66-04, Lunar Orbiter IV Post 
Launch Report #12, May 29, 1967. . 
24Ibid • 
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Lunar Orbiter IV photography had covered 99% of the 
Moon's near side at a resolution exceeding by ten times the 
best Earth-based telescopic photography. This coverage 
revealed significant, heretofore unknown, geological detail 
in the polar and limb regions of the Moon. Unofficially 
the Orbiter IV photography increased to 80% the coverage of 
the far side of the Moon obtained during the first four 
Orbiter missions. These accomplishments attested to the 
high degree of organization in the flight operations of the 
fourth mission in the face of the problems that had been 
encountered. 25 
Its photographic mission ended, Lunar Orbiter IV 
proceeded into its extended mission. Program officials 
planned to change the spacecraft's orbit so that it would 
approximate that planned for Lunar Orbiter V. The additional 
information which ground control could obtain about the 
Moon's gravitational environment by tracking Lunar Orbiter 
IV and analyzing the telemetry data would prove valuable in 
planning the final Orbiter mission. In addition ground 
stations continued to track the second and third Orbiters. 
Lunar Orbiter II, launched in November 1966, was moving 
25Ibid., Lunar Orbiter IV Post Laupch Report#13, June 5, 
1967. The-u7S. Air Force Aeronautical Chart and Information 
Center subsequently determined that of the total farside cover-
age of the Moon only 60% was usable for purposes of mapping (Confirmed in a telephone conversation with Leon J. Kosofsky, 
Lunar Orbiter program engineer, September 15, 1967). 
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closer to the Moon's surface on an inevitable collision 
course. Program officials planned to raise its orbit, thus 
extending its lifetime. Lunar Orbiter III would undergo a 
plane change in its orbit in addition to having it raised. The 
change would provide new data on the lunar gravitational field 
tor use in further mission planning and in the Apollo 
Program. 26 
Preparations for the Fifth Mission 
In March 1967, before the fourth mission, a working 
group within the Lunar Orbiter Program developed tentative 
objectives for the fifth and final mission. These called 
for a multi-site scientific mission with the capability of 
reexamining the eastern Apollo sites. A subgroup formed to 
determine specific target sites for the photographic mission 
of the last flight. As in the past the Lunar Orbiter Project 
Office at Langley coordinated all mission planning activi-
27 ties. On March 21 the entire working group met at Langley 
to review the preliminary plans. The results of the review 
were sen~ to Boeing for further consideration before a 
presentation to "the Ad Hoc Surveyor/Orbiter Utilization 
26Ibid • 
27----Memorandum from SL/Manager, Lunar Orbiter Program, 
to SL/Director, Lunar and Planetary Programs, Subject: Lunar 
Orbiter Mission 5 Planning, March 9, 1967. See also Minutes 
of the March 7, 1967,meeting of the Mission V Planning Group, 
NASA Headquarters. 
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Committee at the end of the month. 
The Lunar Orbiter Mission V Planning Group, which 
had come into being in March, met at the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory on May 26 to review the Boeing Company's prelim-
inary mission design for the fifth Orbiter. Of special 
interest was the problem of orbit design. The Group worked 
out an orbit design which would meet the needs of the 
multi-site mission without violating spacecraft design 
0-
restrictions. The orbit would have an inclination of 85 
to the Moon's equator. The perilune altitude would be low 
enough to allow two-meter_resolution photography on vertical 
photographs instead of one-meter, in order to obtain more 
useful convergent stereo photography at the higher altitude 
of 100 kilometers. At the higher perilune the cross-camera 
tilt would be reduced, offering better resolution on the 
convergent stereo photographs. At the same time, increasing 
the perilune altitude broadened the coverage of the science 
sites. 28 
The Planning Group decided to keep the Lunar Orbiter 
V apolune as low as possible and no higher than 1,500 
kilometers above the Moon. Lighting angles from the morning 
terminator would range from 80 to 24°--angles offering the 
greatest potential relief rendition of surface features to 
28Minutes of the May 26, 196~ meeting of the Mission 
V Planning Group, P. 2. 
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assist scientists in analyzing topographic and geologic 
aspects of the lunar surface. 29 
By June 14 the Lunar Orbiter Program Office had the 
completed plan for the fifth mission, and the Ad Hoc 
Surveyor/Orbiter Utilization Committee approved it on the 
same day. As a result of the review of Lunar Orbiter IV 
photographY,mission planners at Langley changed almost 50% 
of the sites they had initially selected for the fifth 
mission. 30 
Lunar Orbiter V Mission Objectives 
The fifth mission's objectives can be divided into 
two categories: photographic and non-photographic. The 
former composed tne primary part of the mission, the latter 
the secondary. The spacecraft would perform five basic 
photographic tasks. Task 1 entailed additional Apollo 
landing site photography, employing three modes of photogra-
phy: near-vertical, convergent telephoto stereo, and 
oblique. Task 2 would accomplish broad survey photography 
of unphotographed areas on the Moon's farside. Task 3 was 
to take photos of additional Surveyor landing sites of 
29Ibid • 30---Lunar Orbiter Mission V Description approved by the 
Ad Hoc SUrveyor/Orbiter Utilization Committee on June 14, 
1967, prepared by the Lunar Orbiter Project Office, Langley 
Research Center, July 8, 1967, pp. 2-3. 
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high scientific interest to investigators. Task 4 would 
have the spacecraft concentrate on potential landing sites 
for later Apollo Program missions, with particular stress on 
their scientific value. Finally, Task 5 was related to the 
fourth in that it encompassed photography of a wide range 
of scientifically interesting sites. 31 
The second category of mission objectives did not 
differ markedly from the first four missions. It included 
the following: 1) acquisition of precision trajectory 
information for use in improving the definition of the lunar 
gravitational field; 2) measurement of the micrometeoroid 
flux and radiation dose in lunar environment, primarily for 
analysis of the spacecraft's performance; 3) provision to the 
Manned Space Flight Network tracking stations of a space-
craft which they could track for purposes of evaluating the 
network and the Apollo Orbit Determination Program. 32 
Lunar Orbiter V would fly a nearly polar orbit 
inclined 850 to the Moon's equator. The spacecraft would 
deboost into an initial orbit with an apolune of 6,000 
31Ibid., PP. 4-7. The responsibilities for follow-on 
lunar exploration were assigned to the Apollo Program and 
were under the Apollo Lunar Exploration Program. This pro-
gram differed from the Apollo Applications Program, which 
was concerned with Earth-orbit applications of Apollo hard-
ware and technology. 
3~nar Orbiter Mission V Description. 
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kilometers and a perilune of 200 kilometers. In this orbit 
it would take photographs of the lunar far side. Finally, 
the spacecraft would maneuver to a new orbit with an apolune 
of 1,500 kilometers and a perilune of 100 kilometers to 
execute the remainder of the photographic tasks. 33 
As approved the mission plan called for a total of 
212 film frames to be exposed. Of these it had allocated 
44 frames to Apollo tasks and 168 frames to scientific areas, 
including those thought suitable for the later Apollo missions 
and for Surveyor landing sites. Five Apollo sites along the 
equatorial zone, ranging from 420 56' east longitude to 360 
. 0 
11' west longitude and from 00 45' north latitude to 3 30' 
south latitude, would be photographed. Potential Apollo 
Program sites which Lunar Orbiter V would photograph 
included: the Littrow rilles; the Sulpicius Gallus rilles; 
the Imbrium flows; the craters Copernicus, Dionysus, 
Alphonsus, Dawes, and Fra Mauro; Copernicus secondary craters; 
the domes near Gruithuisen and Gruithuisen K; the Tobias 
Mayer dome; the Marius hills; the Aristrachus plateau; the 
area of Copernicus CD; and the areas south of the crater 
Alexander on the northern edge of Mare Serenitatis. 34 
What did mission planners use as criteria for 
selecting science sites? Donald E. Wilhelms of the United 
288 
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States Geological Survey, working with the Lunar Orbiter 
Program Office, described one of the major criteria: 
The primary criterion for selection of Mission V 
sites was freshness of the features in the site. 
Earlier Orbiter missions have shown emphatically 
that most lunar terrain has a subdued appearance 
at all Orbiter scales so that little new is learned 
from high resolution ~hotography. Fresh young 
craters (mostly light) and fresh young rock units 
(mostly dark) that are not yet much modified by 
repeated cratering and wasting potentially reveal 
the most about rock type and origin, both in 
photographs and when sampled on the ground. Old 
terrains show effects of the processes that waste 
lunar slopes, and though these are of interest, 
they seem to be sufficiently sampled in high resolu-
tion photography by earlier Orbiter missions, except 
for very high and steep slopes. A few high and 
steep slopes and other non-fresh targets have been 
selected fgr the purpose of rounding out terrain 
sampling.3~ 
The fifth Orbiter mission would perform the most 
exacting, precision photography of all five missions. It 
also had the experience of the previous four flights to call 
upon in establishing greater confidence in mission controllers 
concerning operational procedures. As a result they could 
demand more of Lunar Orbiter V. Nevertheless the spacecraft 
exhibited several problems during preflight tests and 
check-out at Cape Kennedy. The most serious problem 
35Ibid ., p. 22. Wilhelms subsequently described 
each site-wEich Lunar Orbiter V would photograph, giving its 
geographic location and the main features of scientific 
interest. Lunar Orbiter photographs of each site accompanied 
his descriptions. Mission IV photography proved extremely 
helpful in refining estimates of site freshness, in relocating 
Mission V sites, and in rejecting some previously selected 
sites. 
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developed when the bladders of the oxidizer tanks began to 
leak. The leaks forcffiNASA to return Spacecraft 3 (the fifth 
flight spacecraft) to Boeing in Seattle on May 12. It 
arrived there on May 17 and the oxidizer bladders were 
replaced by June 6. It was then returned to Hangar S at 
Cape Kennedy on June 16 for retesting. Integration and 
checkout with the launch vehicle took place on July 12, with 
final mating on July 19. 36 
By July 27 Lunar Orbiter V had successfully completed 
pre-launch tests and had been mated with the launch vehicle 
in preparation for an August 1 launch. 37 Program officials 
subsequently conducted a simulated launch exercise on July 
28. The fifth mission was about to begin. 
The Final Mission 
A NASA Boeing Lockheed team launched Lunar Orbiter 
V successfully from Launch Complex 13 at Cape Kennedy on 
August 1, 1967, less than one year after the first Orbiter 
had made its long journey to the Moon. The countdown 
proceeded smoothly throughout the day with only one anomaly 
in the Agena, causing a short hold. Then it resumed until 
mid-afternoon. The launch was scheduled for 4:09 p.m. EDT, 
36pro ect Lunar Orbiter Langley 
Research Center, June 13, 19 7 and Ju y ,19 • 
37Status of Lunar Orbiter E, July 27, 1967. 
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but a rain storm delayed it for two and one half hours. 
The threat of postponing the launch grew serious because 
the launch window on August 1 lasted only from 4:09 p.m. 
to 8:00 p.m. EDT. The threat was significant to the mission 
because,if the weather forced a delay until the launch 
window of the following day, a partial loss of farside 
photography would result. Lunar Orbiter V was targeted for 
a high, elliptical polar orbit so that it could perform 
photography over the Moon's entire surface. The Moon 
rotates 130 of arc on its axis per Earth-day. A delayed 
o launch of one day would mean the loss of a 13 portion of 
the lunar far side to darkness.38 
Fortunately the weather improved, and the countdown 
resumed. Launch control fired the Atlas-Agena carrying 
Lunar Orbiter V on its way to the Moon at 6:33 p.m. EDT. 
In the monitoring room program officials sat watching the 
large display panels as various signals lit up, telling them 
that the different marks of the launch operation had been 
achieved. Early telemetry data indicated that all systems 
were functioning excellently. Fifty minutes into the mission 
the Deep Space Tracking Network station at Woomera, Australia, 
acquired radio contact with the spacecraft. It confirmed for 
38 Interview with A. Thomas Young, Lunar Orbiter Pro-
ject Office, Langley Research Center, obtained during launch 
operations at Cape Kennedy, August 1, 1967. 
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ground control that the spacecraft had separated from the 
Agena and deployed its se ar panels and two antennas and that 
its power system was operating on solar energy. All sub-
systems continued to perform normally and within acceptable 
temperature limits. 39 
Flight controllers at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 
where DSN operations shifted after the launch, executed the 
first midcourse maneuver at 2 a.m. EDT on August 3. This 
corrected the spacecraft's trajectory, which was about 7,000 
kilometers off the aim point, for the deboosting maneuver 
into lunar orbit. Lunar Orbiter V carried out a roll 
maneuver of +42.1 0 , a pitch maneuver of +29.1 0 and a burn of 
its velOCity control engine of 26 seconds. The resulting 
velOCity increment of 29.76 meters per second was sufficient 
to put the spacecraft on course for arrival at the planned 
aiming point at the specified time. No second midcourse 
40 
correction was necessary. 
During the cislunar transit the spacecraft had no 
difficulty acquiring Canopus before the midcourse maneuver. 
39Lunar Orbiter Project Office, Langley Research 
Center, Lunar Orbiter Project Mission Countdown Document 
LOTD-106-4, approved July 5, 1967. The document lists 
every command and milestone in the network countdown pro-
cedure, beginning at T minus 505 minutes. See also Lunar 
Orbiter Pro~ram Office, NASA, Post Launch Mission Operation 
Report (MOR) No. S-8l4-67-07, Lunar Orbiter V Post Launch 
Report #1, August 2, 1967. 
40 Post Launch MOR S-8l4-67-07, Lunar Orbiter V Post 
Launch Report #2, August 3, 1967. 
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The radiation dosimeter at the film supply cassette 
registered a dose of 0.75 rads as the spacecraft passed 
through the Van Allen Belt. After transit the dosimeter in 
the camera storage looper was turned on, and it registered 
0.0 rads. The ship recorded no micrometeoroid hits, and all 
subsystems continued to perform well. 
At 12:48 p.m. EDT on August 5, after executing a roll 
and a pitch maneuver, the spacecraft fired its 100-pound-
thrust rocket for 8 minutes and 28 seconds and decelerated 
by 643 meters per second into the gravitational captivity of 
the Moon. The initial orbital parameters were: apolune, 
6,023 kilometers; perilune, 194.5 kilometers; inclination, 
85.01 0 ; period of orbit, 8 hours, 30 minutes. One and a 
half hours after orbit insertion, ground control commanded 
Lunar Orbiter V to scan the Goldstone test film, and the 
subsequent readout showed high-quality data. Following this, 
flight controllers prepared for the major photographic work 
41 
of the mission. 
Photography commenced at 7:22 p.m. EDT on August 6. 
At this time the spacecraft took its first photograph of the 
Moon at a distance of about 6,000 kilometers from the lunar 
surface. The target was a previously unknown area of the 
far side. Then it executed a maneuver early on August 7 
41 Ibid. Lunar Orbiter V Post Launch Report #3, Aug-
ust 7, 19~ 
293 
.-~-
:.~ ,. 
--'-
that lowered the perilune to 100 kilometers while maintaining 
a 6,023-kilometer apolune. The spacecraft continued farside 
photography, exposing eighteen out of nineteen frames during 
the first part of the mission. The nineteenth was a "film 
set" frame, moved through the photo subsystem in an eight-
hour interval to prevent film from setting and Bimat from 
drying out. While this was a planned item in the film1s 
budget, the decision which program officials made early on 
August 7 changed the next scheduled "film set" frame 
significantly. They decided to use it to take a photograph 
of the Earth with the 610 mm high-resolution camera 
lens instead of passing it unexposed through the system. 42 
Site VA-9, as the Earth photograph was identified, 
had not been in the original plan. Program officals 
decided, however, that the position of Lunar Orbiter V 
relative to the Moon and the Earth and the Earth1s position 
relative to the Sun afforded a very fine opportunity to take 
such a picture. The Langley program planning staff together 
with flight controllers implemented a plan to make an Earth 
photograph when the spacecraft neared apolune between orbits 
7 and 8. Since the spacecraft1s orbit geometry kept it in 
view of Earth at all times, the Moon would not appear in 
42Ibid ., p. 2. 
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the PhotOgraPh. 43 
Exactly seven hours twenty-three minutes elapsed 
between the ·exposure of the previous photograph of Site 
VA-B and the moment when Lunar Orbiter V's camera made the 
historic picture of the nearly full Earth on August B at 
about 9:05 Greenwich Mean Time. Shutter speed was 1/100 
second, but the Earth's high albedo caused some overexpo-
sure of the film. This was unavoidable. Later Langley 
Research Center photography specialists successfully applied 
image enhancement techniques, using magnetic tape video 
records of the readout of the photograph, to bring out 
details which would not have shown up in a negative 
reconstructed from the raw readout data. (Note that 
enhancement techniques did not involve any "doctoring ll of 
photographic data in order to "show ll something which was not 
there. ) 
Approximately 1490 of arc of the Earth's surface 
appeared clearly in the photograph. It illustrated the 
possible synoptic weather observations that a satellite 
could conduct in cislunar space or that could be made from 
the Moon. 44 
43 Lunar Orbiter V Photo~raPhY, NASA CR-l094, prepared 
by the Boeing Company, June 19 8, p. 140. 
44 Ibid., pp. 140-141. Picture and computer schematic 
on pp. l4~3. 
295 
C'} '-
-'-
Very early on August 9, EDT, Lunar Orbiter V executed 
a second orbital maneuver, which reduced its apolune from 
6,023 kilometers to 1,500. The final orbital parameters 
were: apolune, 1,499.37 kilometers; perilune, 98.93 
o kilometers; inclination, 84.76 ; period of orbit, 3 hours 
11 minutes. All spacecraft subsystems continued to perform 
normally. The micrometeoroid detection experiment had 
recorded one hit, and the radiation level registered by the 
dosimeter at the film cassette remained constant at 1.0 rads, 
up from 0.75 rads. 45 In the following days the spacecraft 
continued to perform its mission as planned without 
experiencing any troubles. By August 14 it had completed 
51 orbits and had exposed 107 of 212 film frames. Sixty 
frames had been read out, of which the picture of Earth 
showed remarkable detail from such a great distance. 46 
The photographic mission ended on August 18 when the 
spacecraft made its last photograph and ran out of Bimat at 
11:20 p.m. EDT. In all it had successfully covered 5 Apollo 
sites, 36 science sites, 23 previously unphotographed areas 
on the lunar far side, and a view of the nearly fully 
illuminated Earth. The Apollo coverage included 5 sets of 
45post Launch MOR S-8l4-67-07, 
Launch Report #5, August 9, 1967. 
46 ~., #8, August 14, 1967. 
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convergent stereo photographs, each comprising two 4-frame 
sequences, and 4 westward-looking oblique views. Lunar 
Orbiter V had transmitted. seventy-eight percent of the high-
resolution photography to Earth at a rate of about 4 frames 
per orbit or 27 frames per day as of August 21, and ground 
control expected to conclude readout by August 26. 47 
The End of the Operational Phase 
On September 2 Homer E. Newell, Associate Administrator 
for Space Science and Applications, certified that the fifth 
mission was an unqualified success according to prelaunch 
objectives. Deputy Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., 
concurred on September 6. Both NASA officials also assessed 
the whole program as successful; five missions had been 
flown out of five Planned. 48 Indeed the final Orbiter had 
capped an impressive effort by the Office of Space Science 
and Applications to bring man closer to stepping down upon 
the lunar soil and understanding where it was that he would 
be landing in the near future. 
The status of the fifth Lunar Orbiter remained good 
following termination of readout early on the morning of 
47 Ibid ., #10, August 21, 1967. 
~ NASA Mission Ob ectives for Lunar Orbiter E, signed 
by Edgar M. Co right for Homer E. Newe 1, Ju y and 
September 2, 1967, and Robert C. Seamans, Jr., July 26 and 
September 6, 1967. 
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August 27. Lunar Orbiter II and III also continued to 
orbit the Moon and to provide extensive data on the lunar 
environment and its gravitational field. These three 
spacecraft served the Manned Space Flight Network as 
tracking targets for training personnel who would track 
APOIIo.49 
Lunar Orbiter II had sufficient attitude control gas 
to survive until early November. Ground control operators 
planned to impact it into the Apollo zone on the Moon's 
surface even though analysis of tracking data indicated 
that it could probably remain in orbit one or two years 
longer. Once the spacecraft lost its attitude control gas, 
however, it would become a derelict in orbit, beyond the 
control of ground operations. Program officials deemed it 
necessary, therefore, to crash the spacecraft while they 
could, to avoid any potential communications interference in 
future manned missions. They also planned to lower Lunar 
Orbiter Ill's apolune to make its orbit as circular as 
possible for further training for Apollo tracking. However, 
expiration of its gas would soon mean that it, too, would 
have to be crashed. 
The fifth Orbiter had just begun its extended mission 
late in August. Its orbit would be changed on October 10 so 
49post LaunchMOR S-418-67-07, Lunar Orbiter V Post 
Launch Report #11, September 7, 1967. 
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that it might better survive the umbral eclipse of October 
18. (Program engineer Leon J. Kosofsky and mission operators 
changed the orbit so that the spacecraft would pass through 
the eclipse and solar occultation by the Moon at the same 
time.) Apollo network trackers would continue to track the 
spacecraft as long as possible to increase their experience 
50 in preparation for manned lunar missions. 
On September 11 the Lunar Orbiter Program Office 
issued a statement of the plans for terminating the life of 
the three remaining Orbiters. It stated briefly: 
The policy is to track the Orbiter spacecraft until 
the approach of loss of attitude control as indicated 
by the nitrogen pressure. While the spacecraft is 
still controllable, the engine will be fired so as to 
cause impact with the lunar surface. The impact will 
be made within the Apollo zone if feasible. At this 
time, it appears that Orbiter II will be impacted in 
early November, Orbiter III in mid October, and 
Orbiter V in mid ~~mmer 1968. Contact with Orbiter 
IV has been lost.~ 
Following the final acquisition of all Lunar Orbiter V 
photographic data, Lee R. Scherer issued a summary statement 
about the program's achievements. Among these he stressed 
that Lunar Orbiter II photography had led to the identifi-
cation of the Ranger VIII impact point on the Moon. Orbiter 
50Ibid. 
5lLunar Orbiter Program Office, NASA, Termination of 
Active Lunar Orbiters: Present Plans for Terminating Active 
Lunar Orbiters II through V, Lunar Orbiter Item 29, Septem-
ber 11, 1967. 
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III photography had identified Surveyor I on the Moon's 
surface. The locations of the other Surveyors were also 
determined by using Orbiter photography. The fifth Orbiter 
had photographed major lunar features of scientific interest 
at a resolution 100 times better than Earth-based telescopes 
could achieve under ideal observation conditions. All 
Orbiters combined had photographed the entire lunar surface 
at a better resolution by at least an order of magnitude than 
Earth-based telescopes could attain and had surveyed the 
heavily cratered far side of the Moon. The spacecraft had 
provided valuable data contributing to the determination of 
the Moon's gravitational field. Finall~ one of the program's 
most significant accomplishments had been to advance the 
Apollo Program in a way other than photographic site 
certification. 
Five Orbiters had enabled the Manned Space Flight 
Network to train personnel in tracking and to check out 
equipment and computer programs for the manned lunar missions 
beginning with Apollo 8 in December 1968 and including 
Apollo 10 through 17, of which all but Apollo 10 and 13 
landed on the Moon. (Apollo 10 tested the complete space-
craft in lunar orbit and Apollo 13 aborted its landing 
mission because an onboard oxygen tank exploded in cislunar 
space.) The Office of Manned Space Flight could not have 
obtained the needed tracking experience at a timely date 
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if NASA had not flown the five Lunar Orbiter spacecraft. 52 
The chronology of the Lunar Orbiters concluded by the 
end of January 1968. Oh'October 9, 1967, flight controllers 
commanded Lunar Orbiter III to impact on the Moon. On Oct-
tober 11 they commanded Lunar Orbiter II impact. They had 
lost communications with Lunar Orbiter IV on July 17, 1967, 
and assumed that its orbit had decayed sufficiently to 
permit it to crash onto the Moon late in October, but 
had no evidence confirming this. Lunar Orbiter V continued 
to fly its extended mission until, unexpectedly, it 
experienced an anomaly which threatened its orbit safety. 
A sudden loss of pressure in the nitrogen tank forced flight 
controllers to impact the spacecraft prematurely on the Moon 
to avoid losing it in orbit. They conducted this final 
maneuver on January 31, 1968, crashing Lunar Orbiter V near 
the equator on the Moon's western limb. The impact brought 
the operational phase of the Lunar Orbiter Program to a close. 53 
52Memorandum from SL/Assistant Director for Lunar 
Flight Programs (Lee R. Scherer) to SL/D. Pinkler, SUbject: 
Lunar Orbiter Program Highlights, September 13, 1967, 
pp. 1-2. 
53 Information from Lunar Orbiter Program Office, NASA 
Headquarters; Lunar Orbiter Project Office, Langley Research 
center; and Lunar Orbiter V Extended Mission Spacecraft 
Operations and SUbsystem Performance, NASA CR-1142, prepared 
by the Boeing Company, August 1968, p. 121. 
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CHAPTER XI 
CONCLUSIONS: LUNAR ORBITER'S CONTRIBUTION TO SPACE EXPLORATION 
A Sixth Orbiter Mission? 
Even before Lunar Orbiter V flew, the Office of Space 
Science and Applications was entertaining t~e prospect of 
flying a sixth Orbiter mission. Boeing had nearly enough 
parts to assemble another spacecraft at an initial cost of 
about $13 million. A gamma-ray experiment also existed which 
scientists desired to fly on a sixth Orbiter. Its inclusion 
would raise the cost of the mission by about $3 million. 
However, the necessity to relocate personnel on the Lunar 
Orbiter team to other jobs presented a major problem blocking 
1 
another mission. 
Lunar Orbiter Program officials estimated that if the 
mission of Lunar Orbiter V failed, the program would have to 
fly a sixth Orbiter. However, refurbishment of a sixth 
spacecraft required such parts as two new solar panels. The 
Lunar Orbiter Program Office examined the needs and the lead 
times required for a sixth mission dur.lng May and June 1967. 
By the beginning of Jul~ program management knew that OSSA 
soon had to make a commitment to another mission if it wanted 
1 Lunar Orbiter Program Office, NASA, Comments on Seamans 
Draft Memo (Undated), June 26, 1967. See also memorandum from 
SL/Manager, Lunar Orbiter Program, to SL/Acting Director, Lunar 
and Planetary Programs, Subject: Lunar Orbiter 6, April 6, 1967. 
~l~~CEDiJ:~G PAGE BLANK NOT FIL:r.i..W 
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to avoid major shifts r personnel at Lan. ~y and Boeing 
following the photographic phase of Mission V. Known, too, 
was the simple fact that the longer NASA officials waited 
to approve the go-ahead for a new mission, the greater the 
costs and the more severely the management arrangements 
2 
would impact on other NASA programs. 
On July 5 Scherer issued a statement summarizing the 
objectives of the fifth mission and the rationale behind a 
sixth Orbiter flight. He pointed out that the total cost of 
each of the first five missions amounted to $40 million 
apiece. The sixth mission would cost less than one third of 
this. Even if the fifth mission successfully achieved all 
planned objectives, a sixth mission could accomplish very 
valuable and different goals. Briefly it could 1) perform a 
total survey of the far side of the Moon at 60~o 80 meters 
resolution, 2) take a concentrated look at the best Apollo 
Program sites as determined through analysis of photographic 
data from the fifth mission, and 3) closely survey additional 
areas of high scientific interest. If Mission E failed,3 a 
MisSion F would be .necessary, according to Scherer. 4 
2Ibid • 
3NASA missions and spacecraft are denoted by capital 
letters (Mission E) during the prelaunch phase. After a 
successfu1 launch, the mission and spacecraft are designated 
by numerals (Mission V). 
4Lunar Orbiter Program Office, NASA, Action Item Summary, 
Action Item 31, Lunar Orbiter: Review and report the neces_ 
sity for an additional Lunar Orbiter MisSion, memo date June 16, 
1967. 
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The Lunar Orbiter Project Office at Langley sent a 
memorandum to Scherer's Office on July 12 detailing the 
options open to OSSA for a sixth mission. The first option 
required a go-ahead decision by mid-July. The details were 
these: 1) that refurbishment and processing the spacecraft 
required four months and was the pacing item; 2) cost of 
launching Lunar Orbiter F late in November would amount to 
$12.75 million; 3) a launch by that time would retain the 
launch readiness capability of the previous launches; 4) this 
option provided the greatest retention of overall experience 
in the Lunar Orbiter team. 5 The second option was the same 
as the first except that it allowed for cancellation of 
preparations for a sixth flight early in September. At that 
time, data from Lunar Orbiter V would be available. If the 
mission was successful and the need for another mission was 
insufficiently justified, then the Lunar Orbiter Program could 
6 
cancel the additional mission at a cost of about $4 million. 
The third option was the least manageable. It required 
that NASA postpone the July go-ahead but authorize funds to 
hold the team and the hardware in readiness until evaluation 
of the Lunar Orbiter V mission results. This option would 
5Memorandum from Lunar Orbiter Project Office to NASA, 
Code SL, Attention: Capt. L. R. Scherer, Subject: Lunar 
Orbiter Project Recommendation for Implementing an Additional 
Mission, July 12, 1967. 
6 Ibid., p. 2. 
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extend the earliest possible launch date from late November 
1967 to late January 1968 and raise the cost of a slxth mis-
sion to $16.5 million. It would also impact on the launch of 
OGO-E (Orbiting Geophysical Observatory satellite E) and 
would delay the Air Force takeover of Launch Complex 13 at 
Cape Kennedy. In view of these circumstances the Langley 
Lunar Orbiter Project Office recommended that only the first 
option be considered and that NASA Headquarters approve 
go-ahead before July 22, 1967. 7 
On July 14, 196~ Homer E. Newell sent NASA Deputy 
Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., a summary of the 
alternatives for a sixth mission. He reiterated the 
three options which the Langley memorandum had specified and 
underlined Langley's position in support of a July go-ahead 
for a late November launch. He stressed to Seamans that a 
delayed decision would affect management problems, costs, 
and schedules in the Office of Space Science and Applica-
tions. 8 
Seamans weighed the need for a sixth mission and decid.ed 
that NASA funds would better support other activities. On July 
24, 1967,Scherer officially informed Langley that NASA Head-
7Ibid . 8-
Memorandum from S/Associate Administrator for Space 
Science and Applications to AD/Deputy Administrator, Subject: 
Considerations related to decision on a sixth Lunar Orbiter, 
July 14, 1967. 
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quarters had decided against a sixth Lunar Orbiter mission. 
However, he stated in his telegram to Floyd L. Thompson that 
a remote possibility for a reversal existed if the fifth 
mission failed. He requested Langley to proceed to phase 
out the program but to retain mission-peculiar test, launch, 
and flight operations equipment until it had completed the 
photo readout of Mission V. This retention did not apply to 
personnel, and Langley was to commence reassignment. 9 
Because Lunar Orbiter V succeeded beyond expectations 
in carrying out its mission objectives, its achievements 
proved that the cancellation of a sixth mission had been a 
prudent move. Moreover, the Apollo Program had virtually no 
need for the kind of data a sixth mission might have obtained; 
it would not have been decisive in mission planning. Indeed, 
at the Apollo Site Selection Board meeting on March 30, 1967, 
Apollo Program officials agreed that, "although further data 
from Lunar Orbiters D and E will be requested, the photography 
already received from Orbiters I, II, and III meets the 
minimal requirements of the Apollo Program for site survey for 
10 the first lunar landing." They arrived at this conclusion 
9Te1egram, priority, unclassified, from Lee R. Scherer, 
Manager Lunar Orbiter Program,to Langley Research Center, 
Attention: Dr. F. L. Thompson, Mr. E. C. Draley, Mr. C. H. 
Nelson, July 24, 1967. 
10 Memorandum from MA/Apol10 Program Director, Subject: 
Minutes of the Apollo Site Selection Board Meeting, March 30, 
1967, p. 5. 
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by detailed screenings of Lunar Orbiter data using the 
following steps: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Construct Lunar Module landing ellipses and radar 
approach templets from photo support data. 
Outline reject areas on medium resolution photo-
graphs. 
Scan remaining area where high-resolution coverage 
is also available. 
Select better ellipse locations with favorable 
radar approaches. Identify obstacles. 
Select best ellipse based on landing and radar 
obstacles, count craters, and compute 'N' number 
from medium-resolution photos. For most favorable 
sites continue evaluation with high-resolution 
photography. 
Evaluate ellipses on high-resolution photography 
and compute 'N' number.ll 
Apollo Mission Planning and Lunar Orbiter Data 
The Apollo Program was the primary user of Lunar 
Orbiter data in the months following each Orbiter mission 
and in the period between the final mission and the first 
manned landing on the Moon in 1969. The story behind the 
Apollo site selection activities is beyond the scope of 
this history, but a brief summary of Lunar Orbiter's part 
in Apollo mission planning will demonstrate the role that 
11 
Ibid., Attacbment--Steps in Lunar Orbiter Screening. 
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the Lunar Orbiter Program played in the Apollo Program as a 
result of cooperation between the Office of Space Science 
and Applications and the Office of Manned Space Flight. 
The Apollo Site Selection Board (ASSB) had begun its 
work at its first meeting on March 16, 1966. No Lunar 
Orbiter or Surveyor spacecraft had yet flown, and, therefore, 
all discussion of site selection requirements had depended 
upon Ranger and Earth-based telescopic photography. Lunar 
Orbiter would soon change Apollo Program thinking about 
landing sites. At the first ASSB meeting the members ident1-
fied a number of potential sites with the expectation that the 
sites finally chosen would be among them. 12 
By the following ASSB meeting Surveyor I had success-
fully landed on the Moon in Oceanus Procellarum, north of the 
crater Flamsteed. The first Lunar Orbiter mission, scheduled 
for early August, would attempt to photograph the Surveyor. 
Lunar Orbiter Program officials would adjust the positions of 
sites A-9 and A-lO to combine two blocks of photography for 
greater surface coverage of the area in which the unmanned 
spacecraft had touched down. In addition to this change in 
the first Lunar Orbiter mission, Norman Crabill and Thomas 
young of the Lunar Orbiter Project Office, Langley, on June 1 
12 
Memorandum from MA/Apollo Program Director, SUbject: 
Minutes of Apollo Site Selection Board Meeting, March 16, 
1966, document dated May 5, 1966. 
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presented the ASSB meeting recommendations for Lunar Orbiter 
Mission B. They believed that each Mission B site contained 
areas smooth enough to qualify as candidate Apollo sites. 
Finally the Apollo Program representatives, after reviewing 
the target sites for Lunar Orbiter Missions A and B, concluded 
that these sites would satisfy all known requirements for the 
Apollo missions if the surface of the Moon proved hospitable 
at each one. 13 
At the June 1 meeting Oran W. Nicks of OSSA asked 
Apollo Program people if they had any requirements for lunar 
landmarks which Orbiter could photograph. OWen E. Maynard of 
the Manned Spacecraft Center, who had presented the Apollo 
Site Selection Plan to the meeting, replied that the program 
had no plan at the time to use landmarks for updating orbits 
of the Apollo spacecraft. However, it would be desirable if 
such landmark sites could be located within a block of Orbiter 
photography containing a proposed Apollo landing site. 14 
By the December 15 ASSB meeting Lunar Orbiter I had 
obtained medium-resolution stereo photography of nine 
potential Apollo landing sites. Lunar Orbiter II had 
photographed thirteen potential sites in medium-resolution 
13 
Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Apollo Site 
Selection Board and the Surveyor/Orbiter Utilization Commit-
tee, June 1, 1966, document dated July 1, 1966, pp. 1-2. 
14 
Ibid., p. 3. 
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stereo and high-resolution monoscopic photography. Lawrence 
Rowan of the United States Geological Survey interpreted to 
those present the data of the lunar surface with respect to 
impact craters, volcanic fields, and mass wasting of the 
top layer of the Moon's soil. He made the following points 
in his talk: 
1. Older mare areas such as those in Lunar Orbiter II 
photographs of Site II p-6 do not nave the problem 
of crusts and lava tubes as young areas such as 
Site II P-2 most likely have. 
2. SUrveyor I photographs in Oceanus Procellarum 
eXhibit more surface rocks than are found in Sinus 
Medii and Mare Tranquillitatis, suggesting that it 
might be younger and have a thin surface layer. 
3. Slopes in older highland and smoothed mare craters, 
which show "patterned ground," may be unstable, 
with collapse or landslide dangers. 15 
Analysts for the Lunar Orbiter and Apollo Programs had 
chosen nine sites from Lunar Orbiter I photography and had 
applied Apollo site selection criteria in the effort to find 
Lunar Module landing areas. The December 15 ASSB meeting 
reviewed the results. Twenty-three areas proved large enough 
to contain a landing ellipse. These were undergoing further 
l5M1nutes of Apollo Site Selection Board, December 15, 
1966, document dated March 7, 1967. Site II p-6 is located in 
thg southwestern areaoof Mare Tranquillitatis (approximately 
23 east longitude, 2 north latitude). 'This site eventually 
became the Apollo 11 landing Site, Tranquility Base. Site II 
P-2 is located east of the crater MaskeAyne and northeast of 
the crater Censorinus (approximately 33 east longitude, 30 
north latitude). 
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study, and Apollo Program personnel evaluating them would 
make detailed crater counts of each during the next stage 
of selection. Following the preliminary analysis eight of 
16 the twenty-three areas merited special study. The process 
of screening the Lunar Orbiter data is given in the diagram 
on the next page. 
Landing site data determined from further analyses 
of Orbiter photography brought more confirmation that the 
Lunar Module design was correct and offered sufficient capa-
bility to land on the Moon. At a March 30, 1967, meeting of 
the ASSB, Donald C. Cheatham from the Manned Spacecraft Cen-
ter pOinted out that "the LM redesignation capability per-
mits a change of touchdown point of 10,000 feet crosstrack 
at high gate (90 feet per second delta V, command at 30,000 
feet down range). Visibility restrictions do not permit up-
range redesignation. Preliminary examination of the Lunar 
Orbiter photography indicate that this capability will be 
sufficient for crater avoidance.,,17 Already Lunar Orbiter 
had told Apollo mission planners much about the areas 
where they could and could not send a Lunar Module. 
16 
Ibid., Attachment G, Preliminary Landing Site 
Analysis Ol"Orbi ter I, p. 2. 
17Mlnutes of the Apollo Site Selection Board Meeting, 
March 30, 1967, document dated June 26, 1967, p. 1. 
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CONSTRUCT LM LANDING 
ELLIPSES AND RADAR 
APPROACH TEMPLET 
TO PHOTO SCALE 
INPUTS: 
SUPPORTING 
DATA PHOTOGRAPHS 
OUTLINE OBVIOUS 
REJECT AREAS 
DETERMINE CRITICAL 
CRATER DIAMETER 
EVALUATE & DOCUMENT: 1. OUTLINE SMOOTH AREAS LARGE 
ENOUGH FOR LM ELLIPSE WITH 
SMALL SLOPES AND GOOD RADAR 
APPROACH 
1. OUTLINE AND MEASURE REJECT 
AREAS IN LM ELLIPSES 
2. TRANSFER TO HIGH-RESOLUTION 
PHOTO 
1. STEERING COMMITTEE 
2. EVALUATE & NUMERICALLY 
RATE ELLIPSES 
3. COLLATE WITH GEOLOGIC 
SCREENING 
4. COLLATE WITH EXISTING 
PHOTO 
5. ASSIGN PRIORITIES 
2. MSC GROUPS PERFORMING DETAIL ANALYSIS 
3. DOD GROUPS FOR MAP PRODUCTS 
4. USGS FOR GEOLOGIC PRODUCTS 
5. ASSB 
Source: Minutes of the Apollo Site Selection Board Meeting, 
December 15, 1966, Attachment G, p. 3. 
PRELIMINARY SCREENING 
.!" 
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Finally, the December 15, 1967, meeting of the ASSE at 
Houston had the photographic data of all five Lunar Orbiters 
upon which to base its-Judgments. The major criteria for 
selection of the landing sites subsequently depended upon 
performance constraints of the Apollo spacecraft, particu-
larly the Lunar MOdule. 18 Lunar Orbiter had provided the 
photographic data which the Apollo Program had originally 
requested. Surveyor data continued to come in from three 
landed spacecraft in the Apollo zone of interest. Two more 
Surveyors would land in different areas of the Moon before 
that program concluded operations. Beyond this, Lunar Orbiter 
photography did not constitute a major basis for the final 
selection of Apollo landing sites. Selection had to depend 
upon performance constraints of the Lunar Module. At this 
point Lunar Orbiter had fulfIlled its primary mission for the 
Apollo Manned Lunar Landing Program. 
A year later, after the first Apollo mission to orbit 
the Moon, Apollo 8 Astronaut James A. Lovell, Jr., reported: 
••• the Lunar Orbiter photographs which we had on board 
were quite adequate. There was no problem at all in de-
termining objects, particularly on the near side of the 
moon. There are suitable landing sites. They are very 
easily distinguished. We could pick them up. We could 
work our way in. • • • The Lunar Orbiter photos again 
were helpful ••• to check the craters on the back side. 19 
l8Minutes of the Apollo Site Selection Board Meeting 
of December 15, 1967, document dated January 29, 1968. 
19Manned Spacecraft Center, Apollo 8 Technical Debrief-
ing, January 2, 1969, p. 34. 
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Results of Non-photographic Lunar Orbiter Experiments 
The m1crometeoroid experiments flown on all five Lunar 
Orbiter spacecraft provided measurements in the near-lunar 
environment of the rate of penetration by meteoroids of 0.025-
millimeter beryllium copper detectors. Each spacecraft carried 
twenty detectors, totaling an effective exposed area of 0.186 
square meter. The spacecraft flew both equatorial and polar 
orbits at altitudes ranging from 30 to 6,200 kilometers and 
collected data on micrometeoroid impacts for a period of 
seventeen months. 20 
A primary goal of the experiment was to obtain data 
for the purpose of comparing the meteoroid hazard near the Moon 
with that near the Earth. These data would aid the Apollo 
Program in the determination of the amount of protection 
necessary for the spacesuits, instruments, and spacecraft. 
Moreover, they would refine the estimates of the hazard in 
near-lunar environment which scientists had made and which 
ranged from somewhat less to greater by several orders of 
magnitude than the hazard near the Earth. A major uncertainty 
was the contribution of secondary meteoroids created by the 
impacts of primary meteoroids on the Moon. 
Before the Lunar Orbiter missions, only the Soviet 
lunar satellite Luna X had measured meteoroid flux near the 
Moon. The results of its experiment showed that the average 
20 Charles A. Gurtler and Gary W. Grew, "Meteoroid 
Hazard near Moon," Science, Vol. 161 (August 2, 1968), p. 462. 
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rate of flux of micrometeoroids exceeded the average for 
interplanetary space by about two orders of magnitude. 2l 
To arrive at the average rate of flux for the five Lunar 
Orbiter micrometeoroid experiments, the primary investi-
gators (Gurtler, Kinnard, and Grew) divided the total number 
of recorded punctures by the total time-area product. The 
five Orbiters recorded 22 punctures during a time-area ex-
posure of 139.0 square meters per day. These figurer gave 
an average rate of 0.16 puncture per square meter per day 
(m2 x day-2) in the near-lunar environment, or about one 
half the average rate of flux recorded by the Earth-orbiting 
satellites Explorer XVI and Explorer XXIII:22 
Exposure Punctures 
Spacecraft Punctures (m2 x day) (m-2 x day-I) 
Lunar Orb:tter I 
through V 22 139.0 0.16 
EX;Elorer XVI 44 132.9 .33 
Explorer XXIII 50 139.9 .36 
The investigators found by analysis of the 22 punctures 
of the micrometeoroid detectors, in relation to spacecraft 
positions at time of impact, that there was a preponderance 
of punctures on the side of the spacecraft facing forward in 
2lT• N. Nazarova, A. K. Rybakov, C. D. Komissarov, "In_ 
vestigation of solid interplanetary matter in the vicinity of 
the Moon," paper before 10th COSPAR meeting, London, July 1967. 
22 Gurtler "1d Grew, "Meteoroid Hazard near Moon," p. 463. 
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the orbital direction of movement around the Sun. This prepon-
derance agreed with Earth-based rr 1r observations cited by 
g. a Hawkins 23 and indicated that the influx of meteoroids 
on the side of Earth facing forwaI'd in orbit around the Sun 
was several times greater than influx on the opposite side. 24 
Preliminary estimates of the flux of secondary 
meteoroids near the Moon indicated that flux was greater 
nearer the lunar surface and dropped off sharply with 
increase in altitude. 25 Further study of the Lunar Orbiter 
data indicated no statistically significant variation of 
hazard with altitude. 
Gurtler and Grew conclude~ in the summary of their analysis 
of the micrometeoroid experiment dat~ that the penetration 
rates in the near-lunar environment as well as near the Earth 
should be accepted as being only tentative since the number 
of recorded penetrations was statistically small and the 
meteoroid flux near the Earth's orbit might vary from one 
measurement period to another. However, the data did indicate 
that the penetration hazard for 0.025 millimeter of beryllium 
copper was no greater near the Moon than near the Earth. Nor 
23G. S. Hawkins, Monthl) Notices of the Royal Astronomical 
Society, Vol. 116, No.1 (1956 , p. 92 
24 Gurtler and Grew, "Meteoroid Hazard near Moon," P. 463. 
25D. E. Gault, E. M. Shoemaker, and H. J. Moore, Frag-
ments Ejected from Lunar Surface by Meteoroid Impact Analyzed 
~~is.of _ ~~u?+i;~ !aft BYJ,?~~xel?:;~y Impact in Rock and Sand, 
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was there any substantial evidence that the hazard in the 
near-lunar environment increased as a result of secondary 
meteoroid impacts caused by primary impacts on the Moon.26 
The data obtained from the radiation experiments on 
board the five Lunar Orbiter spacecraft had significant 
implications for the Apollo Program. What would be the 
approximate doses of radiation experienced by astronauts in 
space suits? In the Lunar Module? In the Apollo Command 
Module? To obtain an answer, the primary investigator, Dr. 
Trutz Foelsche, analyzed the data recorded by the two cesium 
iodide (CsI) detectors in each of the five Orbiters. One of 
the two was shielded by 0.2 gram of aluminum per square centi-
meter, the other by 2.0 grams aluminum per square centimeter. 
Because of the higher absorption of protons and alpha-particles 
per gram per square centimeter ·in soft tissue or water, the 
doses recorded by the Lunar Orbiter dosimeters had to be multi-
plied by two. The analysis showed that all events recorded 
were of significance to a man in space only where shielding 
was light, specifically in a space suit or in the Lunar Mod-
ule.27 
The following table shows the skin doses that would be 
incurred in a space suit with shielding of 0.17 gram per square 
centimeter in the presence of three solar particle events.28 
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2tnurtler and Grew, "Meteoroid Hazard near Moon," p. 464. 
27Foelsche, "Radiation Measurements in LO I-V," p. 7. 
28 Ibid • 
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Event Date 
September 2, 1966 
January 28, 1967 
May 24/28, 1967 
Radiation Dosage 
270 rads in H20 
106 rads in H20 (24 rads 
behind 2 grams/cm2 shield-
ing) 
130 rads in H20 (Lunar 
Orbiter IV in high orbit) 
Foelsche noted, however, that the skin doses approached or 
even surpassed the suggested maximum permissable skin dose (MPD) 
for astronauts for short-term exposure even for the moderate 
rates above. See the table below. 29 
Types of Mission Suggested MPDs for Astronauts 
Eyes Blood-Formin~ Organs . Skin (rad) (rad (rad) 
Short Term 
(up to two weeks) 27 52 233 
Long Term 
(several months) 250 150 500 
--
~ 
In summary, the Lunar Orbiter radiation experiments 
contributed to four areas of scientific interest in addition 
29Ibid. 
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to monitoring the doses on the camera film. First, they 
allowed estimates to be made of the skin dose rates behind 
2 grams per square centimeter of shielding for astronauts 
passing through the Van Allen Belt. The estimates made 
from these data were based on an assumption of five passes 
through the belt in a one-year period. Second, the 
experiments contributed to information about the Moon's 
core. The weakness or absence of an intrinisic magnetic 
field of the Moon, which Explorer XXXV confirmed, indicated 
that the Moon has no extended liquid conducting core like that 
scientists accept for the Earth. 
Third, by comparing data of Pioneer V and VI (space-
craft that lagged behind or were ahead of the Earth 
while in orbit around the SUn) with Lunar Orbiter data, 
preliminary conclusions could be drawn concerning the 
spatial and lateral extensions and the intensities of solar 
particle flux during the 1966 and 1967 events. Finally, 
the experiments measured, by simulation, high skin doses in 
a light space suit near or on the Moon for the moderate size 
solar particle events of the August 1966 to August 1967 time 
span. From these data the inference could be made that in 
rare cases of large event groups, such as those of 1959 and 
1960, the Apollo astronauts might experience skin doses 
greater than 1,800 to 5,000 rads in one week, if no 
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precautions were taken. 30 
The radiation experiments produced data which 
confirmed that the design of the hardware that Apollo 
astronauts would use on their lunar missions beginning in 
1969 would protect them from average and greater than 
average short-term exposure to solar particle events. 
A Meaning for the Lunar Orbiter Achievements 
Doubtless much more can be said about the Lunar Orbiter 
Program and its relationship to Apollo. However, this must 
be the task of future historians of space exploration. It 
now remains for this author to draw his conclusions about 
the Lunar Orbiter Program. These are certainly preliminary, 
and any error must be attributed to the author. 
The Lunar Orbiter Program, like the Apollo Program, 
had unfolded in a politically charged atmosphere. The 
national commitment to land Americans on the Moon within the 
decade of the sixties imposed certain directions and a sense 
of urgency on the course which the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration took in both programs. It also 
placed certain limitations on unmanned exploration of the 
Moon. First, the Apollo Program provided Lunar Orbiter with 
its raison d'Stre. This meant that the Office of Space Science 
30 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
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and Applications undertook an engineering feat in 1963 
whose most immediate applications would directly support the 
obJectives -:Jf the Apollo Program, to design and bulld a 
system and a mission that could take men to the Moon and 
return them safely to Earth. Lunar Orbiter contributed 
significantly to Apollo mission design (the hardware 
been designed and built before the Lunar Orbiter mission 
operations began). In this it supplemented the pioneering 
work of Ranger and Surveyor. 
The American commitment for a manned lunar landing 
and the needs of Apollo eclipsed unmanned scientific ex-
ploration of the Moon during the sixties. The Office of 
Space Science and Applications thus also stood in the 
shadow of the Office of Manned Space Flight in lunar ex-
ploration. On the other hand, OMSF owed OSSA a debt of 
gratitude for the ground-breaking, precursory work that 
Ranger, Surveyor, and Lunar Orbiter did. Moreover, the 
highly successful Lunar Orbiter Program proved the role 
that unmanned, long-life orbiters could play in future 
space exploration. It is no coincidence that Langley 
Research Center, which directed the Lunar Orbiter Program, 
was in 1976 carryirg out- the operational phase of the Viking 
Mars program, with two Viking spacecraft on their way to 
orbit and land on Mars. Jet Propulsion Laboratory, the 
other major unit carrying out lunar and planetary explor-
ation programs (Ranger, Surveyor, Mariner), als was playing 
a key role in Viking. 
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American exploration of the Moon obtained space-proved 
systems to conduct specific observations and to gather precise 
data on the lunar environment, with or without men. But a1ter-
ing national priorities, government belt-tightening, and re-
duced NASA budgets foreclosed lunar exploration after the 
Apollo 17 landing in 1972, at least for this decade. 
The once ambitious unmanned lunar exploration program, 
Surveyor Orbiter, which would have carried a wide variety of 
scientific instruments and experiments to the Moon's environ-
ment much as the Soviet Luna and Zond spacecraft have,31 has 
not been attempted again. Perhaps it was too ambitious for 
its time; and the road taken to land men on the Moon proved 
politically more reassuring. 32 Certainly the five out of 
five successful missions of Lunar Orbiter and the desire to 
fly a sixth mission substantiated the philosophy within NASA 
that unmanned lunar probes served best when their objectives 
were simple, limited, and mutually supportive of each other 
and of manned exploration. 
Had the Office of Space Science and Applications di-
rected the five missions of Lunar Orbiter to conduct scientific 
31See Record of Unmanned Lunar Exploration Probes, 
Appendix C. 
32 John M. Logsdon gives a detailed and documented 
account of the decision-making process behind initia~ion of a 
manned lunar landing program in his book We Should Go to the 
Moon (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 
'I97U) • 
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investigations of the Moon, independently of Apollo, then 
most likely the missions would have been different. Mission 
IV might have been the first to fly. A total survey of the 
Moon would have allowed scientists to select the most inter-
esting sites for closer, more detailed photographic investi-
gations. Surveyor spacecraft might have landed elsewhere 
than they did, because of Lunar Orbiter data; and even Apollo 
might have flown significantly different missions. This, 
however, did not happen. 
If Lunar Orbiter had been totally independent of any 
manned exploration, much as the Mariner Mars spacecraft 
have been, then perhaps only part of the missions would 
have flown photographic payloads. Numerous experiments to 
analyze the Moon's environment existed or could have been 
designed to fly on an Orbiter, as they were flown on Explorer 
XXXV. Yet Lunar Orbiter could not have satisfied the poli-
commitments the United States had made as a result of the 
early Soviet thrust into space. In fact, Lunar Orbiter 
was inseparably bound to the goals of the American manned 
lunar exploration effort. 
The bond between Lunar Orbiter and Apollo fostered co-
operation between the Office of Space Science and Applications 
and the Office of Manned Space Flight, which otherwise might 
have developed more slowly and less affirmatively. This 
cooperation brought about a higher level of integrated acti-
vities among NASA centers far sooner than might have occurred 
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under different circumstances. The problems encountered 
in the Ranger and Surveyor Programs early in the sixties 
forced NASA Headquarters to search for other means of 
accomplishing the tasks of space exploration, leading it 
to delegate to the Langley Research Center a new area of 
responsibilities beyond its traditional role in research 
and development. In turn this move has broadened the 
agency's base for accomplishing ever more complex and 
sophisticated objectives in American space exploration. 
It would be unjust, however, to claim that without 
Lunar Orbiter photography, Apollo could never have flown 
so early or that America could not have landed on the Moon 
in 1969. Lunar Orbiter greatly illuminated Apollo's way, 
but it is highly conceivable that the Apollo Program could 
have flown one or more manned orbital photographic missions 
before planning a landing. No Orbiter data went into the 
design of th~ Apollo spacecraft system; and, indeed, the 
missions of Apollo 8 and 10 demonstrated the orbital capa-
bilities of the spacecraft. The main objective of these 
two missions was testing the systems and the mission design 
short of actual landing on the Moon. The photography by the 
astronauts on these missions was concentrated on landing 
sites. The Lunar Orbiter photography covered almost the en-
tire Moon and captured scenes of the lunar landscape under 
predetermined lighting conditions and at altitudes that 
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allowed Lunar Orbiter Program officials to obtain precise 
information about the landing sites, which the Apollo Pro-
gram had requested. Moreover, it obtained these data at a 
time when they proved most useful to Apollo mission design. 
Thus Lunar Orbiter saved Apollo time. It also saved 
money; the cost of one Apollo manned mission to the Moon 
was far higher than the total cost of the whole Lunar Or-
biter Program. Without Lunar Orbiter, NASA might have had 
to fly one or more manned orbital missions around the Moon 
to photograph potential landing sites before an actual 
manned landing mission. Lunar Orbiter also gave Apollo 
flight operations personnel experience in tracking five 
spacecraft in orbit around the Moon. It provided valuable 
data on the lunar gravitational environment and its effects 
on orbiting spacecraft. It aided the Surveyor Program in 
selecting landing sites and then it photographed the landed 
Surveyors. Lunar Orbiter V photography of the crater Tycho 
and its vicinity proved instrumental in the decision to 
land Surveyor VII north of Tycho in an area of high scienti-
fic interest but with topography greatly reducing the chances 
of a soft landing. Surveyor VII landed successfully and 
provided valuab.le data on an area of the Moon where astro-
nauts did not land. The teamwork of the Lunar Orbiter V 
and Surveyor VII missions demonstrated the value of un-
manned lunar exploration. 
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The successful achievements of Lunar Orbiter and 
Surveyor also had far-reaching implications for planetary 
exploration. The former director of the OSSA Office of 
Lunar and Planetary Programs, Oran W. Nicks (later Deputy 
Director of the Langley Research Center), outlined some 
of these implications in an address to the American Insti-
tute of Aeronautics and Astronautics on December 5, 1968. 
He stated that experience gained in the initial stages of 
unmanned lunar exploration would have direct applications 
in the exploration of the planet Mars in the seventies. 33 
Exploration of Mars at close range began in 1965 with 
the fly-by of Mariner IV. It provided man his first de-
tailed glimpse of the Martian surface; surprisingly its 
pictures revealed many craters, showing apparent similari-
ties to the Moon. In July and August 1969, Mariner VI 
and Mariner VII brought even closer views of the red planet 
when they flew by, taking pictures and measurements of the 
atmosphere and surface temperatures. Mariner IX went into 
orbit of Mars in November 1971 and in one year of observa-
tions changed scientists' views of the planet's weather and 
possible evolution. These spacecraft have opened many more 
areas of questioning than they have answered and, as a re-
suIt, the Viking Program would search for evidence of life 
330ran W. Nicks, "Applying Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter 
Techniques to Mars," address before the American Institute 
of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Washington, D.C., December 
5, 1968, pp. 10-11. 
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on Mars during 1976-1977. Although the weight and pay-
loads of the Viking Mars probes were to be substantially 
different from those of Lunar Orbiter, the spacecraft 
would profit from the Orbiter experience. The Viking 
Program at Langley and at JPL could use the knowledge 
gained from both Lunar Orbiter and Surveyor, although 
its goals required much more complex hardware and missions. 
The Viking Program's relationship to Lunar Orbiter 
demonstrates how the Office of Space Science and Applica-
tions successfully built on the cumulative knowledge gained 
in its programs in the previous fifteen years. Among other 
achievements, this work proved the Orbiter concept and the 
feasibility of landing an unmanned spacecraft on another 
celestial body. Viking could draw on an an increasing 
treasury of proved concepts in furthering the unmanned ex-
ploration of the solar system. It also would add to that 
treasury. Nicks summed up the meaning of this work in his 
address to the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astro-
nautics in December 1968: 
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Burning questions of immediate concern to you and 
me will be addressed by use of our new tools: "Is 
there life elsewhere? Has life existed op nearby 
planets and disappeared for any reason? Can nearby 
planets be made suitable for life?" 
Together, orbiters and landers form a powerful team 
for the study of Mars and for seeking answers to 
these questions. Together, they will continue to 
extend our capabilities in what is probably the most 
challenging, open-ended arena for expansl~n of sci-
ence and technology in the decade ahead. 3 
34Ibid., p. 12. 
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Men have now landed six times on the Moon and have 
returned with samples of its surface and subsurface materi-
also It still remains a mysterious body, its surface barely 
scratched; exploration of it has only begun. Mars, Venus, 
Mercury, and Jupiter have been studied by space probes and 
the other planets beckon men to pursue the quest for an 
answer to the origins of the Earth, the solar system, and, 
eventually, the universe. 
Two Lunar Orbiter photographs had especially far-reaching 
implications for the Earth's population. The first was the 
Earth-Moon picture made in August 1966 by Lunar Orbiter I. 
Nearly half of the Earth was shown, as well as a substantial 
portion of the Moon's cratered surface. 35 The second was 
the Lunar Orbiter V picture of the nearly full Earth, taken 
in August 1967 while the spacecraft was at apolune in its 
nearly polar orbit of the Moon.36 Both were unscheduled 
pictures, requiring extra planning to execute. Their suc-
cess proved the versatility of the Lunar Orbiter spacecraft 
and the skill of the flight operations personnel, bearing 
witness to America's technological ingenuity and imagination. 
35A detailed description of the Lunar Orbiter I Earth-
Moon photography is given in Lunar Orbiter I--photography, 
NASA CR-847, August 1967, pp. 64-71. 
36For details of the Lunar Orbiter V Earthphotograp~ 
refer to Lunar Orbiter v--photography, NASA CR-I094, June 
1968, pp. 140-141. 
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Yet both photographs were unrelated to the Apollo 
manned lunar landing missions. They came two years before 
the first landing. Although not the first pictures of the 
Earth from space, they were the first to show Earth at the 
distance of its nearest neighbor. 
To the historian they have perhaps a different mean-
ing than to the scientist. Men, it seems, have always been 
on one quest or another, using the Moon, the Sun, the planets 
and the stars in varying ways to explain their existence 
and their destiny. Half a millenium ago Europeans believed 
the Earth to be flat and the center of the universe. Then 
slowly men such as Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Newton 
altered the thinking about the universe. The old Aristotelian-
Ptolemaic concepts of physics and astronomy that had, in 
part, shaped medievial man's' thinking about his existence, 
dissolved in the new body of increasing empirical data on 
man's natural environment. Yet only yesterday were men 
able to see how finitely microscopic their home in space is. 
Man's technology has enabled him to escape the Earth, 
land on the Moon, and return. It also has silently, visually 
warned him that his only home, for the present, is the blue-
brown-white gem around which the cratered, desolate Moon 
revolves. 
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CHAPTER XII 
LUNAR ORBITER PHOTOGRAPHY 
The author selected the following pictures and their 
captions with the advice of Leon J. Kosofsky, former Lunar 
Orbiter program engineer, and Farouk El-Baz, formerly with 
Bellcomm, Inc., and now with the Smithsonian Institution. 
The selection offers a survey of the program's different 
phases. It does not constitute a scientific analysis of the 
Moon, but merely samples Lunar Orbiter photographic achieve-
ments. 
For more detailed, analytical sources, the reader may 
refer to Leon J. Kosofsky and Farouk El-Baz, The Moon as 
Viewed by Lunar Orbiter, NASA SP-200, 1970; and J. Kendrick 
Hughes and David E. Bowker, Lunar Orbiter Photographic Atlas 
of the Moon, NASA SP-206, 1971. 
The photographs of the Moon reproduced in this history 
do not represent the ultimate quality in Lunar Orbiter photog-
raphy. They have been made from negatives of an unknown genera-
tion and therefore their actual resolution is uncertain; lu-
nar Orbiter photos reconstituted from original data had known 
resolutions. NASA has enhanced Orbiter photography for appli-
cations at Langley-Research Center and in cooperation with 
the United States Geological Survey, U.S. Air Force Aeronauti-
cal Chart and Information Center, and Army Map Service. 
Responsibility for any errors in the brief descriptions 
accompanying these photos must rest solely with the author. 
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A. THE SPACECRAFT 
A Lunar Orbiter spacecraft in testing in NASA Hangar S Clean Room at Kennedy Space 
Center. The spacecraft was mounted on a three-axis test stand with its solar panels deployed. 
The one-meter-diameter high-gain dish antenna extended from the side of the Orbiter. 
/lrl , 
The spacecraft's main equipment deck and fuel tank deck held vital components. The back 
of the photographic system casing ("Bathtub") shows below the fuel tanks, and portions of the four 
solar panels that supplied power to the systems can be seen stretching from beneath the spacecraft. 
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The photographic system of Lunar Orbiter V undergoing tests at Cape Kennedy. Technological 
capability to compress all necessary components into an eggshell container with a total weight of 
less than 70 kilograms made the mission possible. The camera had two lenses: a wide-angle, medium-
resolution 80 mm Xenotar Schneider-Kreuznach manufactured in West Germany and a 610 mm 
high-resolution telephoto Panoramic manufactured by Pacific Optical Company. Both were adjustable 
to the same exposure times of 1/25, 1150, and 1/100 second. The Kodak special high-definition 
aerial film, Typ' 50-243, had a slow exposure index of ASA 1.6. It was extremely fine-grain film, 
requiring low shutter speeds, but was also less susceptible to radiation fogging. The lenses were 
protected by a quartz window and a metal door. 
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Close-up of the Eastman Kodak photographic system. The 610 mm F 5.6 
high-resolution lens (left) and the 80 mm F 2.8 medium-resolution lens (right) gave 
the Lunar Orbiter a dual-imaging capability - the ability to take two kinds of pictures 
simultaneously on the same film. 
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The processor of the photographic system included three drums. The drum at the upper left 
held the Kodak Bimat web (processing film). The Bimat, covered with a gelatin layer saturated with 
a photographic processing solution, was laminated with the exposed camera film on the small drum 
in the center. In 3.5 minutes it developed and fixed the film. Then it separated from the film and 
wound onto the spoked take-up reel to the right of the small drum. The camera film passed over 
the large drying drum at the bottom, where it dried in 11.5 minutes at 35° C before moving to readout. 
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B. MISSION OPERATIONS 
CD 
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The drawing outlines essential steps in a Lunar Orbiter mission following launch and transit 
to the Moon's vicinity. In step 1 the spacecraft fired its velocity control rocket to make a course 
correction. In step 2 the rocket fired again to deboost the spacecraft into its initial orbit of the 
Moon. Here its orbit was adjusted, and the first pictures were made (3) before the Orbiter changed 
orbital parameters (4) to assume an elliptical orbit that brought it closer to the lunar surface for 
further photographic coverage (5). 
r,} (. 
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Steps in the acquisition of photographic data by lunar Orbiter included transmission to 
Earth, readout, reconstruction, and reassembly for evaluation. 
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C. APOLLO SITE SURVEY 
PRIMARY SITE 2 - GOOD PRIMARY SITE 4 - POOR 
WORTHY OF FURTHER ANALYSIS 
4.7 MILES 
REJECTED 
LUNAR ORIlITER II APOLLO SITE SEARCH 
2300 FEET 
SEA OF TRANQUI LlTY 
ORBITER II RESULTS 
SURVEY OF POTENTIAL APOLLO LANDING SITES 
NASA 567-1997 
2-24-67 
Lunar Orbiter II photographed potential Apollo landing sites. 
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The top photograph is a Lunar Orbiter IV view of Apollo 17 landing region. Below, sites that 
Lunar Orbiter V photographed in August 1967 are plotted on a chart of the Moon's near side. Sites 
marked S were science and Surveyor sites. Sites marked A were for Apollo. Sites marked X were 
designated as being of interest for the Apollo Applications Program (the lunar exploration part of 
Apollo Applications was later cancelled). 
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D. LUNAR ORBITER PHOTOGRAPHS THE MOON 
A full view of the Moon photographed from the Lick Observatory. Mount Hamilton. California. The 
area outlined by the white square is the bright crater Tycho. Two Lunar Orbiter V photos of Tycho follow. 
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Lunar Orbiter V photographed the 90-kilometer-wide crater Tycho with the wide-angle medium-resolution lens 
(frame M-123) on August 15, 1967. The view looks almost vertically down onto the crater floor and reveals the central 
peak, a rough floor, and precipitous walls. The spacecraft was 206 kilometers above the surface of the Moon when 
this and the following photo were taken. 
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A high-resolution telephoto picture of part of the floor of the crater Tycho. The area shown is 11.2 by 
12.8 kilometers. Fractures, flow markings, and protruding domelike hills with exposed layers suggest a very 
young floor. The scarcity of smaller impact craters and absence of signs of erosion support the theory that 
Tycho is a young impact crater. 
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Copernicus viewed by the 3-meter reflector telescope at Lick Observatory, Mount Hamilton, 
California, appears as a bull's-eye in this picture. Lunar Orbiter views of this major landmark on 
the Moon's near side follow. 
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Lunar Orbiter II recorded this oblique view of the crater Copernicus while flying at 43.8 kilometers 
altitude, 240 kilometers due south of the crater. In the foreground is the "keyhole" crater Fauth, 20.8 
kilometers across and 1,372 meters deep. The southern rim of Copernicus is 42.8 kilometers north of 
Fauth. Copernicus is 96 kilometers in diameter and reaches a depth of 3,200 meters. The Deep Space 
Network at Goldstone, California, received this picture on November 28, 1966. 
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An enlargement of the preceding Copernicus photo shows mountains rising 300 meters from the crater floor. 
Cliffs 300 meters high on the crater rim reveal some downslope movement of material. The horizontal distance 
across the photograph is about 27.4 kilometers; distance from horizon to the base of the photograph is about 
240 kilometers. On the horizon are the Carpathian mountains with the 920-meter-high Gay-Lussac Promontory. 
~ 
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Lunar Oroiter II photographed a rock tield in the southeastern part ot Mare I ranqulilitatis with the 
610 mm high-resolution telephoto lens. This picture was enlarged five times from the original film on which 
the Orbiter photographic data was recorded on Earth. The 365-by 460-meter area is a portion of Site II P-2. 
Some of the larger rocks in the lower right-hand corner are 10 meters across. 
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The picture at the left shows the location of the 
Surveyor I landing site as deduced from horizon features 
photographed by "the Surveyor. Sites I and II seemed 
compatible with these features. The base map was USAF 
Aeronautical Charting and Information Center's Lunar 
Chart LAC 75. 
The three photos opposite, taken by Lunar Orbiter III 
February 22, 1967, enabled NASA to pinpoint the location 
of Surveyor I. The left photo is of the area north of the 
crater Flamsteed, where the Surveyor landed June 2, 1966. 
The black lines point to low mountains photographed by 
the Surveyor. The center photo is a vertical view of the 
area outlined in the black rectangle in the oblique picture 
to the left. The square in the center photo encloses the 
area of the Surveyor landing site that is pictured greatly 
enlarged at the right. The magnitude of the light reflected 
from Surveyor I, the long pointed shadow, and the triangulation 
of Orbiter and Surveyor photos confirmed this as the landed 
spacecraft. 
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Lunar Orbiter V photograpiled an area in the Vitello crater (south of Mare Humorum at 30.61° S 
latitude, 31.57° W longitude) on August 17, 1967. The enlarged portion of that high-resolution telephoto 
picture reveals two large "rolling stones," whose paths are clearly visible. The larger one near the center 
of the picture is about 23 meters across and has rolled or bounced some 274 meters. The smaller rock is 
4.6 meters across and has traveled 365 meters. Numerous boulder tracks in Orbiter pictures have told 
scientists much about the soil mechanics of the lunar surface, its cohesiveness and bearing strength, and 
the possibility of quakes as one cause of rock movement on the Moon. 
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From an altitude of only 56 kilometers Lunar Orbiter III photographed the crater Damoiseau and 
surrounding area in the southwestern part of Oc~anus Procellarum on February 22, 1967. The inner crater 
is 40 kilometers in diameter and the outer crater 56 kilometers. The crater resembles a geological phenomenon 
known on Earth as a caldera, a volcanic structure including an area of collapsed material. The contact between 
mare floor and upland areas is sharply defined here. Damoiseau was scheduled as Science site S-29 on the 
third Orbiter mission. The picture is from frame M-213. 
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Lunar Orbiter IV wide-angle frame 187, taken May 25,1967, at 2,720 kilometer altitude, recorded an 
enormous, complex feature on the lunar surface, the Orientale Basin. Centered at 89° W longitude, 15° S 
latitude, the gigantic circular basin measures 965 kilometers in diameter at its outer scarp. At this perimeter 
the Cordillera Mountains, ringing the basin, rise 6,100 meters and are the most massive on the Moon. Within 
the outer ring the Rook Mountains form another circular scarp about 640 kilometers in diameter. Surrounding 
this complex basin, a coarsely graded blanket extends another 965 kilometers over the older cratered surface. 
The freshness of the surface texture and sharpness of the mountain areas suggest that Orientale is among the 
youngest large circular basins on the Moon. If it and the surrounding scarps and blanket were formed by a 
meteorite impact, as seems possible, then a high-velocity body of asteroidal proportions struck the Moon 
with monumental force. 
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Lunar Orbiter I recorded this view of the Moon's heavily cratered far side in frame 116 on August 
24, 1966. The area shown here covers a rectangle 1,300 by 1,450 kilometers and is in the eastern portion 
of the far side just at the terminator as viewed from Earth. 
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On August 10, 1967, Lunar Orbiter V made this wide-angle westward-looking oblique photo of the 
elongated crater Messier and Messier A. These craters are at 47° E longitude, 2° S latitude on the floor of 
Mare Fecunditatis. A double ray from the pair of craters extends westward for about 160 kilometers. One 
interpretation for the peculiar shape of Messier and the rays is that they may have been produced by a low-
angle impact of a meteorite on the Moon. 
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Lunar Orbiter V telephoto frame 41 shows details of craters Messier and Messier A. 
Taken at an altitude of 97 kilometers, the picture reveals features on the floor of Messier, 
which is about 13 kilometers long, 10 kilometers wide, and 1,220 meters deep. Material 
ejected from the craters can be seen on the mare floor. Downslope movement of material 
in Messier shows some accumulation on the crater floor. Messier A is 13 kilometers across. 
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E. LUNAR ORBITER PHOTOGRAPHS THE EARTH 
The first Earth photograph by Lunar Orbiter I shows the cratered lunar horizon and the swirling 
cloud masses on Earth some 345,700 kilometers away. Taken August 23,1966, as the spacecraft was 
about to pass behind the Moon on its 16th orbit, the picture proved valuable to program scientists for 
what it showed of the lunar surface at an oblique rather than a vertical angle. The illuminated crescent 
of the Earth shows the U. S. East Coast in the upper left, southern Europe toward the night side of 
I=".th and Antarctica at the bottom of the crescent. 
J 
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On August 8,1967, Lunar Orbiter V took this photo of the nearly full Earth with the 610 mm lens. 
The exposure time was 1/100 second, which was insufficient to compensate for the Earth's high albedo 
(about 0.36 of 1.0). However, ground processing successfully compensated for overexposure. The sub-
solar point was just above and left of the Aral Sea, and the spacecraft's camera line of sight with Earth 
focused on a point slightly above and right of the Aral Sea. The angle between the subsolar point and 
the camera's line-of-sight axis intercept was 31.5°. The spacecraft was about 5,860 kilometers above 
the Moon in near polar orbit, so that the surface is not seen. The picture shows Italy, Greece, Turkey, 
the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, most of the African :continent, Madagascar, India, and Central Asia. 
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F. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
Dr. Floyd l. Thompson (above, left), Director of 
Langley Research Center at the time of the Lunar Orbiter 
Program, and Capt. Lee R. Scherer, Lunar Orbiter Program 
Manager at NASA Headquarters, discussed final mission 
results October 17,1967. Behind them is a partial mosaic 
of the Moon's surface made from Lunar Orbiter photos. 
Kneeling on the "Moon" (left) Langley Lunar Orbiter 
Project Manager Clifford H. Nelson examined a section 
of the 1-meter-square mosaic of 127 Lunar Orbiter IV 
photos. The U. S. Army Map Service assembled the mosaic 
for Langley Research Center. 
(\ c~-, 
Oran W. Nicks (above, left), NASA Director of Lunar and Planetary Programs, and 
Robert J. Helberg, Boeing's Orbiter Program Manager, watched thermal shroud fittings in 
1965. Below, the mission monitoring group during Lunar Orbiter II's November 1966 
mission included NASA Program Director Scherer (standing at left) and (left to right) 
Neil A. Holmberg, A. Thomas Young, Uriel M. Lovelace, Leon J. Kosofsky, Joseph Brenkle 
(standing), Dr. Thor Karlstwm, and Gerald W. Brewer. 
359 
~('\ ( 
.. ~ t!. 
360 
~ 
Israel Taback (center), Lunar Orbiter Spacecraft Manager from Langley 
Research Center, examined a reconstructed photograph from Lunar Orbiter II 
with John B. Graham of Operations Integration (right). Picture data from the 
spacecraft were received at the Deep Space Network Tracking Station at Goldstone, 
California, and routed to photographic ground reconstruction equipment at the 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory's Space Flight Operations Center in Pasadena. 
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Appendix A 
GLOSSARY 
albedo -- The ratio of the amount of electromagnetic radia-
tion reflected by a body to the amount incident upon 
it. This concept is identical with reflectance but 
should be distinguished from spectral reflectance. 
anomaly -- In general, a deviation from the norm, an 
irregularity, a malfunction. 
apolune -- That point in a lunar-centric orbit which is 
most distant from the Moon. 
Bimat web -- The continuous processing film used in the 
Lunar Orbiter photographic subsystem to process the 
camera film. 
deboost -- A velocity control engine burn to allow a space-
craft to decelerate and go into orbit around a plane-
tary body, or to leave an orbit and descend to a land-
ing on that body. 
delta V -- A change in velocity. 
flux -- The rate of flow of some quantity, often used in 
reference to the flow of some form of energy. 
gimbal -- A device with two mutually perpendicular and 
intersecting axes of rotation. It provides free 
angular movement in two directions and serves as 
an engine mount. 
Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) -- The local mean time at the 
Greenwich, Eng1an~meridian. Some of the Lunar 
Orbiter post-launch operations reports used the 
local time at the Kennedy Space Center, expressed 
either in Eastern Standard Time (EST, 5 hours behind 
GMT) or Eastern Daylight Time (EDT, 4 hours behind 
GMT), depending on the time of year when a launch 
took place. 
ground resolution -- The degree to which an optical or photo-
graphic system can reproduce fine detail of the surface 
being imaged, a·s measured against a photographic scale. 
It is the product of a combination of capabilities of the 
film (graininess, sensitivity, etc.) and the lens (type, 
resolving power, etc.) and is usually expressed in line 
pairs per millimeter. Photographic scale is found by 
dividing the altitude at which the picture is taken by 
the focal length of the camera. For Lunar Orbiter, the 
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effective film resolution was 76 line pairs per milli-
meter, which gave I-meter resolution through the 610 mm 
lens and 8-meter resolution through the 80 mm lens under 
predetermined contrast conditions on the lunar surface. 
hypergolic -- A term used to describe propellants that ignite 
spontaneously on contact with an oxidizer; a self-igniting 
fuel, propellant, or propulsion system. 
launch window -- The postulated opening in a continuum of time 
or space through which a spacecraft must be launched to 
achieve a desired encounter, rendezvous, or impact. 
noise level -- The level of any undesired disturbance within 
a useful frequency band. 
nominal -- Occurring or performing as intended in pre-mission 
planning. 
oxidizer -- A substance that combines with another to produce 
heat and, in a rocket, hot gases of c9mbustion thrust. 
parking orbit -- A temporary orbit in which a vehicle coasts 
before transfer into final orbit or trajectory. 
perilune -- The point in a lunar-centric orbit which is closest 
to the Moon. 
pitch -- An angular movement (of a spacecraft) about an axis 
parallel to the lateral axis of the vehicle. 
roll -- The rotational or oscillatory movement of a spacecraft 
or similar b09Y about a longitudinal axis through the 
spacecraft. 
software -- (Computer) programs and formulation of programs. 
yaw -- The rotational or oscillatory movement of a spacecraft 
or the like about a vertical axis. 
Sources: Charles McLaughlin, Space Age Dictionary (Prince-
ton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1959). William H. Allen, ed., 
Dictiona of Technical Terms for Aeros ace Use, NASA SP-7 
Washington, D.C.: G , 1 5. J. L. Nayer, A 'Dictiona~ of 
Astronautics (New York: Hart Publishing Co., 1964~ Wood~ra 
A. Heflin, ed., The United States Air Force Dictionary (Air 
University Press, 1956). 
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APPENDIX B 
ORGANIZATION CHARTS 
NASA HEADQUARTERS LUNAR ORBITER PROGRAM ORGANIZATION 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
HEADQUARTERS, Washington, D.C. 
Administrator: James E. Webb 
Deputy Admin.: Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr. 
....-
....-. 
....... 
OFFICE OF SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 
Associate Administrator: Dr. Homer E. Newell 
Deputy Assoc. Admin.: Edgar M. Cortright 
OFFICE OF LUNAR AND PLANETARY PROGRAMS 
Director: Oran W. Nicks 
LUNAR ORBITER PROGRAM OFFICE 
Program Manager: Lee R. Scherer 
Program Engineers: Leon J. Kosofsky 
Kenneth L. Wadlin 
Program Scientist: Dr. Martin J. Swetnick 
LAUNCH VEHICLE AND PROPULSION PROGRAMS 
Director: Vince Johnson 
AGENA PROGRAM OFFICE 
Director: Joseph B. Mahon 
OFFICE OF TRACKING AND DATA ACQUISITION 
Director: Edmond C. Buckley 
NETWORK SUPPORT PLANNING OFFICE, 
LUNAR AND PLANETARY 
Chief of Lunar Orbiter Planning: Clarence P. Wilson 
f.) C 
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LUNAR ORBITER PROJECT 
PROJECT MANAGER 
C.H. Nelson 
ASSISTANT PROJECT MANAGE R 
J.S. Martin 
fLR~;~~T~ r--l Dr. S. KatzoK 
10- --1 LRC DIVISION I I Rodio';on- "'. T. Fool",1>o r ----- --- SUPPORT 
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. L __ -.l ~ .. nodesy - W.H. Michael .J 
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SPACECRAFT OPERATIONS r:EEP SPACE NET 1 I LAUNCH VEHICLE I 
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COMMUNICATIONS SPACECRAFT LAUNCH FLIGHT OPERATIONS ASSEMBLY AND PHOTO POWEF. SUBSYSTEM OPERATIONS OPERATIONS INTEGRATION INTEGRATION SUBSYSTEM SUBSYSTEM 
e.A. Brummer D.H. Ward D.O. Webb J.B. Graham W.I. WatlOn G.C. BraD ... J.E. Harri, R.D.Smith W.H. r ;~rrest R.R. Peterson D.C. Spence C.S.Child, .. C.D. Eng .. C.H.Green E.B .... llJrnner J.D. Timmons l.J. DeRyder M.E. Ebbb J.e. Moorman J.K. Hughes G.R. Egan U.M. Lovelace A.L. N~CDmb W. T. Bundick G.E. Migneault 
_l_ R.W. Mixon R.A. Schiff 
r7'ANGLEY MISSIONl 
W.R. Sanborn 
P.M. Siemers 
I I I SUPPORT OFFICE I IKSCI 
VELOCITY AND ATTITUDE SPACECRAFT THERMAL, STRUCTURE AND L G.H. Sm;.h J 
CONTROL SUBSYSTEM TESTING MECHANISMS SUBSYSTEM 
------R.H. Sproull I.W. R • ."..y T.W.E. H.nkinson D.J. Cuter J.B. H.n I.W. R.msllY A.D. Averill K.H. Rhodes 
R.O.Suib H.F. Willi.ms 
•... , H.lo Smith 
R.A. RUSS811 
J. Thomson 
J.T. Anderson 
I .( I I 
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I I I 1 
COMMUNICATIONS MISSION MISSION DATA HANDLING SPACE VEHICLE TECHNICAL LOPO RESIDENT FUNDING AND AND TR4CKING ASSURANCE INTEGRATION SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION ENGINEER AT TeC SCHEDULES I.G. ReCllnt 
G.W. Brewer N.L. Cubill H.N. Silvers R.lo GiroU8rd T.H. Elder K.lo Wadlin F.E. _Ip."nings E.A. Brum ... r M.J.Pilny W.l. MilyO T.P, H8nsen J.B. Lown F.E. Jennings loP.Onpit A.T. Young G.R. Taylor R. Oon Smith 
L.....---._._ 
G.F. L.WI'ence R.D.Collte J.Y. Taylor I , ! 
DOD SUPPORT ~-~-~ SPECIAL r-""'--, ASSIGNMENTS W.lo Er.,i 
J.L.MiI"r I US.GS. I T.N. ~rtron EA. GurglnUi 
J.D. Perdue Or, L.C. Row.n 
W.R. o.Sh.zor L ___ J 
LANGLEY LUNAR ORBITER PROJECT OFFICE FUNCTIONAL ST AFF ORGANIZA nON 
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LRC 
DIR. 
LOPO 
MGR. 
NASA 
AQMINISTRATOR 
I 
MISSION 
SYS.INT. 
ASSOC. 
ADMIN. 
LERC 
DIR. 
LN 
JPL 
DIR. 
VEH. & SIC SUP. 
AGENAOPNS. 
*The key to this chart is on the next page. 
Source: Project Development Plan, lunar Orbiter Project. Project No. 814-00-00, 
December 10, 1964, Revised June 10, 1966, prepared by the langley 
Research Center, langley Station, Hampton, Virginia, p. V-3. 
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OVERALL PROJECT MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION FOR LUNAR ORBITER* 
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Key to Overall Project Management Chart 
NASA Administrator: James E. Webb 
Assoc. Admin.: Dr~ Robert C. Seamans, Jr. 
OART: Office of Advanced Research and Technology 
OSSA: Office of Space Science and Applications 
OTDA: Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition 
OMSF: Office of Manned Space Flight 
OLPP: Office of Lunar and Planetary Programs 
LOPO: Lunar Orbiter Program Office 
LRC: 
LeRC: 
JPL: 
KSC: 
Langley Research Center 
Lewis Research Center 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Kennedy Space Center 
LOPO: Lunar Orbiter Project Office, Manager 
Mission Sys. Int.: Mission Systems Integration 
sic Mgr. LRC: Spacecraft Manager, Langley Research Center 
~V Mgr. LeRC: Launch Vehicle Manager, Lewis Research 
Center 
Opn1s Mgr. LRC: Operations Manager, Langley Research 
Center . 
DSN Mgr. JPL: Deep Space Network Manager, Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory 
Boeing: The Boeing Company, Seattle, Washington 
L/V: Launch Vehicle 
sic: Spacecraft 
ULO: Unmanned Launch Operations 
DSIF Sites: Deep Space Instrumentation Facility Sites 
SFOF: Space Flight Operations Facility 
RCA: Radio Corporation of America, Princeton, N.J. 
Eastman Kodak: Rochester, N.Y. 
AF SSD: Air Force Support Services Division 
Veh. & SIc Sup. Vehicle and Spacecraft Support 
Agena Opns.: Agena Operations 
Range Opns.: Range Operations 
LMSC Agena: Lockheed Missiles and Space Company 
GD/C Launch: General Dynamics, Convair Division 
GE: General Electric 
Burroughs: subcontractor 
Rocketdyne: subcontractor 
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Appendix C 
RECORD OF UNMANNED LUNAR PROBES, 1958-1968 
~, 
I. United StatefJ 
Launch Date Launch Launch Spacecraft 
Probe (local time) Site Vehicle Weight 
(kg) 
Mission Results 
Pioneer I Oct. 11, 1958 ETR Thor-Able 38 Reached l13,783-km altitude 
before disintegrating in 
Earth's atmosphete Oct. 12; 
insufficient final velocity. 
Pioneer III Dec. 6, 1958 ETR Juno II 6 Reached 102,322-km altitude 
before disintegrating in 
Earth's atmosphere Dec. 7; 
insufficient final velocity. 
Pioneer IV Mar. 3, 1959 ETR Juno II 6 Passed within 60,000 km of 
Moon and went into solar 
orbit. 
Ranger I Aug. 23, 1961 ETR Atlas-Agena B 306 Disintegrated Aug. 30 on 
failure to achieve intended 
Earth orbit. Orbit too low. 
Ranger II Nov. 18, 1961 ETR Atlal?-Agena B 306 Disintegrated Nov. 18 after 
failing to achieve Earth 
i~ orbit. 
w Ranger III Jan. 26, 1962 ETR Atlas-Agena B 330 Missed Moon by 36,790 km; 
'" 
went into solar orbit. 
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0'\ Launch Date Launch Launch Spacecraft CO 
Probe (local time) Site Vehicle Weight Mission Results 
(kg) 
Ranger IV Apr. 23, 1962 ETR Atlas-Agena B 331 Mission unsuccessful because 
camera equipment failed to 
function; faulty programmer. 
First u. S. spacecraft to hit 
Moon. 
Ranger V Oct. 18, 1962 ETR Atlas-Agena B 342 Mid-course correction failed; 
spacecraft missed Moon by 720 
km, went into solar orbit. 
Ranger VI Jan. 30, 1964 ETR Atlas-Agena B 365 Precise lunar impact. Photo-
graphic mission unsuccessful 
because premature turn-on 
caused camera failure. 
Ranger VII JuI. 28, 1964 ETR Atlas-Agena B 366 Successfully sent back 4,316 
high-resolution TV photos dur-
ing last 13 min of flight be-
fore precise impact on Moon. 
Ranger VIII Feb. 17, 1965 ETR Atlas-Agena B 367 Transmitted 7,137 close-up TV 
photos of Moon before precise 
impact in Sea of Tranquility. 
Ranger IX Mar. 21, 1965 ETR Atlas-Agena B 367 Transmitted 5,814 TV photos be-
t ~ fore precise impact in crater 
Alphonsus. First high-resolu-
tion photos of lunar crater. 
Surveyor I May 30, 1966 ETR Atlas-Centaur 270 Softlanded on Moon; transmitted 
11,237 TV photos in 13 days; 
survived one lunar night. 
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Probe 
Launch Date 
(local time) 
Explorer XXXIII Jul. 1, 1966 
(IMP-D) 
Lunar Orbiter I Aug. 10, 1966 
Surveyor II Sep. 20, 1966 
Lunar 
Orbiter II 
Lunar 
Orbiter III 
Surveyor III 
Lunar 
Orbiter IV 
; 
Nov. 6, 1966 
Feb. 4, 1967 
Apr. 17, 1967 
May 4, 1967 
Launch 
Site 
ETR 
ETR 
ETR 
ETR 
ETR 
ETR 
ETR 
Launch 
Vehicle 
Thrust-augmented 
Thor-Delta 
Atlas-Agena D 
Atlas-Centaur 
Atlas-Agena D 
Atlas-Agena D 
Atlas-Centaur 
Atlas-Agena D 
Spacecraft 
Weight 
(kg) 
93 
386 
270 
385 
386 
281 
386 
Mission Results 
Failed to achieve lunar or-
bit because of launch errors; 
remained in Earth orbit. 
Entered lunar orbit Aug. 14. 
Photographed Moon until Aug. 
29, photographing all 9 pri-
mary and 7 potential Apollo 
sites, 11 areas on far side. 
Impacted Moon Oct. 29, 1966. 
Vernier failed. Spacecraft 
crashed on Moon SE of crater 
Copernicus. 
Returned 205 lunar frames, in-
cluding 13 primary and 17 second-
ary Apollo sites. Impacted sur-
face of Moon Oct. 11, 1967. 
Photographed Surveyor I on Moon. 
Returned 182 lunar frames. Im-
pacted Moon Oct. 9', 1967. 
Softlanded on Moon Apr. 19; soil 
sampler, photo experiments until 
May 3, 1967. Took 6,315 photos. 
Returned 163 frames; impacted 
Moon Oct. 6, 1967. 
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Probe 
Surveyor IV 
Launch Date 
(local time) 
JuI. 14, 1967 
Lunar Orbiter V Aug. 1, 1967 
Surveyor V Sep. 8, 1967 
Surveyor VI Nov. 7, 1967 
Surveyor VII Jan. 7, 1968 
Launch 
Site 
ETR 
ETR 
ETR 
ETR 
ETR 
Launch 
Vehicle 
Atlas-Centaur 
Atlas-Agena D 
Atlas-Centaur 
Atlas-Centaur 
Atlas-Centaur 
Spacecraft 
Weight 
(kg) 
281 
386 
281 
282 
290 
Mission Results 
Signal lost 2.5 min before land-
ing on Moon July 17. 
Last mission of Lunar Orbiter 
photo-mapping program. Re-
turned 212 frames; photographed 
23 new sites on far side, 1st, 
"full eart:h" view,-36-scienti-
fic sites, 5 Apollo sites. Im-
pacted Moon Jan. 31, 1968. 
Soft landed on Moon Sep. 10. Re-
turned over 19,000 photos, soil 
analysis data. 
Softlanded on Moon Nov. 9. Per-
formed 1st rocket liftoff from 
lunar surface, moving 2.5 m. 
Analyzed soil 27 hrs. Transmit-
ted 30,065 TV photos. 
Soft landed on Moon Jan. 10. 
Transmitted over 21,000 TV photos. 
Analyzed soil and dug trench. 
Photographed Earth and Jupiter. 
Surveyor program ended with 5th 
success in 7 tries. 
w;; 
.. " 
II. Soviet Union 
Launch Date Launch Launch Spacecraft 
Probe (local time) Site Vehicle Weight Mission Results 
(kg) 
Luna I Jan. 2, 1959 Tyuratam A-I 361 Passed within 6,000 km of 
Moon; went into solar orbit. 
Luna II Sep: 12, 1959 Tyuratam A-I 390 Struck Moon Sep. 13; 1st man-
made device to reach another 
celestial body. 
Luna III Oct. 4, 1959 Tyuratam A-I 435 Recorded lst'photographic data 
on Moon's far side. Reentered 
Earth's atmosphere Apr. 20, 1960. 
Luna IV Apr. 2, 1963 TyurOatam A-2-e 1,422 Passed within 8,500 km of lunar 
surface. 
Luna V May 9, 1965 Tyuratam A-2-e 1,476 Struck lunar surface in unsuc-
cessful softlanding attempt 
May 12. 
Luna VI Jun. 8, 1965 Tyuratam A-2-e 1,442 Intended for softlanding; missed 
Moon by 160,000 km, went into 
solar orbit. 
Zond III Jul. 18, 1965 Tyuratam A-2-e 960 Flew by Moon and sent back 
t ... 
photographic data; went into 
solar orbit. 
Luna VII Oct. 4, 1965 Tyuratam A-2-e 1,506 Intended for lunar soft landing. 
UJ Retrorockets fired prematurely, 
-.;J 
I-' causing impact on Moon Oct. 7. 
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~ Launch Date Launch Launch Spacecraft I\) 
Probe (local time) Site Vehicle Weight Mission Results 
(kg) 
Luna VIII Dec. 3, 1965 Tyuratam A-2-e 1,552 Intended for lunar soft landing. 
Retrorockets fired late, causing 
spacecraft to impact Moon Dec. 7. 
Luna IX Jan. 31, 1966 Tyuratam A-2-e 1,583 First spacecraft to soft land on 
Moon (Feb. 3) and transmit TV 
pictures of landing site to Earth. 
Luna X Mar. 31, 1966 Tyuratam A-2-e 1,600 First spacecraft to orbit Moon. 
Studied micrometeoroid flux, lu-
nar environment until May 30, 
1966. 
Luna XI Aug. 24, 1966 Tyuratam A-2-e 1,640 Entered lunar orbit Aug. 27. 
Sent back data until Oct. 1, 
1966. 
Luna XII Oct. 22, 1966 Tyuratam A-2-e 1,670? Entered lunar orbit Oct. 25. 
Studied radiation, transmitted 
photos of lunar surface. 
Luna XIII Dec. 21, 1966 Tyuratam A-2-e 1,670? Softlpnded on Moon Dec. 24. 
Tested hardness of lunar sur-
face, photographed lunar pano-
rama. 
i r 
Luna XIV Apr. 7, 1968 Tyuratam A-2-e 1,670? Entered lunar orbit Apr. 10. 
Studied Earth-Moon mass rela-
tionships, Moon's gravitational 
field; no photos returned. 
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UJ 
Probe 
Zond V 
Zond VI 
r 
Launch Date 
(local time) 
Sep. 15, 1968 
Nov. 10, 1968 
Launch Launch 
Site Vehicle 
Tyuratam D-1-e 
Tyuratam D-1-e 
Spacecraft 
Weight 
(kg) 
4,820 
4,820 
Mission Results 
First lunar f1yaround, return, 
and recovery. Carried biolo-
gical specimens, photographed 
Earth. Returned to Earth Sep. 
21, 1968; was recovered from 
Indian Ocean. 
Second unmanned circumlunar 
flight and recovery. Carried 
biological specimens, camera. 
Landed in U.S.S.R. Nov. 17 
after double-dip glide reentry, 
aerodynamic lift for decelera-
tion. 
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, D.C. 
Kosofsky, Leon J., Lunar Orbiter Program engineer, 
Office of Space Science and Applications, July 5, 1967. 
Liddel, Dr. Urner, SpeCial Assistant, Office of Space 
Science and Applications, July 14, 1969. 
Newell, Dr. Homer E., NASA Associate Administrator for 
Space Science and Applications, August 24, 1967. 
Nicks, Oran W., Director of Lunar and Planetary Pro-
grams, Office of Space Science and Applications, 
August 14, 1967. 
Scherer, Capt. Lee R., Lunar Orbiter Program Manager, 
Office of Space Science and Applications, July 31, 
1967 (en route to Cape Kennedy, Florida, from Orlando, 
Florida, for Lunar Orbiter V launch); August 14, 1967. 
Thompson, Dr. Floyd L., former Director of Langley 
Research Center, January 29, 1970. 
Lunar Orbiter Project Office, Langley Research Center, 
Langley Station, Hampton, Virginia. 
Brewer, Gerald W., Lunar Orbiter Mission Assurance, 
July 18, 1967; July 7, 1970. 
Broome, G. Calvin, Photo Subsystem Manager, July 19, 
1967. 
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Elder, Theodore H., Technical Administration, July 18, 
1967. 
Foelsche, Dr. Trutz, Aeronautical and Space Mechanics 
Division, July 7, 1970. 
Girouard, Robert L., Space Vehicle System, July 18, 
1967. 
Graham, John B., Operations Integration, July 19, 1967. 
Katzoff, Dr. Samuel, Chairman of Lunar Orbiter Advisory 
Group, telephone interview, August 24, 1967. 
Martin, James S., Jr., former Assistant Lunar Orbiter 
Project Manager (later Project Manager, Viking Project), 
recorded interview, July 7, 1970. 
Nelson, Clifford H., Lunar Orbiter Project Manager, 
July 20, 1967. 
Recant, Isadore G., Data Handling, July 20, 1967. 
Taback, Israel, Lunar Orbiter Spacecraft Manager, July 7, 
1970. 
Young, A. Thomas, Mission Integration, July 21, 1967. 
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VI. ADDITIONAL READING 
This section consists of annotated references selected by the 
author to give a cross-section of information on the Lunar Orbiter 
spacecraft, ita mission, and lunar scientific exploration fram 1961 
to 1969. Mmy mre articles and publications about these subjects 
exist. However, the author has selected these because most of them 
pertain to data acquired from the five Lunar Orbiter missions. The 
list is intended to give the reader a general sUrvey of hypotheses, 
theories, and arguments about the origins, the nature, and the surface 
features of the )bon which Lunar Orbiter has helped to uncover. It 
is hoped that this Will arouse the reader's curiosity to investigate 
the realm of lunar sciences and exploration further. 
Adler, J. E. M., and J. W. Salisbury. "Behavior of water in Vacuum: Im-
plications for 'Lunar Rivers, ,11 Science, Vol. 164 (May 2, 
1969 ) , p. 589. 
The investigators conducted laboratory experiments using 
soils With grain sizes ranging from 0 to 125 microns and 
gravels ranging tram 2 to 4 millimeters With gradations and 
layering. Tests were run under air and vacuum conc1itions to 
determine behavior of water at various flow rates and tem-
perature levels on test soils. Results showed tha~ in the 
presence of ai; water formed terrestrial-like stream chan-
nels. In a vacuum at freezing temperatures water formed 
dendritic ice Jl8sses and contiuued to flow under the ice, 
frequently penetrating to the surface and freezing. Water 
then sublimated, lea.Ying a hUllllllOcky surface. So_ soU 
downslope DIOveJRent occurred, but no stream channels daTel-
oped. Results show that ice Will reacUl.y form in a vacuum 
to a thickness which allows liquicl water to exist under it. 
lobdel streams produced in a vacuum did not erode rille-like 
channels. Results support Lingenfelter's predictions (Sci-
.!!!£!, Vol. 161, p. 266). -
A.l.f'ven, H. "Origin of the )i)on," Science, Vol. 148 (April 23, 1965), pp. 
476-4;r. 
There is a -.lor implication in the _theuatical calcu-
lations of the )t)on' s. orbit as rechecked and improved by H. 
Gerstenkorn. About one billion years ago the )bon, a sep-
arate planet orbiting the Sun, passed very close to Earth. 
Both bodies continued to attract each other until the ltbon 
as8Ull8d a retrograde orbit about the rapidly &pi 001 ng Earth. 
The Moon moved within· the Roche l1a1 t in a polar orbit around 
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Earth, causing part of the lunar surface to break alf8.y and 
bombard Earth. Following this the Moon began to recede from 
Earth until it came to occupy its present orbit. Loosened 
materiaJ.s fell back on the bk>on as meteors, making major cra-
ters. Geological investigations might substantiate Gersten-
korn I s theory. 
Allen, D. A., and E. P. Ney. "Lunar TherD81 AnoIl8lies: Infrared Obser-
vations," Science, Vol. 164 (April 25, 1969). 
Infrared observations of the MOon in the 8- to l4-micron 
atmo~heric window have delineated macroscopic lunar surface 
thermal behavior. Shorthill has discovered further lunar 
thermal anomalies. The craters Aristarchus, Copernicus, and 
Tycho cool much less rapi~ than surrounding areas during 
eclipse. The observations I18de by the authors have not de-
termined the geometric scale of the structure of' hot and 
cold regions. Surface rocks in these areas may be responsi-
ble for the less rapid cooling rates because they are prob-
ably therD8lly connected to a subsurface temperature of 200 
degrees Kelvin. 
Bailey, Nol"JDB.D G. Cinder Iake Crater Field Location Test. Un! ted States 
Geological Survey Interagency Report: Astrogeology 2, No-
vember 1967. 
This report describes the use of' Luna.r Orbiter II photo-
graphs in conducting a test in which the subjects were re-
quired to fix the location of a Lunar lebdule -in a simulated 
crater field near U. S. route 89, northeast of' Flagstaff, 
Arizona. 
Baldwin, Ralph B. ItLunar )i:Lscons: Another InterpreTAtion~ II Science, 
Vol. 162 (December 20, 1968), pp. 1407-1408. 
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The author questions the survivability of an impacting 
body. He postulates tbat 1) craters formed by im:pacting 
events are dry, not lava-filled, 2) isostatic distortions 
occurred, but bef'ore this was complete, lava appeared from 
the body of' the lebon and selectively filled the lower areas. 
This lava was denser than surrounding rock;, which presumably 
could bave been more acidic, and 3) tension cracks (rilles) 
and compression fractures (wrinkle ridges) shoy tbat later 
subsidence and compression bas occurred. ThUB far only the 
dense material centered in craters and capable of yielding 
gravitational effects bas been measured. 
II , 
~ 
The BoeiDg ec.pa.n;y. Final Report OIl A st1!il of the Lunar Orbiter Re-
~ Its Adaptabil1 ty to Surface Experiments vtil1ziy; 
a Fg-by and Earth-Return Trajectory. October 6, 1966, pre-
pared for NASA Langley Research Center. 
This report outlines the necessar,r requ1rellllleDts and COD-
straints which would bave to be met in· order to put a Llm&r 
Orbi ter in an Earth-return trajectory around the tar side of 
the )bon. This constitutes the basis ot a contingency plan, 
should the Orbiter bave failed to go into orbit around the 
Ii:»on. During the fly-by the Orbiter could have taken useful 
photographs of the far side- of the Moon. Upon return to the 
Earth the spacecraft would bum its remaining propellent to 
deboost into Earth orbit for readout of the data. 
C8mbel.l, Malcolm J. ; Brian T. O'Leary; and Carl Sagan. "Moon: Two Bew 
Mascon Basins," Science, Vol. 164 (June 13, 1969), pp. 1273-
1275· 
In studying existing spherical harmonic expansions of the 
)bon's gravitational. potential and the difference among the 
llm&r principal moments of inertia, the authors found two 
large gravitational. anomalies not associated with those of 
Muller and Sjogren. One on the east 11mb of the )bon near 
Mare Marginis appears to be associated with a large circu-
lar basin, 900 kilometers in diameter; centered at 91 de-
grees east, 25 degrees north, with !ere Margin1s tilling in 
the southwest corner. 
On the far Side, Lunar Orbiter photos disclose that 
the authors feel. is an enormous circular basin now very 
heavily eroded. The basin is 1,000 kilometers in diameter, 
centered at·173 degrees east, 11 degrees north. They pro-
po~ that this be called Occultum (H1ddell Basin). 
Cameron, Winifred S. "An Interpretation of ScbrOter's Valley- and Other 
Lunar Sinuous Rilles," Journal. of GeophySical Research, Vol. 
69 (June 15, 1964 ),pp. 2423-2430. 
Various theories exist about the origin of lunar sinuous 
rilles such as Schroter's Valley. The mecban1sm producing 
them can be categorized under aqueous eroSion, faulting, and 
subsidence. Each of these does not stand the intensive in-
vestigations of the rilles' topograp~. Aqueous erosion is 
the least tenable of all the mechanisms because it necessi-
tates the presence of very high vapor pressures for any 
liquid at lunar surface temperatures. Observable evidence 
speaks against faulting as the DBjor mechaniSlll caUSing rilles. 
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Igneous processes suggest another mechM1.,but outflow of 
lava creates a raised feature, not a depression. Yet one 
proces8 could explain their fo~tion: DUeeS ardentea, or 
fluidized outflovs of gas-d.ust m1xtures. The presence ot 
sinuous rilles. in the vicinity of craters whose formation 
seems to be volcanic strongly suggests a relationship sup-
portiDg this mech&n1sm as the process by vh1ch these sur-
face features have been formed. 
cameron, Winifred S.; Paul D. Lovan, Jr.; aDd John A. O'Keefe. "Lunar 
Ring Dikes :from Lunar Orbiter I," Science, Vol. 155 (Janu-
ary 6, 1967), pp. 77-79. 
Lunar Orbiter I photographs reveal portions of the Flam-
steed Ring near the Surveyor I site. The convex body re-
sembling a flow of viscous lava located near Apollo larlding 
site A 9.2 at 2 degrees south latitude, 43 degrees west 
longi tude bas pa.rt~ invaded nine craters in the area. 
This suggests that the flow _ter1al is younger than the 
mare _terlal.. The investigators conclude that these topo-
graphic features indicate the presence ot extruded inter-
mediate lavas of acidic composition. Such lavas are more 
viscous than basic lavas. The investigators :further con-
clude that the Flamsteed Ring is not the result ot basaltic 
flows despite lower gravity on the )bon. These· conclu-
sions are preliminary. 
Conel, J. E., and G. B. Holstrom. "Lunar Mascons: A Near-Sur:faee Inter-
pretation," Science, Vol. 162. (December 20, 1968~ pp. l1Jo3-
l1to4. 
The work of these two men shows that near-surface slab-
like DDdels produce anomalies of the _gnitude observed 
trom tracking data of the Wnar Orbiters. The authors as-
sume that maria fill can be represented by a thin circular 
disk of dense rock at the lunar surface, imbedded in less 
dense material. SubDare and adjacent rim mterial has either 
lower density because this has been breciated and pulverized 
by impact, or is a h1gh~ensity _terial if brought to the 
impact site by an ilIIpacting body. 
Elston, Donald P. Character and Geologic Babi tat of Potential Deposits 
of water, carbon, and Rare Gases on the It>on. United States 
Geological Survey Interagency Report: Astrogeology 6, May 
1968. 
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This report concerns geological. characteristics of the 
Moon, general composition, lunar geological processes, and 
cratering by possible cometary DBterials. Lunar Orbiter V 
photographs are used in the analysis of the craters Messier 
and Messier A. 
Elston, Donald P., and Charles R. Willingham. !ive-day Mission Plan to 
Investigate the Geology of the Marius Hills Region of the 
Moon. United States Geological. Survey Interagency Report: 
AstrOgeology 14, April 1969. 
. . 
Lunar Orbiter V photographs H-216 and H-217 of the Mn-ius 
Hills constitute the basis for a geological survey which a 
manned roving vehicle could conduct during a five-day period 
on the lunar surface. Included in this report are two lAr~ 
geological. maps with scales of 1:200,000 and 1:25,000 re-
spective~. 
Fielder, G., and J. E. Guest. "Lunar Ring structures and the Bature of 
the leria," Planetary Space Science, Vol. 16 (May 1968), pp. 
665-673. 
A new interpretation of lunar ring structures is the re-
sult of ana~sis of data from Lunar Orbiter and Surveyor. 
Instead of accepting the bypothesis that "elementary" rings 
represent old, partial.ly filled craters, the authors posit 
the hypothesis that they are recent volcanic structures. 
Elementary ring structures occur most:b" on flat, smoth 
floors of maria. They consist of luna.ritic materials in 
hUls or wrinkle ridges of both, The rings approximate cir-
cles or polygons and parts o"t them coincide in direction 
With local tectonic patterns. The rings are generaJ.ly in-
cOlllplete. The authors do not claim that all incomplete rings 
on the Maon have the same origins or are of the same type. 
Filice, Alan L. "Lunar Surf'a.ce Strength Estimate from Orbi 1ier II Photo-
graph," Science, Vol. 156, (June 16, 1967), pp. 1486-1487. 
A Lunar Orbiter II photograph of an area in western Mare 
Tranquilli tatis shows a boulder track down the wall o"t the 
crater Sabine D. Assuming a spherical bould~r of r • 6.5 
meters and a denSity of 3.0 graas/cent:1JDeter', ~ the 
surface bearing strength is equal to 4 times 10 dyne/cen-
t1meter2 at a depth of 75 centimeters. This preliminary 
measurement is significant because it can be used as a lower 
l:lmi t of bearing strength over & length of 650 meters versus 
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the footpad-sized measurement of a landed spacecraft. !I!le 
area of this measurement is also significant because it is 
a potential landing site for Apollo. 
Firsoff, V. Axel. "water Within and Upon the lobon," mew SCientist, Vol. 
37 (March 7, 1968),pp. 528-530. 
Firsoff discusses the implications of Lunar Orbiter pho-
tography in relation to two _in theories about the forma-
tion of ll1Il8.r surface features: water and volcanic/meteoric. 
The existence of sinuous rilles, of long valleys and evi-
dences of "aprons" to the west and southwest of TSiolkovsky 
suggest water action in various forms from high-pressure 
sUbl1DBtion to ash-covered g1&ciers. ~ formations could 
not have resulted from lava flows as understood by known 
behavioral characteristics of such flows on Earth. Under 
conditions on the lobon lava cannot travel far. Water, how-
ever, when escaping to the surf'ace under extreme pressure 
from Wi thin, could cause explosions and craters to form. 
Moreover, if one assumes that Orientale was formed in an as-
troidaJ. impact event, then this would have released au:f'fi~ 
cient gases and water trapped within to have formed a tempo-
rary lunar atmosphere. The impact would have triggered far-
reaching processes and initiated prolonged volcanic activity 
whose effects would have affected the entire lunar surtace. 
Fulmer, Charles V., and wayne A. Roberts. "Sur1'ace Lineaments Displayed 
on Lunar Orbiter Pictures," Icarus, Vol. 7 (November 19(7), 
pp. 394-406. 
Lunar Orbiter photograpby reveals closely spaced parallel 
lineament sets in such areas as the craters Gufuart, Maske-
l.yne F, Gambart C, Kepler, and Copernicus, and also in Oceanus 
Procella.rum and in Martus. These _1' be surface expressions 
of underlying faults or fractures. It is Dot certain it 
these lineament sets were restricted in fo:nation to a single 
time spaa. Lineament sets parallel to po~goD&l sides or 
rayed and unrayed craters suggest the presence of a precra-
ter parallel Joint system. These surface lineaments Jay have 
been produced by Earth tidal forces. This would indicate 
that the)(oonls surface is aad has· been a working unit through 
much 01' lUDar history. 
Gambell, BeU, and Burbal K. Lucch1tta. A L1m1tation of First Generation 
Lunar Orbiter Regatives as APRlied to PhotocliDoJletry. United 
states Geological Survey Interagency Report: Astrogeology 11, c 
Boveaber 1968. 
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Thi8 report describe. tests coDducted to detena1ne the 
usefUlness of Lunar Orbiter photographic negatives 1D de-
t&nI1n1ng slopes on the Moon' s surtaee. RImdaa tests were 
conducted to define the reliab1llty of fila density meas-
ured against the gray scale. Results show tbat negatives 
vi th density read 1 ngs higher than step nine of the gray 
scale give erroneous slope measurements. 
Gilvarr.y, J. J. "Nature of the Lunar )Bscons," Nature, Vol. 221 (Febru-
ary 22, 1969), pp. 732-736. 
Gilvarry posits the theory that positive and negative JIBS-
cons have been caused by a series of events after the initial 
formtion of the Moon: The lunar seas constitute the oldest 
exposed areas of the surface. Their presence and the exist-
ence of positive and negative gravitational anomalies in ir-
regular lIBria rule out the law. mechaniSll fo:r-.tion theory 
and support the theory of a lunar qdrosphere at some t1me 
after the Moon's formtion. Experiments With various soil 
types under conditions involving s1m:ulated lunar hydrosphere, 
atmosphere, and vacuua conditions otter explanations for the 
nature of lIBria 118ter1als, the former existence of surtac* 
water acting as a transport mechanism f'or these _terials, 
and the differing isostati-c conditions between -.ria and high-
land areas. Begative DBscons would have resulted when over-
lying water flowed to lower areas or escaped into space. The 
geographical location of negative _scons supports this sup-
position. water, in turn, carried deposits down to the great 
circular maria whose depths, produced by meteoric 1mpacts, 
accepted greater sedimentation and, therefore, increased DBSS 
concentrations. 
Guest, J. E., and J. B. MurraY. "Bature and Origin of TSiolkovsky Crater, 
Lunar Farside," Planetary ~e Science, _ Vol. 17, pp. 121-14l. 
Oxf'ord: Pergammon Press, 19 9. 
The authors discuss the formation of the Tsiolkovsky cra-
ter on the tarside of the Moon. They base their observations 
on data tram Lunar Orbiter III :high- and medium-resolution 
frames Bo. 121. Tsiolkovsky is a landmark on the far side, a 
young, distinct, and very large crater in an area saturated 
with craters. The authors discuss the probable origins of 
TSiolkovsky in relation to: 1) the distribution of craters 
around it, 2) the nature and shape of its ra, 3) radial 
gouges and crater chains, and 4) the presence of an apparent 
ejecta blanket. They conclude that Tsiolkovsky formed as a 
result of an impacting astroidal body or a giant volcanic ex-
ploSion, and they prefer the former hypotheSiS to the latter. 
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Gurtler, Charles A., and Ga17 W. Grew. IlMicrolleteoroid Hazard near )t)on," 
Science, Vol. 161 (August 2, 1968), pp. 462-464. 
All five Lunar Orbiters flew m1crometeoroid flux experi-
ments to test the frequency of Ilicrometeoroid hits in the 
lunar enviromaent.. The only other spacecraft which had at-
tempted to do this vas the SoTiet Luna 10. This spacecraft 
bad registered particle impacts exceeding by two orders of 
_gni tude the average of interplanetary space. The Lunar 
Orbiter experiments had a conf'iguration which detracted from 
DBJd.mum exposure to the lunar environment. Test material 
on board each spacecraft consisted of pressurized. beryllium 
copper detectors covering an area. of 0.282 square meters, of 
which only 0.186 square meters vas effectively exposed. OVer 
a one year period five Orbiters recorded. a total of 22 hits 
or one-half the record registered in Earth orbit by Ex;Plorers 
16 and 23, using the same kind of detectors. The investiga-
tors caution that these data are too tentative to fora a gen-
eral theory about micrometeoroid flux near the Moon. 
Hartme.nn, W. K. "Lunar Basins, Lunar Lineaments, and the Moon's Far Side," 
Sky and Telescope, Vol. 32 (September 1966), pp. 128-131. 
lJartDBrm bas examined rectified pictures from the Russian 
Zond III of portions of the )bon' s far side and of Orientale 
Basin. Be discusses the significance of the pict;ures in 
theories concerning the formation of lunar basins and the 
J8l'ia. Of special interest ia Orientale which involves a 
whole system of craters, crater chains, concentric mountain 
rings and scarps including the Rook and CQrdillera mountains. 
Photographic data is still too scarce to determine wbat role, 
if any, volcaniBJll, tectonic activity, and ejected rubble 
played in modifying ancient continental uplands. 
Hixon, S. B. "Topography and Geologj,c Aspects of a Far-Side Lunar Cra-
ter," Science, Vol. 159 (January 26, 1968 ), __ pp. 420-421. 
This brief article describes a flOW-like surface feature 
in a tarside crater some 70 kilometers south of Tsiolkovsky. 
Initial analysis of Lunar Orbiter photography indicates that 
the flow bas a thickness of at least 20 meters at a point 
about 4 kilometers east of G in the super~sed schematic 
on the photograph. '.rhe author rules out the possiblli ties 
of it being a mudflow or an air-cushioned landslide because 
of vacuum conditions. Be suggests tbat it is considerably 
more like an ash-flow tuff. 
Hughes, J. I:enricit, and David E. :Bowker. Lunar Orbiter Photographic Atlas 
of the Moon. National Aeronautics and Space Adiliinistration, 
NASA SP-206, 1971. 
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A selection of ppotographs giving complete coverage of the 
Moon, front and back, and referenced to the surface by index map 
;, '-
Hunt, Graham R.; John W. Salisbury; and Robert K. Vincent. "Lunar Eclipse 
Infrared IDages and an AnoDlBJ.y of Possible Internal. Origin," 
Science, Vol. 162 (October 11, 1968),p. 252. 
The authors conducted infrared studies of the Moon in 
eclipse on April 13, 1968, and their observations were the 
first to confirm the thermal anomalies observed by Saari 
and Shorthi11 in December 1964. They conclude tba t because 
the hundreds of anomalies have remained unchanged in 3.5 
years, they are not the result of ephemeral activity on the 
lunar surface. They detected a linear 1;hermal. anolllBl.y at 
the western ed8e of Mare Humorum which, unlike prominent 
crater anomalies, is warmer than its surroundings before 
sunset. It remains warmer after sunset. Lunar Orbiter IV 
photography of Mare Humorum, at a ground resolution of 54 
meters, shows no unusual surface structm-es which would sup-
port the belief that the anomaly is caused by low .thermal .. 
inertia material. The more probable cause is an internal 
heat source because 1) heat flow to the surface would make 
an area warmer than its surroundings during lunar a:fternoon, 
and 2) the geological pOSition of the anomal.y supports this. 
Karlstrom, T. N. V.; J. F. McCauley; and G. A. Swann. Prel1mi nary Lunar 
Exploration Plan of the Marius Hills Region of the )bon. 
United States Geological Survey In"~ragency Report: Astro-
geology 5, February 1968. 
The scientific objectives, operational guidelines and sur-
face exploration constraints of a five-day mission of the 
Marius Hills constitute the subject of this report. LuDar 
Orbiter V photographs of this :region have been used in COD-
structing preliminary geological maps and descriptions of 
the traverses which astronauts could perform in a lunar 
rortng vehicle. 
Kosofsky, lA!on J. "Topograpby from Lunar Orbiter Photos," Photogr8!!llletric 
Engineering, Vol. XXXII, No. 2 (March 1966~ p. 2TT. 
The author discusses in detail the Lunar Orbiter photo-
graphic Ilission. ADDng its DBjor tasks the Orbiter space-
craft is designed to obtain use:f'ul. 'topographical data of the 
lunar surface for the Apollo Program. Special methods of 
photometric data reduction must be applied to L\m&r Orbiter 
photography because of the peculiar characteristics of re-
flectivit.y of the lunar surtace. Preflight calibrations 
will be necessary to compensate for &D;Ydistortions in high-
resolution photograpby due to the !bon's surface character-
istics and the tact that tile film Will not be returned to Earth. 
401 
JlI. ( /. iI., 
"'"-
J(osofsky, Leon J., and Farouk El- Baz. The Moon as Viewed by Lunar Or-
biter. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
NASA SP-200, 1970. 
A selected compilation of photographs tQat illustra~e the 
heterogeneous nature of the lunar surface, including four 
stereographic views in color and accompanied by index maps. 
Many features are similar to features or~ Earth; others have 
no Earth counterpart. Also included are photographic guide-
posts for planning manned exploration of the surface. 
Lamar, D. L., and Jeannine McGann. "Shape and Internal Structure of the 
Moon, II Icarus, Vol. 5 (1966), pp. 10-23. 
The authors offer a summary of the various theories on 
the origins of the Moon and its shape and internal compo-
si tion. They point out that no theory has explained the 
nature of the Moonls core nor the distribution of the den-
sity of subsurface material. They do not suggest the pres-
ence of mass concentrations (Mascons) on the Moon. 
Ian8r, Donald L., and Jeannine V. McGann-Lamar. "Shape and Internal 
Structure of the !bon, from Lunar Orbiter Data. II Earth 
Science Research Corp., Final. Report, NASA Contract NSR 
05-264-002, November 1968. 
The report points out that there is a difference be-
tween the Moon 1 s center of figure or volume and the center 
of its mass. There appears to be a systematic excess of 
elevation of continental areas over maria, relative to the 
loben 1 s center of _ss. A comparison of the mascons with 
the lunar map indicates excess masses are c~)ncentrated 
wi thin the imler rings of the Imbrium and Hectare Basins. 
If II&scons are assumed to be masses of nickel-iron, then 
they correspond to a layer about l2 kilometers thick. Iso-
static models of the Moon also fit the data, but Lunar Or-
biter data does not sufficiently resolve which model. 
Liebelt, Paul B. "The Flight Path Cont)l Software System of the Lunar 
Orbiter," a paper presentee.. at the International Astro-
nautical Federation, seventeenth International Astronautical 
Congress, Madrid, Spain, October 9-15, 1966. 
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Ranger and )Briner software programs were found to be in-
adequate for Lunar Orbiter. Thus the Lunar Orbiter Program 
developed new concepi;;s for flight control and the necessary 
software to implement thea. Among other things the. opt1ll1-
zation ot the Il1dcourse aa point and the orbit injection 
point beca. a necessary and practical procedure. A mean 
element traje: ':tory program was developed to~cil1 tate or-
bital transtt;;:.1J by' greatly reducing· computa· :.>n times to a 
few minutes rather than hours as was necesSt.j;."'Y under tbe spe-
cial perturbation anal.ysis approach. 
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Lingenfelter, Richard E.; stanton J. Peale; Gerald SchUbert. ¥~Distribution 
of Sinuo'll8 Rilles and water on the loi:>on," Nature, Vol.. 220 
(DeceIriber 21, 1968), pp. J222-1225. -
The aut:aors preSeI1'li a defense of' the theory of W8."I;er on 
the loi:>on as the major cause of sinuous ril.l.es. Their analy-
sis is based upon da;;a from Lunar Orbiter IV photography 
and upon Urey's hypothesis of a lunar atmosphere existing 
at one tiDe in the past. 'l'hey point out that volcanic ash 
floYs, as sugges'ted by Gold, cannot explain the length and 
meandering of many rilles. Nor can faulting. Holt--ever, water 
flow under a ~er of surface ice offers a viable explana-
tion. ltk>reover, certain events could have caused outgassing 
of major volatiles ~O and CO. Major meteor impacts would 
have released trappea volatil~s and could have led to a tem-
porary atmosphere. They conclude that the distribution of 
sinuous rilles is the only available, unambiguous indicator 
of location of subsurface volatiles. 
Lingenfelter, R. E.; S. J. Peale; and G. Schubert. "Lunar Rivers," Science, 
Vol.. 161 (July 19, 1968), pp. 266-269. 
L\lIl8.r Orbiter photo~phs show sinuous rilles resembling 
meandrous channels of terrestrial streams. Thirty of 
these are visible from :Earth. L\lIl8.r Orbiter revealed sig-
nificant new fea'liures in the sma.ller mean~s cbannels in-
side the larger rilles. The authors biYP<>thesize that the 
rilles are fea'CUreS caused by water erosion in the form of 
ice-covered rivers whose source is subsurface water released 
through tne impacts of meteors. 
Lipskii, I. N. "fund 3 Photographs of the lOOOn's Fars1de, II Sky and Tele-
~, Vol.. 30 (December 1965), pp. 338-341. 
The author describes the achievements of Luna III in 1959 
and compares them with those of the Zond III mission in 1965 
The latter confirms the data of the former concerning the 
lunar far sid6: it is more heavily cratered than the front 
side. On the whole the craters exhibit similar features to 
those on the front side. Crater chains also exist on the far 
side but are much longer, in some cases 1,500 kilometers. 
Numerous ring-shaped concavities called thalassoids also can 
be seen in Zond III pictures. In size and shape they cOJ]!.-
pare to maria. No such thalassoids are present on the front 
side. Lipskii concludes that available data show the Moon's 
surface to be continental with maria resulting from endogenic 
depressions being filled with lava. 
MacDonald, Gordon J. F. "Interior of the Moon, II Science, Vol.. 133 (April 
7, 1961), pp. 1045-1050. . 
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MacDonald discusses the several modern theories con-
cerning the nature and composition of the Ibon' s interior. 
He states that even a chem1caJ.J.y homgeneous ltbon would 
undergo discontinuities in the structure of subsurface 
material. SUrface features and the lack of evidence of 
major faulting imp~ a constant volume of the Moon. Little 
conclusive evidence exists to prove or disprove current 
hypotheses. The author suggested a lUnar orbiter 
spacecraft circling the )bon could be tracked and that this 
would provide data on the !bon's gravitational field, its 
mean moment of inertia, and other fundamental data which 
'WOuld reveal more about the nature of the Earth's natural 
satellite. 
Mayo, Alton P. "Orbit Determination for Lunar Orbiter," Journal of 
§Pacecraft and Rockets, Vol. 5 (April 1968), p. 395. 
This report covers the results of orbit determination 
programs in the first four Orbiter missions. Orbit deter-
mination proved to be very accura.te and. precise with toler-
able deviations from planned parameters. Some deviations 
between planned and executed mid course , deboost, and orbit 
maneuvers resulted from oscillation in Doppler reSiduals, 
especially in low photographic orbits. Uncertainty of lu-
nar gravitational constraints make orbital statistics not 
entirely valid. One accomplishment of the program 'WaS the 
improvement of orbit determination as a result of predicted 
photo-location by real-time and postflight orbit determina-
tion. On the Lunar Orbiter In mission the difference be-
tween the two factors 'WaS about 5 kilometers and considerably 
worse for certain sites in the first two missions. 
Mccauley, John F. "Geologic Results From the Lunar Precursor Probes," 
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a paper presented at the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Ameri-
can Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, October 1967. 
A1AA Paper No. 67-862. 
The author points out that the Lunar Orbiter Program 'Was 
by far the most productive of the precursor probes in terms 
of total amount Of information received and the nature of 
that information in certain areas vital to further explora-
tion. The author discusses several of the most significant 
topographical features which Lunar Orbiter photographed and 
concludes that the photographic data greatly help in identi-
fYing morphological classes of these features. 
.~ ~ 
Michael, William H., Jr., and Robert H. Tolson. "The Lunar Orbiter Proj-
ect Selenodesy Experiment," a paper presented at the Second 
International Symposium on The Use of Artificial Satellites 
for Geodesy, Athens, Greece, April 27-May 1, 1965. NASA/lang-
ley Research Center. 
The authors summarize the mission of Lunar Orbiter and 
concentrate upon its usefulness in the more refined deter-
mination of the lunar gravitational field and the MOon's shape 
and mass. They briefly review the existing knowledge on these 
subjects and then describe in detail various technical ap-
proaches to the problem of determining spacecraft orbital 
parameters and what they will show about the Moon. 
Michael, William H.; Robert H. Tolson; and John P. Gapcynski. "Lunar Or-
biter: Tracking Data Indicate Properties of the Moon's Gravi-
tational Field," Science, Vol. 153 (September 2, 1966), pp. 
1102-1103. 
The authors have drawn preliminary conclusions about the 
significance of the orbital behavior of Lunar Orbiter I based 
upon early tracking data. Their priDary task was the estab-
lishment of a rough estimate about the MOon's gravitational 
field from lOOre extensive data from the other four Lunar Or-
biter missions. Preliminary results of their investigation 
show that orbital variations during periods of photography did 
not degrade the quality of photographs. Tracking data used 
in this analysis were two-way Doppler data providing a measure 
of relative velocity of the ~cecraft and the NASA Deep Space 
Network stations in California, Spain, and Australia. 
Mulholland, J. Derral, and William L. Sjogren. "Lunar Orbiter Ranging 
Data: Initial Results, II Science, Vol. 155 (December 9, 1966), 
p. 74. 
The investigators have used ranging residuals data from 
the first two Orbiter missions to test corrections in the 
lunar ephemeris. lobst residuals were reduced to less tban 
100 meters. Preliminary ephemeriS tapes at the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory were used to analyze raw data. Tracking data from 
the Deep Space Network stations enabled the investigators to 
refine the mathematical calculations. Variations in ranging 
residuals from the three stations verify unusual Doppler re-
siduals obtained near pericenter passage of Lunar Orbiter I. 
These were not attributed to onboard system, anomalies and ap-
peared to be real and. to show that the ~cecraft bad an ano-
malous motion of 60 meters near pericenter. 
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Muller, Paul M., and William L. Sjogren. Consistency of Lunar Orbiter 
Residuals with Trajectory and Local Gran t~ Eftects. JPL 
Technical Report 32-1307, September 1, l' » 
Tne authors have analyzed the results ot Earth-based co-
herent two-way radio Doppler data trom the Lunar Orbiters. 
Tney tound the residuals' consistency to be too high. This 
could be caused by: 1) forces such as gravity, solar pres-
sure, gas Jets; 2) errors in tracking data; and 3) software 
problems in the computer. They then utilized higher bar-
D:>nics models of the Moon, and the residuals reducei, reach-
ing agreement between separated tlight on the same trajectory. 
Muller, Paul M., and William L. Sjogren. I1Mascons: Lunar Mass Concentra-
tions," Science, Vol. 161 (August 16, 1968), pp. 680-684. 
The authors have cons·cructed a gravipo·l;ential map ot the 
near side of'the Moon based upon orbital accelerations ot 
the Lunar Orbiter spacecraft. These show gravitational ano-
malies termed "mascons" beneath the lunar surface in all f'ive 
ot the ringed maria. This suggests a correlation between 
mass anomalies and the ringed maria. Conclusions are tenta-
tive. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Lunar Orbiter I Pre-
liminary Results. NASA report SP-197, 1969. 
A brief description ot the Lunar Orbiter Pro~'S his-
tory, this report describes the spacecraft, its mission, and 
what the tirst Lunar Orbiter accomplished. 
No:rJW.n, Paul E. 'iout-ot-This-World Photogra.mmetry ~.i Photogrammetric En-
gineering, Vol. XXXV, No. 7 (July 1969h pp. 693-700. 
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No:nIWl diSCUS6eS the Apollo requirements for carGographic 
and topographic data on the lunar surface, tlle lanQ1ng sites, 
and their approaches. Photogrammetry plays a DanQatory role 
in determining accurate coordinates f'or landing sites am 
reference marks called landing-site landmarks. Lunar Orbiter 
photographic data has provided the only applicable source 
f'or making large-scale maps ot the Apollo landing zone. How 
this is done constitutes the subject ot the article. The 
author concludes that Lunar Orbiter successtully demonstrated 
the potential ot surveying and mapping the MOon or a planet 
trom space. 
A , 
Oberbeck, Verne R., and William L. Quaide. "Estiated Thickness of a 
)'ragmental Surface Layer of Oceanus Procellarum," Journal. 
of Geophysical Research, Vol. 72 (September 15, 19671 p. 469. 
Analyses of Lunar Orbiter I photographs of Oceanus Pro-
c~llarum shoWing craters of varying morphology indicate a 
correlation between crater si2\e and crater shape as a re-
sul t of meteorite impact against a surface consisting of 
fragmental mterial of varying thicknesses overlying cohe-
sive substrata. The analySis of these data indicate that 
85~ of the area. considered bas surface thickness between 5 
and 15 meters. Photographs from Luna 9 and Surveyor I sup-
port this indication. Moreover, formation of new ronk sur-
faces aP!)e&rs to bave occurred intermittently, leading to a 
complex stratigraphic sequence of alternating hard and frag-
mented rock. The existence of concentric craters substanti-
ates this seg,uence. 
Oberbeck, Verne R., and William L. Qus,ide. "Genetic Implications of Lu-
nar Regolith Thickness Variations," Icarus, Vol. 9 (1968), 
pp. 446-465. 
The distribution of the l~r regolith thickness for 
twelve areas on the lobon has been determined using high-reso-
lution photographs from Lunar Orbiter II, III, and V. All 
but one area lie within ten degrees of the equator. -The ex-
ception is in M:t.re Imbrium. The article compares lunar cra-
ter geometry With laboratory craters. Results show that the 
regolith thickness varied from 3.3 meters in the southern 
portion of Oceanus Procellarum to 16 meters in the crater 
Hipparchua. The report also discusses the delineation of 
flow fronts and the discovery of many linear markings on the 
pr.esumed flows. These lineaments may be crater chains of a 
collapsed or drainage origin. Still other lineaments ~ be 
lava channels. The authors conclude that the thickness of 
the regolith is a function of crater denSity. Over time im-
pacting bodies break down the lunar surface and create the 
regolith which is the result of impact fragmentation. 
Pohn, H. A., and T. W. Offield. Lunar Crater }.brphology and Relative Age 
Determination of Lunar Geological Units. United states Geo-
logical Survey Interagency Report: Astrogeology 13, January 
1969. 
This report describes a system for determining the rela-
tive age of craters on the lunar surface by using as a basis 
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their major topographical. components. From this the authors 
have constructed a prel1m.1nary B:>rphological. continuum which 
they use to classify craters over the entire surface of the 
Noon. Lunar Orbi ter photograp~ was instrumental. in provid-
ing them with reliable data. 
Rindfleisch, Thomas. "Photometric Method for Lunar Orbiter," Photogram-
metric Engineering, Vol. XXXII (March 1966), p. 262. 
The photometric method for deriving surface elevations 
from a single picture of the lunar surf&ce in the absence 
of stereoscopic pictures is described. The author uses 
Ranger photographs as subjects and concludes tbat a deriva-
tion of quantitative topographic information about an ob-
ject scene is possible. At best the resulting data are in-
direct, and estimation of errors seems unrealistic by-analyti-
cal means. lobreover, calculations show tbat it is wrong to 
assume uniform albedo for large areas. 
ROZeJl8, Wesley. The Use of Spectral Analysis in Describing Lunar Surf&ce 
Rougbness. Uni ted States Geological Survey Interagency Re-
port: Astrogeology 12, December 1968. 
Photography from Lunar Orbiter In, a topographic map 
of the Surveyor III landing site, and photographs from !!!!-
gers VIII and IX are utilized in applications of the power 
spectral density (PSD) function to determine relative rough-
ness of different types of lunar terrain. SUch information 
would be valuable in the construction and operation of a lu-
nar rOving vehicle. 
Scherer, Lee R. "The First Four Lunar Orbiter PhotographiC MiSSions," a 
paper presented to the Committee on Space Research, London, 
England, J~ 1967. 
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Scherer describes the Lunar Orbiter spacecraft as a plat-
form designed to carry a camera system which can take high-
and medium-resolution photographs of the Moon's surface. The 
spacecraft bas four objectives: 1) obtain photography of 
wide areas of the M::>on to certify Apollo and Surveyor landing 
Sites, 2) define gravitational field of the lobon through 1'8 ... 
fined tracking of the spacecraft, 3) measure micrometeoroid 
and radiation flux during extended lifetime of ~ecraft, 
and 4) provide a spacecraft for equipment checkout and per-
sonnel training of the Apollo tracking network. 
A , 
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stipe, J. Gordon. "Iron Meteorites as Mascons," Science, Vol. 162 (De-
cember 20, 1968 ~ pp. 1402-1403. 
The author bases his interpretation on studies of impacts of 
steel projectiles into concrete and soila and then makes 
large extrapolations upward in size. On the Moon an impact-
ing body must penetrate below the surface to a depth of 290 
kilometers before pressure can be released sufficient to melt 
material. His results suggest that lava-filled maria formed 
when large iron objects struck the lunar surface at a velo-
ci ty so low that there was no immediate fracture of the ob-
ject. The impact produced a large crater and material 
flowed to the surface to fill the crater. Each mare was 
formed by one large iron object impacting, and the remnants 
of this dense object under the lI8re are the maacon. 
Swann, G. A. Lunar Geological Field Investigations. United states Geo-
logical Survey Interagency Report: Astrogeology 9, August 
1968. 
Swann describes how investisation of the MOon's surface 
can test the hypotheses based upon terrestrial observations 
of the geological history of the Earth in an effort to de-
termine the origins of both bodies. ~ Apollo 8.1stem con-
stitutes the basic capability with which such extended lu-
nar exploration can be carried out. 
Trask, N. J., and L. C. Rowan. "Lunar Orbiter Photo~phs: Some Funda-
mental Observations," Science, Vol. 158 (December 22, 1967), 
pp. 1529-1535· 
The first three Lunar Orbiter spacecraft photographed PJf, 
(600,000 square kilometers) of the near side of the Moon. 
High-resolution photographs show that the surface is dotted 
with a great number of small, perfectly circular craters 
from 50 meters diameter down to the limit of resolution. 
The majority of these are cup-shaped with distinctly sharp 
rims. But many al.so have shallow interiors8.nd indistinct 
rims. The authors conclude that these craters were formed 
by primary and secondary impacts. Fresh craters are those 
Which have material on the exterior slopes which is distinctly 
different from adjacent material. of the inter-crater areas. 
These young craters al.so tend to have a profusion of angular 
blocks on the floors and exterior slopes. The albedo of these 
blocks and other ejecta material is relatively high. The num-
ber of fresh craters is much less than the number of craters 
not exhibiting these features. 
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Tyler, G. L., et al. "Bistatic-Radar Detection of Lunar Scattering Cen-
ters with Lunar Orbiter I," Science, Vol. 157 (July 14, 1967), 
pp. 193-195. 
Lunar Orbiter I bounced continuous-wve signals off of 
the }.bon's surface, and these were received on Earth. Using 
the frequency spectrum and studying Doppler shifts, the in-
vestigators located discrete, heterogeneous scattering cen-
ters on the luna.r surface. Shadowing, especially wi thin five 
degrees of the tenrlnator would effectively "hide" some scat-
tering centers. On the other hand variations in surface re-
flectivity provide a model which will explain the observations. 
This could mean that material in scattering areas is con-
siderably more compact or different from mterial in surround-
ing areas. The use of continuous-wave bistatic radar appears 
to offer a new method for mapping and study of lunar and plan-
etary surface s. 
Ulrich, G. E. Advanced Systems Traverse Research Project Report with a 
Section on Problems for Geologic Investisations of the Ori-
entale Region of the Moon by R. S. Saunders. United States 
Geological Survey Interagency Report: Astrogeology 7. 
This two-part report discusses some of the problems in-
herent in an extended lunar surface mission in the Orientale 
region and the scientific pOints of interest which such a 
mission might best help to explore. Lunar Orbiter photography 
played a significant role in the preparation of this report. 
The authors discuss various arguments about the origins of 
Orientale and the geological features which would be most Sig-
nificant in a surface investigation. 
Urey, Harold C. "Mascons and the History of the ~on," Science, Vol. 162 
O;lecember 20, 1968), pp. 1408-1410. 
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The )bon bas a viscosity higher than that of Earth by a 
factor of 104• !oBscons represent a non-isostatic condition 
in the surface of the M:>on. Apparently an object collided 
with the Moon's surface, flattened out and left high-density 
DBterlal tbat has remained since the lIBra were formed. lava 
flows cannot account for what is observed on the )bon. Maria 
areas on the )b)n are not lava flows, and no liquid masses 
exist below the )bon. Thus large objects collided with the 
)b)n in its early history. These objects should be similar 
to meteorites in composition and denSity. F1~, the ltbon 
bas sufficient rigidity to support these masses. 
.t ,. 
Urey, Harold C. "Water on the Moon," Nature, Vol. 216 (December 16, 1961), 
pp. 1094-1095. 
Urey summarizes several arguments asainst the presence 
of water on the )bon, and then he presents his own detailed 
argument, based upon his knowledge and new data from Lunar 
Orbiter photographs, in support of the presence of water on 
the Mlon. The existence of rilles and of such landmarks as 
Schr6ter's Valley, the irregularities of the crater Krieger 
north of Aristarchus, and the knowledge of terrestrial geo-
lOgical processes causing pingos in areas of permafrost strong-
ly support the theory that water has existed on the Moon and 
bas caused various lunar surface fornations. Urey defends 
the view that water, not lava or dust-sas mixtures, formed 
the maria and that these may yet be frozen seas. However, he 
concludes that this in no way defines the composition of the 
solid materials in the maria. 
u.s. Army Topographic Command. Final Report to National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration: Co.nvergent Stereo Analysis. 
Washington, D.C.: June 1969. 
This report, done under contract to NASA, explains the 
usefulness of stereoscopic photography transmitted to Earth 
by Lunar Orbiters II, III, and Y in mapping the )k)on. Higll-
resolution stereo photographs include coverage otherwise un-
obtainable from a vertical IlDde. Moreover, the exaggerated 
height effects in convergent stereo photography should in-
crease the accuracy in the determination of ground point ele-
vations. The report discusses the problems of using existing 
computer programs and available photographic data for con-
vergent photo triangulation. It also outlines the best meth-
ods for accomplishing triangulation. Tests with Lunar Or-
biter data proved that accuracy of triangulation is increased 
by using high-resolution stereo photographs. 
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